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The goal of this thesis is to study the notion of informational privacy, and how it is 
protected both by the right to privacy and the right to data protection. The age of Big Data 
has brought with it new ways of creating and processing data, which has led to 
challenges to the way that individuals are protected from the use of that data. This thesis 
shows that a new approach is emerging in European data protection law, which is based 
on protecting informational privacy specifically instead of the existing approaches which 
have been developed so far. We attempt to study and develop this new approach, and 
propose a framework based on it and how this might handle the challenges to 
informational privacy brought about by the age of Big Data.  
  
This new approach is based on two core concepts. First, that there is a difference 
between “data” and “Information”, the second being the combination of “data” and human 
agency into a new entity, which includes not just data but also human intelligence, biases 
and imperfections. We assert that the absence of distinction between the two in EU data 
protection has led to the notion of “personal data” and “identifiability” as defined in the 
GDPR having challenges in handling data in the information age.   
  
The second core concept is what we describe as “Guarantees”. The new approach being 
developed in data protection law attempts to restrict the processing of personal data by 
implementing measures which limit what data controllers can do when processing data. 
These measures all attempt not to prevent all possibility of harmful consequences 
occurring, but only to ensure that reasonable guarantees are in place to make these 
consequences unlikely. We thus call those measures “Guarantees”, and build a 
taxonomy of such Guarantees based on Lawrence Lessig’s four modalities: legal norms, 
social norms, market forces, and architecture. 
  
As such, this thesis asserts that data protection is moving towards an approach having 
the protection of informational privacy as its core goal, protecting it through a balance 
between Information and Guarantees binding that Information. 
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Introduction 
 
A. Introduction to the Thesis Topic 
I. Greater Context: Privacy, Data Protection and 
Informational Privacy 
 
The Rights to Privacy and to Data Protection are some of the newest human rights in 
European law, protected under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union1. So new in fact, that protection of personal data as a distinct right 
has only been introduced with the European 1995 Data Protection Directive2. As data 
gathering becomes ubiquitous, control over it becomes an issue that no longer just 
matters to privacy, but to autonomy, democracy, and free speech as well3. This has led 
to a large academic body of work which has attempted to understand each right 
separately, and how they work together4. 
 
The Right to Data Protection is a young right, only a handful of decades old5. It is a right 
created to solve a specific problem - the creation of new technologies with capabilities 
that had never existed before6. The need for data protection is all the more important 
because of the arrival of the Big Data age. Big Data is the phenomenon by which various 
entities (corporations, governments, and increasingly even individuals7) have the ability 
to process a very large Volume of data, from a vast Variety of sources, with a high 
Velocity of processing8. This profound transformation in how knowledge is created and 
shared has had a similarly profound impact on what is known about individuals, and by 
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b70.html [accessed 3 May 2018] 
2 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processingTry  of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, Off. J.L. 281 (Nov. 23, 1995) ("Data Protection Directive") 
3 Sobolewski, M., Mazur, J., & Paliński, M. (2017). GDPR: A Step Towards a User-centric 
Internet?. Intereconomics, 52(4), 207-213. 
4 Burkert, H. (2000). Privacy-Data Protection, in Governance of Global Networks in the Light of 
Different Local Values, edited by Engel, C. and Keller, K. (pp 43-70). 
5 Bennett, C. (1992). Regulating privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and in the 
United States, Cornell University Press  
6 Burkert (n.4) 
7 Swan, M. (2013). The quantified self: Fundamental disruption in big data science and 
biological discovery. Big Data, 1(2), 85-99. 
8 Tene, O., & Polonetsky, J. (2012). Big data for all: Privacy and user control in the age of 
analytics. Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop., 11, xxvii. 
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whom, creating new challenges for privacy and data protection. Data protection has a 
controversial relationship, however, with the right to privacy. The newly introduced 
General Data Protection Regulation9 has carefully pruned references to privacy, but has 
not developed a fully autonomous concept of data protection, furthering the idea that the 
two rights are interwoven in a core way10. This leads to questions about the foundations 
of data protection and the notion of ‘’personal data’’. Why is protecting data important? 
What is the link between data protection and privacy? Is privacy the core interest that 
data protection is trying to protect, or are there other interests to protect? If so, how far 
can data protection stretch? Over time, some patterns started to appear11 - some 
common forces that seemed to be found in cases involving both privacy and data 
protection12. As we will show, these forces highlight the overlap of privacy and data 
protection to protect a specific interest: informational privacy. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
This thesis is concerned with these forces, and how the rights to privacy and data 
protection have been challenged by the advent of the Big Data age. The methodology of 
this work is doctrinal, studying the development of the right to privacy and data protection, 
combining an analysis of the legislation and case law surrounding privacy and data 
protection, with a particular focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, and a study 
of the literature developed around theories of privacy and data protection. Doctrinal 
research is defined as ‘’a detailed and highly technical commentary upon, and systematic 
exposition of, the context of legal doctrine13’’. 
 
The ‘’black letter law’’ methodology is the primary research strategy of this thesis, 
analysing the legal rules to understand the meanings and implications of these rules, as 
well as the principles which underpin them. Using a comparative method of various 
theories of privacy and data protection, this thesis attempts to understand the 
foundations of those rights, and how the Big Data age affects the validity and 
9 Reg (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Dir 95/46/EC (GDPR) 2016 
10 Burkert (n.4) 
11 Banisar, D., & Davies, S. (1999). Global trends in privacy protection: An international survey 
of privacy, data protection, and surveillance laws and developments. J. Marshall J. Computer & 
Info. L., 18, 1. 
12 Burkert (n.4) 
13 Salter, M. and Mason, J. (2007), Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research Pearson 31. 
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effectiveness of these theories. Using a doctrinal methodology for this work is necessary, 
since these rights are primarily based on legal instruments and cases, and the legal 
doctrines surrounding them. This means that a large part of the thesis will be devoted to 
fundamental doctrinal research, that is, to studying the underlying assumptions behind 
those rights. 
 
Apart from legal doctrinal research, this thesis looks beyond the scope of the law itself 
and analyses the historical, cultural, sociological, and especially technological factors 
which have moulded these rights. This interdisciplinary element is vital, as this thesis 
seeks to understand what factors have created the law as it is today, and the arrival of 
Big Data has been one such powerful factor. These interdisciplinary factors are 
nevertheless limited so as not to broaden the scope of the thesis beyond what is 
necessary, and to keep it firmly anchored in doctrinal research, with a critical and 
qualitative analysis of legal materials in order to support its hypothesis. 
 
III. Research Overview 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation defined personal data as ‘’any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable 
natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly’’14. According to this 
definition, the scope of the notion of personal data, and hence the scope of application 
of data protection law as such, essentially depends on how “identifiability” is construed. 
To keep pace with technological development, courts and data protection authorities 
have construed “identifiability” in an increasingly broad sense, to include any data which 
on its own is not identifiable, but may potentially be linked with other points of data in 
order to re-identify an individual15. Because ‘’identifiability’’ is based on the ‘’means likely 
to be used’’ to re-identify the data, and those ‘’means’’ keep getting more affordable and 
widespread, the notion of personal data is rapidly ballooning into a state where a huge, 
unenforceable regulatory burden weighs on every company. Additionally, it is possible 
to violate the societal interests that data protection is meant to protect without actually 
violating data protection law16. In short - the current data protection rules, though 
14 GDPR, Article 4(1) 
15 Clauβ, S., Kesdogan, D., & Kölsch, T. (2005, November). Privacy enhancing identity 
management: protection against re-identification and profiling. In Proceedings of the 2005 
workshop on Digital identity management (pp. 84-93). ACM. 
16 Schreurs, W., Hildebrandt, M., Kindt, E., & Vanfleteren, M. (2008). Cogitas, ergo sum. The 
role of data protection law and non-discrimination law in group profiling in the private sector. 
In Profiling the European citizen (pp. 241-270). Springer, Dordrecht. 
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functional in a majority of cases, are increasingly at risk of both over-regulating non-
problematic practices, while under-regulating practices that encroach upon fundamental 
rights and interests of individuals.  
 
In the Patrick Breyer v Germany case decided on the 19th of October 2016, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union was faced with the question of whether dynamic IP 
addresses were ‘’personal data’’. In that case, the CJEU took a relative approach to the 
‘’identifiability’’ criteria, which means the same piece of information can be personal or 
non-personal data, depending on who is holding it and whether they can identify the 
person using it. That goes as far as the idea that since a website operator has ‘’legal 
means’’ of obtaining access to the information held by an ISP to identify an individual, 
this is personal data. The number of factors which might make data ‘’personal’’ are so 
varied, so subjective, that it may change from day to day, from person to person17. This 
does not lend itself well to a binary approach. 
 
The starting point of this thesis is the limitations of the notion of “personal data” as defined 
by the legislation and as expanded by jurisprudence: that as shifts in technology 
increasingly change how information is created and shared, the traditional conceptual 
framework for understanding privacy and data protection is failing, and a new framework 
is taking shape in order to address the previous one’s limitations. The goal of this thesis 
is to analyse and understand these patterns, and use them to articulate this new 
conceptual framework and how it might be able to address the challenges of the 
Information Age. 
 
A possible conceptual framework is the ‘’risk-based approach’’, an approach based not 
on whether the data is personal, but on the impact on the individual if a risk manifests18. 
The risk-based approach is pushed heavily by the GDPR as a parallel system to the 
rules-based system surrounding consent, and was considered a more pragmatic, 
realistic, adaptable system19. However, it eventually became apparent that taxonomies 
of harm related to the topic were impossible to establish conclusively, principally because 
the interests that data protection seeks to cover are very broad, and the GDPR expressly 
avoids defining them, instead trying to base risk on the data and its processing itself. 
This would be a fine approach (and one which inspires the approach developed in this 
thesis), but it is held back by the fact that parallel to this ‘’data protection risk’’, guidance 
17 Schwartz, P.., and Solove, J. (2011). The PII problem: Privacy and a new concept of 
personally identifiable information. NYUL rev. 86 (2011): 1814. 
18 Maldoff, G. (2017). The risk-based approach in the GDPR: interpretation and 
implications. IAPP https://iapp. org/media/pdf/resource_center/GDPR_Study_Maldoff. pdf 
19 Ibid 
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related to the GDPR soon became linked back to privacy, and from there to the quagmire 
that is ‘’privacy harm’’20, a notion that is particularly elusive and controversial21.  
 
This has meant that one cannot base the framework either on the ‘’identifiability’’ of the 
data itself, or the actual ‘’harm’’ its mishandling could cause. Additionally, the rights to 
privacy and data protection, though they are held as separate rights, are not fully 
independent from one another. Despite the GDPR not mentionning the word ‘’privacy’’ 
(unlike its predecessor, the Data Protection Directive)22/23. Because of that, our thesis 
asserts that that the overlap between the two notions –  dubbed ‘’informational privacy’’, 
a term based on existing taxonomies of privacy and data protection24 - cannot be neatly 
split apart, but must be taken together. The notion of ‘’informational privacy’’, was best 
described in ‘’A typology of privacy’’ by Bert-Jaap Koops and others25 as ‘’ a broader 
concept, encompassing information/data/facts about persons or their 
communications.’’26, a broad notion which is not based on particular interests but 
overlaps many. This thesis argues that data protection should focus on informational 
privacy, and any particular measures aimed at particular interests should lay these out 
explicitly, instead of attempting to stretch the notion of personal data to include an ever-
increasing number of informational interests27. The notion of ‘’informational privacy’’ 
which will be developed in this thesis is based, specifically, on an expansion of the scope 
of the right to data protection in order to overcome the limitations of the ‘’personal data’’ 
approach. 
 
The GDPR itself is moving away from the traditional ‘’personal data’’ approach: most of 
its new developments use new tools in order to protect individuals28, and increasingly 
shift focus away from a strict set of rules and towards a risk-based, pragmatic 
20 Calo, R. (2011). The boundaries of privacy harm. Ind. LJ, 86, 1131. 
21 Maldoff (n.18) 
22 The word ‘’privacy’’ appears 13 times in the Data Protection Directive, usually in the form of 
the statement ‘’protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular 
their right to privacy’’, indicating the prevalence of the right to privacy in data protection. 
Comparatively, the word privacy appears not once in the text of the GDPR. 
23 Rouvroy, A. (2008). Privacy, data protection, and the unprecedented challenges of ambient 
intelligence. Studies in ethics, law, and technology, 2(1). 
24 Koops, B. J., Newell, B. C., Timan, T., Skorvanek, I., Chokrevski, T., & Galic, M. (2016). A 
typology of privacy. U. Pa. J. Int'l L., 38, 483. 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 Case C-434/16, Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner, (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 
28 Goodman, B., & Flaxman, S. (2016, June). EU regulations on algorithmic decision-making 
and a “right to explanation”. In ICML workshop on human interpretability in machine learning 
(WHI 2016), New York, NY. http://arxiv. org/abs/1606.08813 v1. 
11 
 
                                               
approach29. A new way of understanding informational privacy is developing, and the 
focus of this thesis is to understand and map this new conceptual framework. 
 
In order to do so, this thesis builds a framework based on Lawrence Lessig’s ‘’Four 
Modalities’’, and particularly inspired by Helen Nissenbaum’s ‘’Contextual Integrity’’. This 
framework starts with a basic assertion inspired by Lessig’s work: that when a change 
occurs in how information is obtained, some forces will enter into effect to restore an 
appropriate balance30. For example, new technological tools, which allow gathering of 
data previously impossible to obtain, may get regulated by a new legal instrument to 
restore balance. Based on that, we have used the ‘’Four Modalities’’ to map out these 
forces – called ‘’Guarantees’’ – and to assert that as long as these forces are balanced, 
‘’informational privacy’’ is preserved. The rest of this thesis is spent proving this 
assertion, and laying out a way to identify the various underlying forces and use them to 
assess the state of the Balance in different situations. We propose that this ‘’Balance’’ 
approach is the direction that EU data protection is headed towards, and that the GDPR 
is the first step on that path. 
 
One of the primary goals in creating this framework is to avoid the pitfalls of other 
conceptions, the greatest of which is the difficulty of defining what interests should be 
protected. The reason why the GDPR does not mention privacy is to dissociate itself 
from that right, in order to avoid having to define what privacy is (which, as the first part 
of this thesis will show, is the source of much academic debate31). The GDPR attempts 
to make data protection a wholly separate right, not dependant on any further rights or 
interests and with its own value. However, as we will show, this attempt has not been 
wholly successful, with the recognition of ‘’risk’’ which goes beyond risks to data 
protection and to various ‘’harms’’ covering a huge variety of rights and interests. Inspired 
by Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity, the conception I develop in this thesis looks 
only at whether the various forces are balanced. Differently from Nissenbaum’s 
conception, the focus is on the Information itself, and not the context in which it is 
processed. Context is relevant, but only in so far as it imparts some Guarantees to the 
controller of the Information. Through conceptualizing informational privacy as a balance 
of Guarantees, we attempt to bypass the limitations of both the harms-based framework 
(and its difficult to define ‘’harms’’) and the personal data framework (and its limited 
scope). The GDPR’s conception of ‘’risk’’ is moving towards an interest-neutral 
29 Butin, D., & Le Métayer, D. (2014, May). Log analysis for data protection accountability. In 
International Symposium on Formal Methods (pp. 163-178). Springer, Cham. 
30 Koops (n.24) 
31 Ibid 
12 
 
                                               
conception, in line with the rest of the GDPR, defining risk not based on particular harms, 
but on certain processing activities instead32. As data protection moves further from 
specific interests and how they may be harmed, we propose a framework based on a 
balance of Guarantees, which would be completely separate from those interests and 
harms, as the way forward for data protection.  
 
B. Thesis Structure 
I. Research Questions 
 
Before going into detail as to how we will develop this issue, we will go over the core 
research questions which drive this approach. 
 
This thesis is built on two core assertions, demonstrated, analysed and evidenced 
throughout it. The first is that the concept of ‘’personal Information’’ should replace the 
one of ‘’personal data’’ in the EU data protection regulatory system, with the main 
difference being the removal of the ‘’identification’’ element of ‘’personal data’’ and a 
renewed focus on the ‘’relating to’’ element of the definition. Data can be transformed 
and interpreted in a way that makes linking it back to an identifiable data subject 
impossible. However, the ‘’relating to’’ element of personal data includes not just whether 
the data is ‘’about’’ the person, but also whether the data is processed in a way which 
either intends to affect the individual, or results in them being affected33. The second is 
that the concept of a ‘’Balance of Guarantees’’ should be used to regulate the creation, 
use, and dissemination of this Information, accounting for forces beyond those officially 
recognized so far by EU regulation.  
 
The primary research question we will try to answer is thus: ‘’Is the EU protection of 
personal information shifting from an ‘’identifiability’’-focused framework to one based on 
a balance of Guarantees for those holding the means to create personal Information, 
and is that framework able to address the limitations of other conceptions as well as the 
challenges brought on by the age of Big Data?’’   
 
32 Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) 
and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, WP 248, Adopted on 4 October 2017 
33 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, WP136, 
Adopted on 20 June 2007 
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This question requires some unpacking. This thesis will develop and analyse each piece 
of it, but first starts by building a foundation. What are ‘’privacy’’ and ‘’data protection’’? 
How has the legislation surrounding these two rights evolved, and what interests are they 
trying to convey? Answering that, as well as understanding what ‘’informational privacy’’ 
is, is paramount to understanding the framework developed in this thesis..  
 
We then study the development of forces which have challenged these rights in a 
fundamental way: new technological tools which together constitute ‘’Big Data’’. How do 
these new tools challenge the existing framework protecting informational privacy? Why 
is the arrival of ‘’Big Data’’ such an important transformation? Is it an altogether new 
phenomenon, or simply a bigger version of something that came before? Answering 
those questions by studying this new force is vital, as the hypothesis of this work is that 
informational privacy should be protected by a balance of forces: under that hypothesis, 
Big Data is the greater shift in these forces in history. 
 
Because it is possible for pieces of data which, alone, are unable to identify an individual, 
to be combined in a way which makes it possible to learn vast amounts of information 
about them, the ‘’identifiability’’-centric approach which underlies much of the GDPR is 
increasingly unable to handle the new ways by which knowledge can be generated. 
However, new tools in the GDPR34 as well as some opinions by data protection 
authorities35 seem to be moving away from that ‘’identifiability’’-focus criteria. We 
propose a shift away from ‘’identifiability’’, as well as away from focusing on the data 
itself, and instead focusing on what information can be learned from that data based on 
the means and motivations of those holding it. That is what we will call ‘‘personal 
Information’’ throughout this thesis (or ‘’Information’’ when referring to the greater 
concept of knowledge obtained from data, regardless of whether it relates to an 
individual). 
 
This leads to the question as to how we will develop the concept of ‘’personal 
Information’’. How can personal Information be linked back to the interests of individuals 
in the same way that personal data is? How can Information be regulated without the 
binary approach of ‘’identifiability’’ adopted by the GDPR?  
 
34 See GDPR, Article 22 – the right to automated decision-making focuses on decisions which 
may affect the individual, not on the data used to do so. 
35 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, WP136, 
Adopted on 20 June 2007 
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II. Chapter Summaries 
 
The answer developed in this work (and supported by evidence from EU privacy and 
data protection legislation) is to move away from a strict, binary, rules-based system, 
towards one based on forces, that is, based on the means and motivations by which 
various parties can create personal Information. These forces, dubbed ‘’Guarantees’’, 
are modelled after Lawrence Lessig’s Four Modalities36. This leads to questions of how 
to assess what constitutes sufficient Guarantees, and whether using Guarantees instead 
of other approaches – such as the harms-based approach – is more effective in 
protecting informational privacy. 
 
The analysis will be divided into six chapters.  
 
In Chapter One, we analyse privacy and the way in which that notion has changed over 
history, laying out the groundwork for the balance created later in the thesis by showing 
that there is a very clear pattern of changes to how personal information flows through a 
society becoming balanced over time, sometimes by legislative intervention, but 
sometimes by other forces. This thesis suggests that we are simply at another one of 
these paradigm shifts, and the only question is whether the forces we can put in place 
can be enough to offset the change, or if things have truly changed, for good. We then 
analyse the notion of ‘’privacy’’ itself, its evolution as a right, and in particular the way it 
has developed in European law. This serve a double purpose - to show in more detail 
how these approaches were developed as reactions to changes in Information control, 
and to understand better how approaches to privacy work and how successful they have 
been. This also allows us to frame our analysis better by defining what is meant by 
‘’Informational privacy’’, allowing a development of this term without having to take on 
the impossible task of defining privacy and without having to take on all the varied 
undefined interests to which  data protection can extend. 
 
The second Chapter addresses data protection more specifically. We highlight the fact 
that the idea of data protection as a separate right makes it possible to avoid the 
limitations of ‘’privacy’’ , and that the conception developed in this thesis is simply an 
expansion of that idea. Data protection has intentionally distanced itself from specific 
interests such as ‘’privacy’’ or ‘’consumer welfare’’ which are hard or even impossible to 
define, instead focusing on protecting ‘’personal data’’, in and of itself, based on 
36 Lessig, L. (1999), Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books 
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principles of care and responsible gathering, handling, and securing of that data37. This 
transition is difficult, and not yet completed. In order to ensure that the GDPR is 
successful, adaptable and enforced, it was built in an interestingly pragmatic way. The 
core of the GDPR attempts to focus only on the data itself, without any of the context of 
what type of data it is and how it may impact various interests.  
 
In some situations, however, the GDPR cannot ignore the interests which go beyond 
data protection alone, and has had to develop tools in order to take them into account, 
such as rights against automated decision-making38, which cite non-discrimination as 
one of the interests which may be harmed by that practice39. We show that these gaps 
that the GDPR has filled with new measures are also gaps that have been created by 
the Big Data age, such as profiling, and that there is evidence that data protection is 
moving towards a framework which is able to emancipate itself from hard-to-define 
interests, the way data protection does, while still taking them into account. We propose 
that the framework developed in this work fulfils those criteria, and that it is the way along 
which data protection is already heading. 
 
Having set the stage in terms of privacy and data protection, the third Chapter highlights 
the technological developments that have created the current challenges. Understanding 
the power and scope of these technologies is necessary in order to understand the 
difference between ‘’data’’ and ‘’Information’’: we are arriving at an age where it is not 
just the data we hold, but how we can analyse, use, and interpret that data, that has the 
most significant impact. One cannot understand the need for a new approach without 
understanding the technologies which threaten the existing one. Terms like profiling, 
Internet of Things, cookies or Big Data need to be laid out and analysed to see the impact 
they have on the way Information flows in our society.  
 
We discuss the notion of ‘’Information’’, which we argue should be used as a conceptual 
framework to interpret the concept of ‘’personal data’’. In a metaphor we call ‘’the 
Sculptor’s Work’’, we show how the use and processing of data is less like the ‘’mining’’ 
of data, and more similar to a sculptor creating something new from a block of marble. 
The same marble can create an infinity of sculptures – depending on the sculptor. In the 
same way, the same data can create different Information based on a wide number of 
37 The most evident way to highlight this transformation is the GDPR not mentioning privacy a 
single time, Interestingly, other interests, such as discrimination, are mentioned, which show 
how intent data protection is intent to show itself separate to various interests, but especially 
privacy. 
38 GDPR, Article 22 
39 GDPR, Article 22(3) 
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factors, and these factors are getting exponentially more influential over time. This has 
a number of implications, but most important amongst them is that many factors affect 
what can be learned from data, which is not taken into account by the current conception 
of data protection. We then build on that core argument to show that a conception which 
allows for an ‘’Information’’ perspective is already developing. Evidence, from intellectual 
property law as well as earlier developments on privacy and data protection law, 
demonstrate this. If it is possible to create something new from raw data with its own 
legal status, then ‘’Information’’ as a concept can exist separately from ‘’data’’. Finally, 
we develop ‘’personal Information’’, as opposed to ‘’personal data’’, and show that the 
transition towards ‘’Information’’ is already showing signs of being adopted. 
 
The fourth Chapter analyses the foundations of European data protection law, finding its 
limitations, and the source of these limitations. In that part, we develop the argument that 
the Big Data era is challenging some fundamental distinctions in EU privacy and data 
protection law. We display this through the study of the ‘’means likely to be used’’ test 
developed to assert whether data ‘’identifies’’ an individual, and show that the GDPR 
recognises, through certain of its provisions, the limitation of this conception. We then 
expand the analysis to examine two core pillars of EU data protection law and how they 
show the limitations of that law: anonymisation and consent. The ‘’personal data’’ 
conception and the focus on ‘’consent’’ as the way to legitimise data processing are 
central to how the GDPR works, and their weaknesses highlight the need for a solution. 
 
After identifying the weaknesses in two core pillars of data protection, the Chapter does 
the same with a core pillar of privacy: the public/private distinction. In the same way that 
data protection is strongly divided between data that is personal and data that is not, 
privacy has a separation between the public and the private space, which is quickly 
eroding in the information age. This analysis is grounded on the idea of the private/public 
distinction being obsolete, and needing to be replaced with a ‘’transparency/opacity’’ 
distinction, which takes into account the new ways in which personal Information is 
created and disseminated. 
 
Chapter five analyses the Guarantees, the balancing forces which limit how those who 
control the means to create Information can act. We start out by analysing the literature 
which backs up the idea of Guarantees: the works of Lawrence Lessig and Helen 
Nissenbaum. We also study the common ways this problem has been answered, the 
limitation to those approaches (especially in the case of ‘’privacy harm’’) but also how 
they can inform the framework developed in this thesis. 
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This leads to the explanations of what the Guarantees are. Explaining this notion requires 
some development, because it comes from a very specific mindset, and those 
Guarantees have a very wide scope, based on Lawrence Lessig’s taxonomy. We start 
by studying technological Guarantees – or ‘’architectural’’ as Lessig put it – by analysing 
how technology and the ability we have to use it to shape our environment influences the 
creation of Information, but also its control. We then study market Guarantees, which are 
not taken into account by the GDPR: the ‘’identifiability’’ test, based on ‘’means likely to 
be used’’ to identify the data subject, only looks at the technological capacity of the data 
controller, and not whether they have sufficient economic motivation to use that capacity 
to identify them. Because of that, and the increasing expansion of both the notion of 
‘’personal data’’ and the technological means for identification, controllers with no 
incentive to identify individuals or obtain particularly sensitive data about them have to 
comply with the full weight of the GDPR, just like controllers who have that incentive. For 
businesses far removed from data analytics, this can be an unexpected and pointless 
burden. Market Guarantees are also important as a way to show that the price of 
technology is as much a barrier as the existence of the technology itself: in other words, 
if the technology is too expensive for the value of the Information it produces, then that 
technology will not be used. 
 
We then examine the social Guarantees, which also have an important impact, especially 
when it comes to changing behaviours over time. Many rules of privacy are unwritten, 
and become legal rules only where technological developments make it impossible to 
rely on social rules alone. Additionally, social rules evolve over time, and the current 
conflict over the future of privacy – whether society is accepting a world without it by 
mass participation in social media – may change irreversibly the balance of Guarantees. 
One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that society tends not to change fundamentally its 
views on the need for privacy, which is why we argue that it is possible to set a ‘’default’’ 
level for the balance. We argue that the claim society is fundamentally changing its value 
of privacy may be mistaken, and that the balance will reassert itself, a view which early 
signs are showing is likely to be happening. Finally, we go over the role of legal 
Guarantees, and how they are just here to fill in gaps where the natural state of the 
balance cannot reassert itself naturally. As such, this concludes that the only role of any 
law dealing with informational privacy only needs to work to re-establish this balance, 
and so should be conceptualized accordingly. The GDPR does so in a number of ways, 
but is still incomplete. 
 
Finally, in Chapter six, we close this thesis by establishing the last steps of the 
Information/Guarantees balance. First, the argument for the ‘’default’’ state for the 
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balance is made, based on historical precedent. This argument is based on the pattern 
identified in the beginning of the thesis: that over time, the balance has been uneven 
multiple times which has meant that measures were taken to rebalance it. As such, we 
identify a reasonably even balance as any point at which no measures were taken for a 
significant amount of time. The last step is an overview of various measures which might 
help balance the Guarantees. It includes many measures which have already been 
proposed - but put in the new light of the Information/Guarantees balance. In particular, 
it shows the successes of the European approach in addressing the Balance, in 
particular by focusing on the purpose limitation principle. 
 
At the end of this thesis, we intend to have proven that separating informational privacy 
completely from specific interests and harms is necessary in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
other conceptions. Seeing it as a balance of forces which need to be set right allows a 
multidisciplinary, adaptive and effective approach, because of its ability to use various 
Guarantees. Basing this balance not on ‘’personal data’’ but on ‘’personal Information’’, 
a concept which sets aside the ‘’identifiability’’ test, makes it possible to address the 
challenges of Big Data by being technology neutral and not being limited by the data 
itself, but looking at the whole picture instead. Meanwhile, using the Guarantees makes 
it possible to bypass the binary test of ‘’identifiability’’ while still protecting individuals. As 
we have shown, this is the direction along which EU privacy and data protection law is 
already heading – though whether that transition can be fully made considering how core 
the ‘’identifiability’’ test is to the existing framework is still not a certainty.  
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Chapter 1. An Introduction to Informational 
Privacy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Multiple conceptions of privacy, frameworks, classifications and taxonomies have been 
developed to understand better the  right to privacy40. Some have attempted to see 
privacy as being defined by certain risks41, some relying on a torts-based approach to 
address potential abuses42, with several taxonomies of the ‘’harm’’ that may result from 
a breach of privacy having been attempted43.  Some theorists have suggested new 
rights, from identity44 to procedural data due process45. Some see the answer to adapting 
privacy to the Big Data age as lying in new technologies46, while some see it in stronger 
legislation47.  With the birth of the Information Age, this is only getting more complex as 
privacy concerns multiply and obtain new dimensions and interests. 
 
Instead of dealing directly with this - seemingly unanswerable - question, we propose a 
limited approach which bypasses this question altogether, by not stating an absolute 
definition of privacy and instead looking at the role of privacy as a force put into place to 
make up for an imbalance of forces - a force of “control”. This conception of privacy - 
40 Danezis, G., & Gürses, S. (2010). A critical review of 10 years of Privacy Technology. 
Surveill. Cult. A Glob. Surveill. Soc., 1–16. 
41 Centre for Information Policy Leadership. (2014). A Risk-based Approach to Privacy: 
Improving Effectiveness in Practice, 19 June 2014 
42 McKay, C. (2015). Next Generation Privacy: The Internet of Things, Data Exhaust, and 
Reforming Regulation by Risk of Harm. Groningen Journal of International Law, 2, 30. 
43 See “Calo, M. R. (2011). The Boundaries of Privacy Harm. Indiana Law Journal, 86, 1131.”, 
and “Solove, D. (2006) “A taxonomy of privacy”. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 477-
564” 
44 De Hert, P. (2007). A right to identity to face the Internet of Things ?, Strasbourg: Unesco 1–
21.. 
45 Crawford, K., & Schultz, J. (2014). Big Data and Due Process - Toward a Framework To 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms. BCL Rev., 55(1), 93–128. 
46 Danezis (n.40) 
47 Hornung, G. (2012). A General Data Protection Regulation for Europe? Light and shade in 
the Commission’s draft of 25 January 2012. SCRIPTed, 9(1), 64–81. 
doi:10.2966/scrip.090112.64 
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known as ‘’informational privacy’’ - has a limited scope based on where data protection 
and privacy overlap. 
 
Our aim is to show that attempts to define and conceptualize privacy may not be taking 
into account certain underlying forces surrounding it. By looking at the evolution of the 
technological landscape, it would indeed seem that technology is ever-changing, and 
that each paradigm shift is so unpredictable and so unlike what we’ve seen before that 
no conception of privacy could be “future-proof”. For example, in "Seven Types of 
Privacy"48, Rachel L. Finn, David Wright, and Michael Friedewald build on a previous 
approach by Roger Clarke, arguing for the replacement of Clarke’s taxonomy of “four 
categories of privacy” by expanding and updating it to seven categories to adapt to the 
modern world49. 
 
The authors’ thesis in this article (which we will examine in greater depth later) is that 
privacy issues become more complex over time, and privacy conceptions need to adapt 
to them as they appear50. And while that is correct, our argument is that, though there is 
change and development, there are also recurrent patterns within these privacy issues 
which can be identified. Our goal is to highlight these patterns, and the different forces 
of which they consist, in order to build a conception of privacy which has a limited, defined 
scope that can allow for a framework which can protect it without losing itself in a myriad 
of other interests.  
 
The conception we will be using is thus based on a limited conception of the European 
conception of privacy, one which overlaps to a great extent with data protection. Since, 
as we will see, the European conception of privacy is quite extensive and its boundaries 
are ill-defined, we will be using a more specific understanding of privacy, which we qualify 
as “informational privacy”, and purposefully removing from this analysis the many 
different other interests that privacy can cover. 
 
Our conception of “informational privacy” aims at showing that there exist some 
underlying patterns involved in the creation and control of personal information, that have 
been approached before in many ways, but never identified within their own framework. 
We will then highlight some later attempts, in particular Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual 
48 Finn, R., Wright, D. and Friedewald, M (2013). Seven Types of Privacy, Dordrecht European 
Data Protection: Coming of Age 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
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integrity51, and what makes them successful by showing that they touch on the “balance” 
framework that we will be attempting to demonstrate. By studying the history of attempts 
at defining “privacy”, one can identify the need to adapt to new technologies and the 
challenges they pose. Instead of redefining privacy every time a new technology 
appears, we argue we should instead look at the underlying forces driving these 
changes, and build a framework that takes them into account, as these forces will exist 
no matter the time or technological level, only in different forms. 
 
We will show the inception of the idea that the “balance” is upset, by looking at how 
privacy is unique in the sphere of Human Rights in that it is an altogether young right, 
which only exists because of technological developments having upset a system which 
previously did not need legal intervention to be balanced. We will also show that this 
essential character of privacy is extremely significant in understanding its role: why it was 
needed then, why it is needed now, and what form it needs to take in order to fulfill that 
role.  
 
We will finally link this model to our working conception of privacy, based on European 
privacy law. Through this analysis, we will show the role of data protection in this 
conception, as a right that was created in part to respond to an upset in the balance. 
Because of the right to data protection being a consequence of this upset, it has been 
the field of law which has been given the task of solving the problems brought about by 
this imbalance. As such, data protection is a field which will be used throughout most of 
this thesis, because the concept of “privacy” and the concept of “data protection” overlap 
to a great extent. In other words, this thesis will limit itself to a specific interest, one which 
lies in the area where privacy and data protection overlap – ‘’informational privacy’’. This 
is especially relevant because, though data protection was originally created to deal 
specifically with informational privacy, it is expanding to protect other interests as well52. 
 
Through this development, we will show how a vision of privacy as a balance of shifting 
forces can give new insight into this particular area of privacy. 
 
Before elaborating on the vision of privacy as a balance of control, we will first establish 
the currents in conceptions of privacy over time and how they show hints of this balancing 
approach. This will show a trend in conceptions of privacy being developed almost 
51 Barth, A., Datta, A., Mitchell, J. C., & Nissenbaum, H. (2006). Privacy and contextual integrity: 
Framework and applications. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006, 
184–198. doi:10.1109/SP.2006.32 
52 Burkert (n.4) 
22 
 
                                               
entirely to balance out new technological developments, and will highlight the 
preponderant role that data protection has taken as a tool for privacy. 
 
 
A. The Evolution of Privacy: Identifying Recurring 
Patterns  
 
Privacy, and tools to ensure that privacy, is not a new idea. The opposition of society 
and solitude goes back to Greek philosophy53. There have always been mechanisms54, 
legal, social, or technological, meant to separate private and public life. Throughout the 
evolution of the concept of privacy, we can see a clear causal link between changes in 
the ability to obtain information by new or different means, and new developments in the 
landscape of privacy law - and later, data protection. 
 
This is true of the development of the “home” as a sanctuary of privacy coinciding with 
the development of cities where traditional social norms linked to community and family 
had disappeared55. For most of history, communities were close knit, society was “small” 
in the sense that one’s social sphere was limited to neighbors, coworkers and family56. 
As such protecting one’s privacy was not a legal matter so much as a social one - a small 
social circle means easy control over who knows what. But cities led to the erosion of 
this sense of community, and with it came a demand for privacy. The intimacy of a 
necessarily small social circle, which had until then been the major protection for privacy, 
was no longer there, and the “home” became the new focus for privacy protection57. Even 
today, American privacy law sees a violation of the home as the utmost invasion of 
privacy58. The imbalance created by the move to cities was rectified by the rise of the 
home as a private space: whereas one’s control over privacy was once due to the close 
community, it was now due to protection afforded by the home, and the sociolegal 
recognition of that home59.  
53 De Hert, P., & Gutwirth, S. (2006). Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of 
the individual and transparency of power. Privacy and the criminal law, 61-104. 
54 Holvast, J. (2008) History of privacy. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.  
55 McKeon, M. (2009) The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, private, and the division of 
knowledge. JHU Press  
56 Ibid  
57 Koops, B. J., & Leenes, R. (2005). Code and the slow erosion of privacy. Mich. Telecomm. & 
Tech. L. Rev., 12, 115. 
58 Ibid 
59 Baumer, D. L., Earp, J. B., & Poindexter, J. C. (2004). Internet privacy law: a comparison 
between the United States and the European Union. Computers & Security, 23(5), 400-412. 
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 This is also true of the increasing public dissemination of newspapers concerning notable 
individuals at the end of the 19th Century60, and the invention of the instantaneous 
photograph, being directly responsible for Warren and Brandeis writing their famous 
essay, “The Right to Privacy”61.  
 
This last example deserves a moment of pause, because it is the first development which 
can be directly compared to the challenges we see today in terms of data collection and 
analysis, and the first peek into the world of data protection. Looking at the situation 
before and after in terms of balance will illustrate the fact that this balance can always 
be found, whether one is looking at newspapers in the 1890s or Google in 2016.  
 
Before technological developments allowing newspapers to disseminate information 
easily and allowing instantaneous photographs, there existed certain practical 
protections to privacy. The aforementioned sacrality of the home and of personal 
correspondence (Legal). The social norms protecting one’s personal affairs from 
excessive scrutiny (Social). The technological challenge of getting pictures of individuals 
without their consent or distributing to the general public newspapers containing the 
information (Technology). But finally, and possibly most relevant in this case, is the fact 
that newspapers are businesses pursuing profit, and that it was unprofitable to gather 
this information before these innovations allowed for juicy, easily disseminated articles 
(Market).  
 
The development of instantaneous photography and easy dissemination of media upset 
this balance by removing some technological limitations. The first, instantaneous 
photographs, was a change in what information could be collected – photos of individuals 
without their consent. But the second, notably, had nothing to do with the collection of 
information, but with its dissemination. The privacy invasion was not just that newspapers 
were able to obtain such information: it was that the public at large was able to obtain it 
too. This shows how changes in information sharing can have an impact on privacy 
regardless of whether there is a change in information creation. This establishes an 
important rule: restricting data dissemination can be as important as restricting data 
collection. 
 
60 Hixson, R. (1987), Privacy in a Public Society. Human Rights in Conflict . New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press  
61 Solove, D. J. (2006). A Brief History of Information Privacy Law. Proskauer on Privacy: A 
Guide to Privacy and Data Security Law in the Information Age, 1–46. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914271 
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However, the dissemination of media had repercussions on other practical concerns, 
such as economic profit. Privacy invasion is only interesting to newspapers if they obtain 
a profit from it, and as such the fact that privacy invasion was not worth it from an 
economic perspective disappeared, leading to a greater dissemination of personal 
information. Because of these changing factors, the balance which existed before these 
innovations was upset. And this is what prompted Warren and Brandeis to work towards 
establishing a right to privacy. It is an example of how when the balance is disturbed by 
the weakening of an existing protection, attempts are made to redress it, in the case of 
Warren and Brandeis by establishing the Right to Privacy.  
 
Finally, this causal link is also true for the creation, seventy years after Warren and 
Brandeis’ article in the United States, of a taxonomy of privacy harms by William 
Prosser62, the content of which will be studied in further detail below. As the technological 
landscape continued to evolve, new privacy issues arose, and eventually a clearer, more 
robust taxonomy was required to keep up with the expanding sphere of privacy invasion. 
 
This same pattern, a change in the environment leading to new protections being created 
to re-establish the balance, is found at every level, in every country, in every time period. 
However, by looking deeper at various developments, we will see that this pattern has 
not been identified as such by most attempts to reform privacy law. This has led to some 
attempts not answering the root of the problem - restoring the balance. In particular, this 
is the case of the European data protection, which has set itself certain goals which, 
while they act on some forces affecting the balance, do so sometimes inadvertently and 
imperfectly, which means that certain cracks remain open. 
 
Seeing current privacy issues through the lens of that balance can allow us to understand 
better the privacy challenges we face, and the solutions we need. In order to study this, 
we will analyse some major doctrinal approaches to privacy, and how these have evolved 
over time. Through this analysis, the pattern of new technologies disrupting the way 
privacy is challenged will be explored, and how various types of approaches have dealt 
with this pattern - or failed to. 
 
 
62 Ibid 
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B. Doctrinal Approaches to Privacy: Rectifying 
Imbalances as they Appear  
 
We have seen that there exists a pattern of balancing forces at every stage of the 
development of the right to privacy. Every great step forward made by privacy law has 
been done in direct response to a - usually sudden, and usually technology-driven - 
imbalance of these forces. We will now study the main proposals made to strengthen the 
right to privacy, identify what imbalance led to their creation, whether they rectify it, and 
why. We start by looking at privacy conceptions in the US, then moving on to European 
ones. This is due to the fact that American approaches offer a clear case study of 
successive developments trying to capture the elusive concept of privacy while being 
challenged by successive technological developments. 
 
I.  The Torts-Based Approach  
Before studying the European conception we will look at a common approach which was 
developed first in the United States, and now is the major legal regime governing 
American privacy law: the torts-based approach to privacy. The reason for this cross-
Atlantic analysis is that some useful lessons can be learned from the torts-based 
approach. Because it needs to adapt to new harms, it is an approach that always tries to 
catch up, which is getting more and more difficult with the rapid development of privacy-
challenging technologies. Nevertheless, it does highlight a recurrent pattern: that a 
‘’privacy harm’’ becomes codified in law not when that harm becomes a possibility, but 
when that harm becomes so prevalent that legal measures have to be taken to prevent 
it. As we will show, there are underlying patterns behind these harms that, if identified, 
could allow for a more reactive approach. 
1. Warren and Brandeis’ Right to Privacy 
 
As mentioned above, Warren and Brandeis’ “Right to Privacy” was written as a response 
to new technological developments, namely instant photography and the 
commercialization of tabloids63. These developments allowed an invasion of privacy 
which had never been technologically possible before, and in response the authors 
63 Ibid 
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characterized a number of privacy torts, new harms which, while they had always laid 
under the surface, suddenly became major concerns64. 
 
The idea of privacy torts began with Warren and Brandeis’ “Right to Privacy”, but only 
started to take shape as a legally-binding approach in the early 20th century65. The first 
statute on the topic dates from 190366, and was followed by a decision of the Georgia 
Supreme Court in 1905 which established a tort for privacy invasions in Pavesich v. New 
England Life Insurance Co.67. The facts of the case were that a life insurance 
advertisement was using the image of the plaintiff without their consent68. The defendant 
obtained the negative of an existing picture of the plaintiff, then using this picture for his 
commercial purposes. The Court’s reasoning in the case mentioned: “One who desires 
to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in 
which and at which he will submit himself to the public gaze.69” 
 
When put under the lens of a “balance” between technological developments 
endangering privacy and forces put into place to contain the privacy intrusions created 
by these developments, this affirmation gains new meaning. This case would not have 
been possible but for the existence of photography, and the ability to obtain previously-
unobtainable information. This goes back to the instant photographs which prompted 
Warren and Brandeis to develop their Right to Privacy, and the same reasoning driving 
the judge’s decision to establish privacy invasions as a tort. The principle laid down by 
the judge in that decision went beyond the small scope of the use of photographic 
negatives, but the fact that it was prompted by this technological innovation is no 
accident. By creating a larger principle, the judge was attempting to establish a protection 
that would extend to all cases in which privacy was threatened - whether or not 
technology was a factor. As we will see, this trend continues. 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid 
67 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
68 Solove (n.61) 
69 Ibid 
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2. William Prosser’s Four Privacy Harms 
 
The next major innovation came with William Prosser’s taxonomy of privacy harms in 
1960, which recognized four torts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private 
facts, false light, and appropriation. 
 
Intrusion upon seclusion, as Prosser defines it, provides that: “One who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”70. It covers in its scope 
offenses such as clandestine entry or photography into one’s home. It extends to privacy 
offenses linked indirectly to new technologies, such as overbearing surveillance of an 
individual while in public, which shows how new technologies create new challenges 
when they enter the mainstream or are used by powerful entities like the government. 
 
Public disclosure of private facts provides that: “One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.71” This once again 
looks back to the roots of technology-driven privacy law, with Warren and Brandeis 
creating the Right to Privacy partly because of the recent availability of easily-
disseminated newspapers. For example, a case based on this tort was Smith v. Daily 
Mail72, in which the publication of information on juvenile offenders was seen as a breach 
of privacy. The obtaining of this information by the newspaper was not the problem - the 
problem was the consequent mass dissemination of that information, which would not 
have been possible a century earlier. The addition of a “public interest” exception is 
notable, as it highlights the balance of interests inherent in considerations of privacy. 
 
False light, having as a tort the act of spreading false information about an individual, 
was not directly applicable to our purposes back when Prosser theorized it, but also takes 
on major significance with the technological developments of the modern age: as 
increasing amounts of information get processed and used to make decisions, it 
becomes increasingly likely that individuals will be portrayed in a wrongful light due to 
inaccurate or obsolete data or human bias leading to inaccurate conclusions. 
70 Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 652 Copyright (c) 1977, The American Law Institute 
71 Ibid 
72 Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
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 Finally, Appropriation pertains to: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy”73. 
This once more is increased by technical means previously unavailable, such as camera 
pictures. One’s likeness was more difficult (though possible) to use for profit before the 
invention of the camera. 
 
Interestingly, however, we also have with these torts the first example of where an 
approach that was meant to solve a problem - the problem of new ways of obtaining 
information - ended up not establishing exactly which problem it aimed to solve and 
moreover, some claim, ended up losing its way74. Critics of this approach to the right to 
privacy point out that the original torts ended up being diluted, dealing with things only 
tangentially related to the right to privacy, such as most cases of defamation being ruled 
under the doctrine of privacy75. We propose that part of the reason for this phenomenon 
is that without a clear understanding of the underlying forces impacting the ebb and flow 
of information, there is no clear directing line for the development of ways to rebalance 
those forces. This is the danger we aim to prevent with this thesis, a danger which is 
likely to materialise in EU law, as we will show. 
 
As we can see, this tort-based approach was mainly built around preventing abuses 
which would have been impossible or impractical to commit in times past. The same 
trend continues with Daniel Solove’s subsequent taxonomy, which attempted to set the 
right to privacy back along the right tracks. 
 
3. Daniel Solove’s Taxonomy 
 
 
A more modern taxonomy was proposed more recently by Daniel Solove in 200676, 
directly referencing Prosser’s harms and the need for a new taxonomy. Solove’s 
argument for why that updated taxonomy was needed was mainly the complexification 
of the legal aspects of privacy77. The American vision of privacy is of particular interest 
to our purposes, because it is spread out over a large variety of case law, statutes - both 
73 Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 652 Copyright (c) 1977, The American Law Institute 
74 Kalven Jr, H. (1966).Privacy in tort law--were Warren and Brandeis wrong Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 31 : 326. 
75 Ibid 
76 Solove (n.61) 
77 Ibid 
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at federal and state-level - and constitutional law. This is the essence of the approach 
we criticise in this thesis: attempting to solve privacy issues as they appear in various 
contexts, without a way to adapt to emerging issues, which leads to a situation in which 
the values to be defended are hard to identify. 
 
Solove attempted to solve this problem with a core taxonomy of privacy harms78. As we 
will see, this approach is focused on the activities that may be problematic for privacy. 
Our interest is not just in activities harmful to privacy, but also why these activities are 
considered harmful. However, Solove’s approach highlights clearly the direct relationship 
between a rise in technological forces and the impact on privacy, continuing the long, 
uninterrupted thread running since Warren and Brandeis’ essay. 
 
Solove adds to the mostly “dignitary” harms identified by Warren and Brandeis and 
codified by Prosser79 what he calls “architectural” harms, which are assimilated to 
environmental harms - harms not directly detremental to the person but harming the 
climate in which their privacy is contained. 
 
Solove’s taxonomy regroups four subdivisions of harmful activities: information 
collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion. These 
activities are arranged around the individual and the impact these activities have on 
his/her life. Importantly, none of these groups of activities were found in the time of 
Prosser, but the new technical means which have appeared with the age of Big Data – 
collecting, processing and disseminating information – have allowed these harmful 
activities to occur. 
 
This pattern can be found in Solove’s exposition of his taxonomy, as historical 
perspectives for some of the listed harms are provided in his analysis. 
 
a. The Issue of Surveillance 
 
A foremost example in the “information collection” category is the practice of surveillance. 
Eavesdropping and peeping have been offences for centuries past – the simplicity of the 
means involved compared with modern surveillance techniques is an illustration of how 
far technology has come – while laws restricting surveillance by various means of 
communication were developed as these means appeared. Examples include California 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
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prohibiting the interception of telegraph communications in 1862, then telephone 
wiretapping in 1905, with later on federal statutes on the limits of wiretapping during the 
20th century80. 
 
Surveillance, and more specifically surveillance in public, poses an interesting problem 
for our purposes. In the 1983 case of United States v. Karo81, the defendant was tracked 
while driving by the police following a tracker hidden in a can of chloroform. The Court 
argued that the surveillance “amounted principally to the following of an automobile on 
public streets and highways”82, and argued that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a public space83. The US uses a strict distinction between “public space” and 
“private space”84, where the public space holds no particular expectation of privacy85. 
Our argument is that the reason this conception of privacy took hold is due to the fact 
that it used to be utterly impractical to gather significant private information about 
individuals in public, while the “home” was the core of privacy. Just as there is no law for 
the theft of large buildings, there was no law for invasions of privacy in public. However, 
practical and technological advances have made it so that the American “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” has disappeared in the modern world86. 
 
This blurring of the line between “public” and “private” due to technological advances 
illustrates the difficulties inherent in seeing privacy in such a light. Dealing with this 
problem using these same frameworks cannot fully handle the problem as we see the 
rise of forces which had previously been considered inexistent or impossible. This will 
happen again and again as new technological developments take place, and 
conceptions focused on the technology itself, or the torts that come from it, will not be 
able to keep up with those developments. 
 
b. Aggregation 
 
Out of Solove’s categories, it is in “information processing” where the most obvious 
examples of the “technology-driven privacy law” phenomenon are evident. The rise of 
the first computers in the 1960s led to significant concerns, which led to legislative 
80 Ibid 
81 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
82 Solove (n.61) 
83 Ibid 
84 Whitman, J. (2014). The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, Yale Law 
Journal 
85 Reidenberg, J. R. (2014). Privacy in public. 69 University of Miami Law Review 141 
86 Ibid 
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scrutiny, with the aggregation of data into one database being the main source of those 
concerns87. The fact that existing information can be collected and aggregated into much 
more powerful information is the real issue with the aforementioned practice of 
surveillance: following someone’s many daily innocuous acts can lead to information that 
observing any one act could not. 
 
This has always been true, of course – it has always been possible to link two pieces of 
data together to create new information, but the extent of that ability was so limited that 
it was not a force which needed to be reined in by legislation. That changed in the 
Information Age, with privacy law and data protection law both being spurred to further 
development due to this change. Once again, it is not a whole new practice which led to 
an entirely new law: it is the natural development of existing practices. 
 
As Solove shows, aggregation can be seen as a violation of privacy: In United States 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the disclosure 
of profiles made from the compilation of various criminal records was held to be an 
invasion of privacy even where every one of those individual criminal records had already 
been disclosed. This shows that privacy is not only about data and its disclosure, but 
also about what information is constructed from that data. Nevertheless, the controversy 
over treating aggregated information as a separate entity88 shows that consensus is not 
set on this matter. 
 
c. Information Dissemination  
 
This brings us to the third of Solove’s categories, which includes the most direct “harms”, 
such as breach of confidentiality, blackmail, appropriation (recalling to Prosser’s harms) 
or distortion89. 
 
Importantly, this is also the category which was changed least by the rise of the 
Information Age: blackmail has always existed, alongside slander or public humiliation 
through the disclosure of private facts. This stands in an interesting contrast with the 
former two categories that Solove identified: unlike information collection and information 
processing, information dissemination is not a category which has stood untouched by 
87 Solove, D. (2006) A taxonomy of privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 477-564 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
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legislation until very recently. Indeed, even ancient Romans, for example, had rules 
about nudity and its public exposure90.  
 
An interesting example when it comes to the obsoleteness of the public/private distinction 
is the case of Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, in which a woman had her underwear 
exposed while at a county fair91, with a picture then taken at that moment and put on the 
front page of a newspaper. In this case, the newspaper argued that since the picture was 
taken in a public space, there was no expectation of privacy, which takes us back to 
Warren and Brandeis’ reason for creating their Right to Privacy: the rise of instant 
photography and mass-disseminated media. This case would not exist except for these 
technological developments, showing once again the shifting role of privacy. But it also 
shows tjat whether some information is public or private changes as technological 
capabilities change, and in the modern age where any information can quickly become 
very public, the distinction between public and private becomes blurred. More recent 
examples are easily identified, from the recent case of a woman in Korea whose behavior 
in a train - refusal to pick up her dog’s excrement - led to a severe barrage of personal 
attacks92 or the case of Google Street View allowing private movements of individuals to 
be visible to the whole world93. 
 
In a world where capturing and disclosing information which has an impact on one’s 
personal life can happen to anyone, anytime, the idea of a “public” sphere is relative. The 
public sphere only exists until someone turns on a smartphone. 
 
d. Invasion 
 
Invasion is the last group of harms which Solove identified, and includes intrusion upon 
the individual’s private space - which in the American conception is principally the 
“home”94. The presence of one in a private context is different from the other types of 
harm according to Solove as it includes an element of physical interruption. Invasion 
highlights that privacy has dimensions stretching beyond simply the creation and 
90 Solove (n.61) 
91162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964).  
92 Houghton, D. and Joinson, A. (2010). Privacy, social network sites, and social relations. 
Journal of Technology in Human Services 28.1-2 
93 Segall, J. (2009), Google Street View: Walking the line of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion 
and publicity given to private facts in the digital age. Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 10  
94 Solove (n.87) 
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dissemination of information95. This is where the scope of this thesis limits itself to 
‘’informational privacy’’, as exploring other dimensions of privacy has been attempted 
many times with no fully satisfying conclusions96. 
 
Looking at this harms-based approach to privacy, we can identify some common threads 
which reveal what the informational dimension of privacy entails. It means identifying 
ways to prevent information from being acquired (control over information collection), 
and finding ways to ensure that once information is acquired those controlling it know 
limits (control over information dissemination). In each case, it can be summed up as 
clash of forces: forces attempting to gather and use information, against tools attempting 
to provide control over those forces. The constant emergence of new harms (as shown 
by the evolution of various taxonomies over time) and the difficulties of quantifying the 
“harm” in privacy invasions means that the transposition of that privacy conception into 
law is always catching up with technology97.  
 
II. Privacy as an Interest: Roger Clarke’s Taxonomy  
 
Some definitions of privacy attempt to avoid the difficulties of conceptualising privacy by 
not referring to it as a “right” (a loaded legal notion), but instead treating it as an “interest”. 
We will go over the groundbreaking conception of Roger Clarke on the matter, and further 
developments which have stemmed from his analysis, to illustrate how seeing visions of 
privacy as an interest is consistent with a vision of privacy as a clash between data 
gathering/usage, and tools to control them. 
 
An important contribution to the scholarship of privacy comes from Roger Clarke, who 
defines privacy as “the interest that individuals have in sustaining a 'personal space', free 
from interference by other people and organisations.98”. This is based on multiple 
“dimensions”, of which Clarke identifies five. We will analyze them, showing the 
underlying forces expressed through them. 
 
The first dimension is “privacy of the person”, or “bodily privacy”, which involves the 
actual human body, such as blood transfusion without consent. The second includes 
95 Zhu, B. (2014). Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying Intrusion upon Seclusion to 
Dataveillance Observations, NYUL Rev. 89 : 2381. 
96 Koops et al (n.24) 
97 Calo (n.20) 
98 Clarke, R. (2006) What’s privacy. Australian Law Reform Commission Workshop. Vol. 28. 
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“privacy of personal behaviour”, such as religious or political habits. The third is “privacy 
of personal communications”, relating to interception of communications through 
technological means. Then, “privacy of personal data” includes concerns over making 
sure personal data is not available to other entities (both public and private) and 
empowers individuals to have control over such data. Finally, a fifth dimensions, ‘’privacy 
of personal experience’’, encompassing the everyday experiences that were, until the 
age of Big Data, never recorded99. 
 
Just like before with the harms-based approach to privacy, further developments have 
extended and expanded these categories to adapt to technological developments. The 
paper “Seven Types of Privacy” by Rachel L. Finn, David Wright, and Michael Friedewald 
expands the original four categories into seven. Seeing the differences will show the 
same pattern of increasing privacy-protective forces developed to address new 
information-gathering and information-using practices. 
 
The first category not found in Clarke’s analysis is “privacy of thoughts and feelings”, 
which involves tracking behavior to draw conclusions about a person’s thoughts and 
opinions; the article recognises this aspect of privacy “may be coming under threat as a 
direct result of new and emerging technologies”100. The pattern we have previously 
established remains true even when seeing privacy as an interest: new interests develop 
for privacy to be protected, as new possibilities appear. Once again, shifts in the same 
underlying forces - information gathering and use - prompt a revaluation of existing 
categories. 
 
The second added category is “privacy of location and space”, which involves being 
tracked, both in public (monitoring and tracking) and in private (the home). Our previous 
comments on surveillance in public are similarly applicable: the problem of privacy in 
public was not prominent enough at the time Roger Clarke was writing in 1997, while the 
2013 article identifying this type of privacy follows the rise of surveillance technology: it 
acknowledges that “This categorisation of privacy was [...] not as obviously under threat 
when Clarke was writing in 1997, however, this has changed with technological 
advances”101. 
 
99 Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., De Hert, P., & Poullet, Y. (2013). European data protection: Coming 
of age. European Data Protection: Coming of Age, 1–440. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5170-5 
100 Ibid 
101 Ibid 
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The last one is “privacy of association”, which relates to freedom of religion or assembly, 
which complements perceived gaps in Clarke’s typology when it comes to freedom of 
religion or assembly - which while an important element, is not in the scope of 
‘’informational privacy’’ and shows the necessity of this limited scope. Without it, this 
thesis would have to expand as far as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. 
 
As we can see by looking at the way US law has attempted to adapt its list of torts to 
new technological developments, trying to keep up with the various ways in which 
information can be created or spread by amending and adding to a taxonomy of torts is 
difficult. Instead, we propose to base the interest of informational privacy on a balance 
between the ability of data controllers to create and disseminate information, and the 
guarantees against them doing so. Nevertheless, these taxonomies bring something 
very important to the scholarly discussion: they take the shifting, subjective views 
surrounding privacy and lay them out as a comprehensive guide. 
 
III. Helen Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity: A New Way 
of Thinking about Privacy 
 
After looking at taxonomies of privacy and identifying the patterns of new dimensions of 
privacy appearing and requiring revisions of these taxonomies, we will now analyze 
another type of privacy conceptualisation which focuses on some of the underlying forces 
we have identified: Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity. 
 
In Helen Nissenbaum’s theorized framework of “contextual integrity”102, privacy consists 
of appropriate flows of information: instead of focusing on the data itself, the focus being 
on whether the flow is correct for the context in which it is shared103. As such it is possible 
to identify the appropriateness of the flow of information without focusing on the data 
itself, but also on relevant outside factors104. 
 
An example is the doctor–patient relationship: in such a context, individuals confide very 
personal information to their doctor, but the social and legal context binds the doctor from 
sharing that information, while a similar obligation does not bind the patient, if the doctor 
were to confide similarly personal information to them105. 
102 Nissenbaum, H. (2004). Privacy as contextual integrity. Washington law review 79.1. 
103 Ibid 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid 
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 “Contextual integrity” allows for separating the privacy concerns from the data itself, by 
focusing instead on appropriate information flows, with a breach occurring where those 
flows are not appropriate. This vision of privacy as flows of information is effective when 
taking into account the changing landscape of the personal data processing field, as it is 
adaptable to technological changes due to always retaining the same elements: a 
sender, a receiver, a message, and a referent of the message. However, this definition, 
in and of itself, does not posit a justificatory framework as to where contextual integrity 
needs to be maintained or not. Nissenbaum has addressed it by looking at US law and 
identifying three principles of privacy law arising from it - “(1) limiting surveillance of 
citizens and use of information about them by agents of government, (2) restricting 
access to sensitive, personal, or private information, and (3) curtailing intrusions into 
places deemed private or personal.”106. 
 
In that way, contextual integrity creates a basis on which it can be applied. We build on 
this theory in this work by focusing on the ‘’informational privacy’’ interest, instead of on 
the wider notion of ‘’privacy’’. This limited scope will allow us to set aside the various 
other interests covered under the umbrella of privacy and focus on a particular interest 
which, as we will argue, is key to addressing the challenges of the Information Age. 
 
IV. Understanding ‘’Informational Privacy’’: An Interest 
Linked to Data Protection and Privacy 
 
The scope of this work is limited to one specific interest, ‘’informational privacy’’. As we 
have shown so far, no conception of privacy has fully managed to encompass all of the 
various interests of ‘’privacy’’, and as we will show in the next chapter of this thesis the 
same is true for ‘’data protection’’. Instead, we will focus on this particular interest. This 
is done for a number of reasons: first, as we will show, informational privacy is an interest 
that has been heavily disrupted in the age of Big Data, which has led to other interests 
being also impacted. As such, protecting informational privacy protects those interests 
as well. Second, informational privacy sees an overlap between privacy and data 
protection law, allowing for a study of both these rights through the lens of a single 
interest. Third, informational privacy, as we will show, is a relatively unique interest in 
that it is based on a balance of ‘’availability’’ of information and not on any specific 
‘’harms’’ that may arise from its breach. Because of all those factors, we argue that 
106 Ibid 
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protecting this interest, using a balance between the means of obtaining information and 
the forces which prevent that information from being obtained, is vital in handling the 
challenges brought about by the age of Big Data. 
 
This idea of ‘’informational privacy’’ as an interest is far from new107 and has been 
described and defined in a number of ways108. This interest is so central that some have 
claimed that it is synonymous to privacy as a whole109. Nevertheless, as we will see, its 
definition has remained muddled110.  
 
There have been multiple attempts to map out the various interests covered under the 
right to privacy111. The one we will make most reference to in this thesis will be the 
typology of privacy elaborated by Bert-Jaap Koops and a team of scholars112. According 
to this typology, the various interests covered under the umbrella of ‘’privacy’’ are 
arranged under two axes - one going from the ‘’personal space’’ to the ‘’public zone’’, 
and one going from placing the emphasis on the ability to be left alone to placing it on 
the freedom towards self-development113. 
 
Though not aimed at being a perfect and all-encompassing classification, it contains 
eight primary ideals of privacy. Bodily privacy (interest in the privacy of one’s physical 
body), spatial privacy (interest in having a private space), proprietary privacy (image and 
reputation), intellectual privacy (privacy of thought and mind), decisional privacy (the 
ability to make intimate decisions), associational privacy (interests in being free to 
choose who one’s close associates are), and behavioural privacy (privacy while 
conducting publicly visible activities). This typology highlights how the European 
approach to privacy is broad and encompasses a large number of interests. Privacy 
includes the right to respect for one’s business premises 114 or the right to have one’s 
107 Floridi, L. (2006). Four challenges for a theory of informational privacy. Ethics and 
Information technology, 8(3), 109-119. 
108 Tavani, H. T. (2008). Informational privacy: Concepts, theories, and controversies. The 
handbook of information and computer ethics, 131-164. 
109 Parent, W.A. (1983).Privacy, morality and the Law. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(4), 269-
288. 
110 Cohen, J. E. (1999). Examined lives: Informational privacy and the subject as object. Stan. L. 
Rev., 52, 1373. 
111 Tavani (n.108) 
112 Koops et al (n.24) 
113 Ibid 
114 ECtHR, Société Colas Est and others v. France, Application no. 37971/97, Judgment of 16 
April 2002.  
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gender identity rectified in public records115, thus touching on a wide scope of rights and 
interests. 
 
This typology makes informational privacy a separate interest altogether, an overarching 
aspect of each type, ‘’typified by the interest in preventing information about oneself from 
being collected and in controlling information about oneself that others have legitimate 
access to.’’116 Since each element of privacy contains some element of restricting 
information about oneself, every privacy aspect contains informational privacy. This also 
means that if a technological innovation impacts informational privacy every aspect of 
privacy is also impacted. As we will show, the biggest transformation of the Big Data era 
is how information is created and shared, and the profound impact on privacy is the result 
of this transformation impacting primarily informational privacy. 
 
One theory of informational privacy has been called the ‘’restricted access theory’’, which 
claims that one has informational privacy when one is able to limit or restrict others from 
access to their personal information117. This approach was developed in the US, and is 
based on ‘’zones’’ where there is a distinction between ‘’public’’ and ‘’private’’ spaces (a 
notion we will approach in Chapter 4, showing its limitations). Another is based on 
‘’control’’, the ability to control who has access to information about us and the ability to 
create and maintain various relationships118. This echoes the typology we previously 
analysed, showing that informational privacy is based on information control, and through 
it touches on every part of privacy. 
 
One of these theories includes the aforementioned ‘’privacy as contextual integrity’’ by 
Helen Nissenbaum, based on appropriate flows of information. Beyond this work, 
another ‘’benchmark’’ approach is made by Luciano Floridi: an ‘’Ontological 
Interpretation’’ of informational privacy, based on the forces which limit the availability of 
personal information, arguing that privacy is ‘’nothing less than the defence of the 
personal integrity of a packet of information’’119, arguing that a breach of one’s 
‘’informational sphere’’ is a breach of one’s personal identity. The limitation of Floridi’s 
approach is conflating informational privacy with other types of privacy - linked to identity 
115 See cases such as Rees v. UK (ECtHR, Rees v. UK, Application no. 9532/81, Judgment of 
25 October 1986), Cossey v. UK (ECtHR, Cossey v. UK, Application no. 10843/84, Judgment of 
27 September 1990, Series A, No. 184), B v. France (ECtHR, B v. France, Application no. 
13343/87, Judgment of 25 March 1992) or Goodwin v. UK (ECtHR, Christine Goodwin v. the 
United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95, Judgment of 11 July 2002) for examples of such 
cases. 
116 Koops et al (n.24) 
117 Tavani (n.108) 
118 Ibid 
119 Floridi (n.107) 
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or autonomy - which brings in a group of interests that are difficult to untangle120. 
Nevertheless, it allows oneto view information as a balance of forces, which is an idea 
that inspires this thesis. 
 
Informational privacy is based on the ability to create and disseminate information about 
individuals. Information being obtained about individuals by large entities is not new - 
from William the Conqueror creating a ‘’Domesday Book’’ including data about every one 
of his subjects121 to census record kept by governments as far back as the Roman era122. 
When that ability is too widespread, it impacts other interests of privacy: for example, 
instant photography at the time of Warren and Brandeis alongside the rise of tabloids 
had an impact on associational privacy (information on who one spent one’s time with 
was easier to record and disseminate), as well as proprietary privacy (information on 
what one owns and prefers is also easier to obtain and share), amongst others. In fact, 
associational privacy, as an interest, did not change. As a societal value, being able to 
choose freely with whom one associates without the judgment or knowledge of others 
was as important before instant photography as it was after it, or as it is now in the 21st 
century. As we will see in Chapter 3, this is true of many interests of privacy, which shows 
that not only is informational privacy the one interest which overlaps all others, but that 
fact also makes it a core source of the challenges both privacy and data protection are 
facing. 
 
Because the creation and sharing of information is easier than it has ever been, various 
entities - companies, individuals, governments - have been able to obtain vast amounts 
of information about individuals in an ever-expanding fashion. Meanwhile, means to limit 
what these entities can do with that information have not changed significantly. This has 
led to an imbalance, between the information that these entities are able to obtain and 
share, and the guarantees against them being able to do so. As we have seen throughout 
this chapter, and as we will develop further throughout this thesis, there is a pattern 
showing that when the balance between the information that can be created and the 
guarantees on that information becomes imbalanced, new guarantees will appear to 
restore the balance. This, we will show, is the core of what informational privacy is: the 
existence of sufficient guarantees to limit the information about individuals which can be 
created and shared. 
 
120 Tavani (n.108) 
121 Ibid 
122 Shank, R. (1986). Privacy: History, legal, social, and ethical aspects. In Library Trends 35 (1) 
Summer 1986: Privacy, Secrecy, and National Information Policy: 7-18 
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We will organize these guarantees alongside a taxonomy developed by Lawrence 
Lessig123, whose theory identified four types of forces which affect behaviour: Law, Social  
Norms, Market and Architecture (in this case, “Architecture” being the technological 
environment). The use of this taxonomy is based on two main reasons: first, to allow an 
examination of those various forces and how they interact (for example, some 
technological developments like the easily-disseminated tabloids of Warren and 
Brandeis do not allow any new information-gathering, but made it cheaper to spread that 
information, thus incentivizing a breach of informational privacy by making it profitable), 
and second to allow a framework in which every situation which involves informational 
privacy, in any context or time period, can be examined using a common benchmark. 
 
Out of the control mechanisms which are able to control information flows, the one we 
have focused the most on in this analysis is the legal mechanism. The GDPR, for 
example, uses legal mechanisms to deal with specific practices. For example, it includes 
special provisions for data profiling124, targeting a specific practice with restrictions, in 
this case decisions based solely on automated processing. 
 
But these forces can also be technological - for example, automatically compiling 
customers’ purchases into one database and automatically creating full profiles from 
dozens of different data sources are both “automated processing operations”, but one 
has less technological capability for information creation. As such, one needs fewer legal 
control measures to be balanced.  
 
These controls can also be social. Relying on social trends is always uncertain, as they 
can change over time, however social norms play an important role of regulating 
behavior parallel to legal ones. There is no law against revealing someone’s secret, but 
social norms ensure that it is possible to share information with a reasonable guarantee 
that it will not be revealed to those outside your confidence. 
 
Finally, these controls can also be economic, that is, Market-oriented. Paparazzi are 
more interested in the lives of celebrities than regular people because information about 
their private life is more valuable, while data only is gathered and analyzed in a privacy-
intrusive way when it became a valuable commodity. By increasing or reducing 
incentives to gather this information (including making it more or less difficult to obtain or 
process), the information can be protected. Controlling these incentives is as important 
as stemming it through legal or social means. 
123 Lessig (n.36) 
124 GDPR, Article 22 
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 The framework developed in this thesis takes from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual 
integrity, Lessig’s’s taxonomy, Floridi’s ontological interpretation of informational privacy, 
and Bert-Jaap Koops’ typology of privacy to formulate informational privacy thus:  
 
‘’Informational privacy is preserved when the Information relating to individuals which 
can be obtained and disseminated is bound by sufficient Guarantees.’’ 
 
This definition highlights what we aim to achieve with this conception: protecting 
informational privacy through assessing whether information is as available as it should 
be, and proposing ways of limiting such availability. As we will see in later chapters, 
whether information ‘’should be’’ available is reliant on a further hypothesis of this thesis, 
which is that the various interests privacy protects (and which depend on informational 
privacy) have kept their societal value over time, and will continue to do so. 
 
We will now develop an overview of how privacy, and especially informational privacy, 
was conceptualised in the legal system around which this thesis will be developed: EU 
law. This will guide our analysis as well as start to introduce the role of data protection 
and how it interacts with privacy in protecting the interest of informational privacy. 
 
V. Sources of Informational Privacy in EU law: Privacy 
and Data Protection 
 
Before studying the right to data protection and how it aims to protect informational 
privacy, the relationship between privacy and data protection requires some analysis. 
Indeed, we assert that the core overlap between those two rights is informational privacy. 
 
The EU authorities have not been forthright about why the right to data protection was 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the European Union’s Article 8125. 
Nevertheless, the idea that privacy and data protection should remain steadfastly 
separate has been expressed by the academic community (such as Roger Brownsword 
stating that the link between the two needs to be “clean and clear”126), and the relation 
125  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, 
Article 8 
126 Brownsword, R. (2009) Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing, and 
Confidentiality’ in Reinventing data protection? by S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. de Hert, & C. de 
Terwangne (Eds.). Dordrecht: Springer. 
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between privacy, data protection and informational privacy was held to be “not commonly 
understood”127. 
 
Some models base the relationship between the two on being aimed at protecting 
“human dignity” - with an early 1983 German case making that link128, then backed by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union expanding the applicability of Article 8 to 
protect human dignity in cases related to the patentability of body parts129 or a human 
embryo130, or the prohibition of a laser game simulating killing131. Nevertheless, the right 
to human dignity remains relatively vague in the Big Data era132, covering a number of 
subsequent rights and interests, including not just privacy and data protection but the 
right to life and to free expression133, as shown by the fact that the ECtHR held that the 
State should have a large margin of discretion when applying that right134. 
 
Another vision is data protection simply as one element of privacy, as a new evolution in 
protecting a “right to be left alone”, and only aimed at protecting privacy in the digital age. 
However, there are multiple privacy interests which have only a tenuous link to data 
protection such as a person’s control over their own body135. Instead, data protection is 
an independent right, which serves a number of purposes. As observed by Orla Lynskey 
in “The foundations of EU data protection law”: “While it is often accepted that data 
protection serves a multitude of purposes in addition to protecting informational privacy, 
there has been insufficient effort to identify and explain the rationale of these 
objectives.”136 In other words, though both the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection have a number of goals and interests that they seek to protect, one area where 
the overlap is most prominent is informational privacy. This is where our analysis will 
focus. 
 
127 Lynskey, O. (2015). The foundations of EU data protection law. Oxford University Press. 
128 Judgment of 15 December 1983, 1 BvR 209/83, BVerfG 65, 1. 
129 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079.  
130 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I-09821 
131 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin 
der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
132 Caulfield, T., & Brownsword, R. (2006). Human dignity: a guide to policy making in the 
biotechnology era?. Nature Reviews Genetics, 7(1), 72. 
133  Lynskey (n.127) 
134  Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 21 
135  Lynskey (n.127)  
136 Ibid 
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Meanwhile, case law from the ECHR also links together data protection and Article 8137. 
An example can be found S. Marper v. the United Kingdom138, in which the judgment 
stated that “The mere storing of  data  relating  to  the  private  life  of  an  individual  
amounts  to  an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights”139. Meanwhile, there are other cases such as Ben Faiza v. France140 
where placing a real-time geolocation device on one’s vehicle by the police constituted 
a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, L.H. v. Latvia141 where the collection of one’s personal 
medical data by a State agency without consent was a violation of Article 8, and Malone 
v. the United Kingdom142 in which interception of postal and telephone communications 
by the police was considered a violation of Article 8. All these show that there is a strong 
link between the right to private life and informational privacy. 
 
In conclusion, “informational privacy” is one of the interests protected by EU law, using 
primarily a combination of privacy and data protection, as evidenced by the use of data 
protection and Article 8 of the ECHR to restrict the creation, dissemination and use of 
information. That interest has the aim of protecting individuals by restricting the 
information collected and processed by data controllers, and is enforced by a number of 
rights restricting different information-related practices143, and implementing safeguards. 
A common criticism of the GDPR is that it uses tools which cannot follow the progression 
of technology and might hamper innovation144. We argue that this is because of a 
conception of informational privacy based on some assumptions about data and 
information that are being challenged in the Big Data era. Nevertheless, as we will show, 
the GDPR is showing signs of accepting a new framework, going beyond a binary 
definition of ‘’personal data’’ and towards a contextual approach. 
137 De Hert, P., & Gutwirth, S. (2009). Data protection in the case law of Strasbourg and 
Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in action. In Reinventing data protection? (pp. 3-44). Springer, 
Dordrecht. 
138 S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [2008], Applications no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
ECHR 1581 § 67 
139 S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [2008], Applications no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
ECHR 1581 § 67 
140 Ben Faiza v. France [2018], Application no. 31446/12, ECHR 153 
141 L.H. v. Latvia [2014], Application no. 52019/07, ECHR 515 
142 Malone v United Kingdom [1984], Application no. 8691/79, ECHR 10  
143 Rotenberg, M. and Jacob, D. (2013), Updating the law of information privacy: the new 
framework of the European Union, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36 Issue 2 
144 Hildebrandt, M. and Tielemans, L. (2013) Data protection by design and technology neutral 
law. Computer Law & Security Review 29.5509-521. 
44 
 
                                               
 Conclusion: Informational Privacy as a Self-contained 
Interest 
 
“Privacy” and “Informational Privacy” are not synonymous. The former is a wide bundle 
of interests touching on various issues without unifying definition, but is protected under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. The latter is a more specific interest enshrined in European Law 
through, primarily, some uses of Article 8 and through Data Protection legislation.  
 
As we have seen through studying different privacy conceptions, all of them, starting with 
Warren and Brandeis, have in common the idea of controlling the creation, 
dissemination, and use of information, whether it means addressing the appearance of 
widely distributed gossip columns in the 19th century or the NSA collecting data on 
individuals in the 21st century. Whether we are talking about surveillance in public, 
intrusion in private, or social media tracking somewhere in the middle, tools to gather 
information are present, and are limited by control mechanisms, constructed to limit 
these tools as they develop.  
 
This interest is “informational privacy”: controls on the creation, dissemination, and usage 
of information affecting individuals. As we will show, the GDPR has introduced new tools 
which affect these different controls, showing signs of moving towards the approach 
developed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Informational Privacy and the Right to 
Data Protection 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended to show European data protection regulation through the prism 
of “informational privacy”, and the declared goals and philosophy of the regulatory 
framework. An understanding of this framework is necessary in order to understand fully 
how it currently protects informational privacy, and the challenges to that protection 
brought about by the age of Big Data. 
 
Indeed, “data protection”, as a notion separate from “privacy”, is a young right, only a few 
decades old145. Its appearance, as we will show, is due to the same changes that have 
driven the transformation of privacy. Hence, we will argue that data protection was 
created simply as being able to regulate behaviours in a way that privacy law could not, 
primarily because of the complex scope of privacy described in Chapter 1. Therefore, we 
will only analyse data protection within the bounds of the same concept of “informational 
privacy” within which we analysed privacy. Data protection covers a number of interests 
unrelated to privacy (including self-determination146, no-discrimination147 or 
competition148), though interests that go beyond informational privacy are outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
In order to understand the European vision of data protection, it is necessary to 
understand the roots of that right and its goals. Through an analysis of the European 
data protection regime, we will show that though the GDPR attempts to avoids any 
question of “privacy” , it eventually recognizes a link between the two rights. We will also 
show that the European legislators have started using new tools, such as ones creating 
indirect social and economic pressure, to safeguard the right to data protection. This will 
highlight the fact that a multi-disciplinary approach, going beyond purely legal tools, is 
145 Bennett (n.5)  
146 Hornung, G., & Schnabel, C. (2009). Data protection in Germany I: The population census 
decision and the right to informational self-determination. Computer Law & Security Review, 
25(1), 84-88. 
147 Schreurs et al (n.16) 
148 Kerber, W. (2016). Digital markets, data, and privacy: competition law, consumer law and 
data protection. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 11(11), 856-866. 
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both an effective way to protect informational privacy, and an approach that the EU has 
already starting moving towards. 
 
A. The Development of EU Data Protection Law: A 
Young Right  
 
Though the keeping of records by governments of information about individuals is ages 
old149,  the concept of “data protection” appeared at the same time as the modern 
understanding of “data”, in the second half of the XXth Century150. 
 
The main factor in the rise of Data Protection is naturally the rise of data-processing 
systems coming with the age of computing, in order to implement checks and balances 
to limit these new tools. However, this does not account for all of the development in the 
field. The rise in individual rights, especially against the State, after World War II has 
affected privacy, and later data protection. 
 
Data Protection as a means to protect privacy takes its roots from Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights151, which states that “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
 
Data Protection arose in Europe with the influence of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe, starting in the 1980s. 
The OECD established non-binding guidelines in 1980, holding principles which were 
later built on by subsequent legislation. They include that data should be accurate, that 
the purpose of collection should be specified, and that the data gatherer has a 
responsibility against the access, destruction, modification or dissemination of that 
data152. The Guidelines also provided for transparency, including the right to know what 
kind of data was being collected, and the right that the individual correct or erase that 
data. A familiar addition, which is the source of a maelstrom of conflict in the field of data 
149 Roch, M. P. (1996). Filling the Void of Data Protection in the United States : Following the 
European Example. Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, 12(1), 71–96. Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol12/iss1/3 
150 Bennett (n.5) 
151 Article 8, ECHR 
152 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recommendation 
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
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protection153, is the limitation of cross-border flows of data to countries which have 
adequate existing protections154.  
 
These principles were quite vague, showing how the development of specific data 
protection provisions took some time to be fleshed out, though the basic principles the 
EU used have remained unchanged: top-down regulation limiting practices involving 
data, with some goal of user control and transparency. 
 
Meanwhile, the Council of Europe, an entity created with the promotion of human rights 
in mind, began to study data protection legislation in 1968155, and passed a resolution to 
protect “personal data” in 1974. Similar principles to the OECD can be observed, such 
as purpose limitation, rules on creation and dissemination of data, and transparency 
towards individuals156. Of particular interest is the fundamental place “personal 
information” holds in this conception, a structural decision which made sense then but 
does not now. These guidelines became the first binding data protection instrument in 
Europe as the 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data157. 
 
That Convention applies to both the public and private sectors - showing the European 
interest in focusing on the individual and those infringing on his dignity-based privacy 
interests, wherever they come from. Aside from the accuracy, purpose limitation, and 
legitimacy issues seen in the previous works, it altogether prohibits the gathering of 
information related to race, religion, health, and other matters considered particularly 
private158. This division of data based primarily on certain factors pertaining to the data 
itself in a vacuum is apparent from the first data protection instrument, which as we will 
show is the source of a growing problem. 
 
Because the Convention allowed States to implement it as they pleased, harmony 
between European nations was not complete, which led to frictions and obstacles due to 
the cross-boundary transfer provisions not allowing such transfers if protection 
153 See  Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (No.2), [2014] IEHC 351 (2014). 
154 Hoepman, J. H., Hubbers, E., Jacobs, B., Oostdijk, M., & Schreur, R. W. (2006, October). 
Crossing borders: Security and privacy issues of the european e-passport. In International 
Workshop on Security (pp. 152-167). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
155 Cole, P. (1985). New Challenges to the U.S. Multinational Corporation in the European 
Economic Community. Data Protection Laws, 17 N.Y.U. J. Iirr'rL L. & POL. 893, 898 n.30 
156Roch (n.149) 
157 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. TS. No. 108 
158 Ibid, Article 6 
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requirements between the two States were uneven159. As we will see, harmonization of 
data protection norms is possibly the most conflictual aspect of European data 
protection, especially in opposition with the US. 
 
Not all data protection legislation at the European level came from supra-national 
entities. Sweden and West Germany were the first States to implement comprehensive 
data protection rules. Sweden started implementing data protection norms in 1973 with 
the Swedish Data Bank Statute, requiring governmental authorization to collect personal 
data, and a Data Inspection Board enforcing the statute and monitoring compliance160. 
 
In West Germany, privacy was enshrined in the Constitution after World War II which led 
to a first Data Protection Law in 1970, though it was limited to one State and only to the 
public sector161. In 1977, West Germany developed a precursor to the Council of Europe 
at the national level, the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz which had a wider scope and 
protected “natural persons”, containing similar protections as the Convention, and 
including a supervisory body. 
 
These national examples show us the trend in European countries: a unified data 
protection legislation, protecting individuals, supported and enforced by a supervisory 
agency. As we will see, all of European data protection regulation since has followed in 
the footsteps of this model. 
 
These efforts coalesced in 1990, when the European Commission drafted three 
proposals to protect personal data rights. The first dealt with personal data collection, the 
second with electronic data networks, and the third with, specifically, information 
security162. 
 
The 1992 Amended Proposal on Data Protection acknowledges the conflict between the 
interests of data privacy and free flow of personal data163, such as in order to protect 
freedom of the press. This limitation highlights the real focus of data protection: 
commercial and governmental use of data164. 
 
159Roch (n.149) 
160 Cole (n.155) 
161 Ibid 
162 Roch (n.149) 
163 European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1992 OJ. (C 311) 4 [hereinafter Amended Proposal]. 
164 Roch (n.149) 
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A recurring theme, which took a back seat with more recent developments, was a focus 
on “data quality”: the requirement that data must be kept current, updated, and accurate, 
with a burden on the data controller or processor. This has the side effect of encouraging 
limiting the data kept by data controllers, to avoid the burden of updating mountains of 
irrelevant data165. This links back to the original torts identified with misrepresentation or 
false light, which mainly grew out of an economic concern but evolved in the European 
context to be closer to a moral concern, of transparency and control over one’s identity 
and how it is perceived by others. 
 
The development of a primarily rights-based European approach can be seen in the 
development of such control measures for individuals. Instead of a torts-based approach 
such as the one used in the US, European development of legislation is focused on 
establishing a high standard of rights, starting with the ones in the Amended Proposal.   
 
The Network Draft designed by the European Commission in 1990 was intended to 
complement the Amended proposals in the area of telecommunications - adding extra 
regulatory constraints to that industry166. This continues the pattern of addressing 
problematic new developments with new constraints as they appear, with the usual 
latency that legal action takes. By the time the Data Protection Directive167, based on 
these legal developments, came into effect in 1995, new types of technologies - in 
particular, the Internet, and later the explosion in digital storage leading to the 
phenomenon of Big Data - were already in their early stages. As we will show, one of the 
main limitations of the Directive was that it focuses too much on “personal data”, while 
developments in the field of Big Data have created new concerns which go beyond 
simply the “personal data” framework that has been in development since the OECD’s 
Guidelines. Nevertheless, we will show that the creation of ‘’Data Protection’’ as a 
separate, whole right is a legal innovation which has allowed new solutions to the 
challenges of the Information Age168. 
 
These developments mirror the evolution seen in the previous chapter: both privacy and 
data protection have had their major transformations directly related to new ways of 
processing data. As we will see, the latest development in EU data protection law, the 
165 Ibid 
166 Ibid 
167 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, Off. J.L. 281 (Nov. 23, 1995) ("Data Protection Directive") 
168 Safari, B. A. (2016). Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe's GDPR Will Set a New Global 
Standard for Personal Data Protection. Seton Hall L. Rev., 47, 809. 
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GDPR, has implemented new tools which show a move towards a new type of approach: 
one based on protecting informational privacy through compensating new tools giving 
more power to data controllers with guarantees limiting that power. 
 
As a new legal right, data protection’s scope has increasingly widened over time, both 
through the legal instrument mentioned above, but also through case law. The European 
Court of Human Rights has developed a number of such cases where the protection of 
personal data was an important element, especially regarding state surveillance, such 
as in cases of tapping phone conversations 169 or phone metadata170. 
 
B. Innovations in EU Data Protection Law: First Hints of 
a Balancing Approach 
 
In the previous section we have shown how European data protection evolved to become 
the developed right it is today. In this section, we will show instances where the European 
data protection authorities have accepted the need to foray outside the bounds of the 
traditional means of protecting individuals, and how this is indicative of a shift towards 
the balance-based framework developed in this thesis. We will show that the new rights 
and principles created by the GDPR heavily rely on taking into account the context of the 
data processing, and the risk it presents to various interests of the data subject. This 
shows that even though attempts have been made to distance the right to data protection 
from other rights, especially privacy, the two are still strongly linked. 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation came into effect on the 25th of May 2018. 
Replacing the outdated Data Protection Directive, it introduces a new and expanded set 
of rules for promoting individual control over data and for increased transparency, 
replacing the European framework on data protection previously enshrined mainly in the 
1995 Data Protection Directive 171.  
 
169 See ECtHR, Klass v. Germany, Application no. 5029/71, Judgement of 6 September 1978, 
ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerkand, Application no. 27798/95, Judgement of 16 February 2000, or 
ECtHR, Halford v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 June 2997, Reports, 1997-III 
170 See ECtHR, Malone v. United Kingdom, Application no. 8961/79, Judgment of 2 August 
1984, ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdrom, Application no. 44787/95, Judgment of 4 
May 2000, or ECtHR, Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no.  62617/00, Judgment of 
23 April 2007 
171  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, Off. J.L. 281 (Nov. 23, 1995) ("Data Protection Directive") 
51 
 
                                               
In order to analyse the parts of the GDPR which show evidence of moving away from 
the ‘’personal data’’ binary, and towards a ‘’balance-based’’ framework, we will first study 
some new rights which signal the existence of this new way of conceptualizing 
informational privacy, and will then go over the ways in which the GDPR, in its attempts 
to expand its influence to a global scale, has opened itself up to using these forces to 
achieve its goals. In other words, we will show that where the Law is unable to protect 
informational privacy, other Guarantees come in - a core hypothesis of this work. These 
measures relying on new forces notably either first appeared with the GDPR, or were 
strongly reinforced by it. This highlights the two frameworks the GDPR is currently 
moving between: an instrument built on pillars that are becoming problematic, while 
attempting to implement new tools that can deal with emerging problems in innovative 
ways. 
 
I. New Rights and Principles in the Age of Big Data: 
Contextual Tests and the Accountability Principle 
 
1. Rights against Automated Individual Decision-making 
 
A core new right that was created by the GDPR is Article 22 on automated individual 
decision-making172. According to Article 22:  
 
“Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject 
or significantly affects him or her, to be prohibited unless authorised by Union or Member 
State law to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate safeguards 
for the rights and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller.”173 
 
The second paragraph in Article 22 then moves on to adding special requirements where 
the profiling is done based on special categories of personal data (namely, “suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms”), with paragraph 3 
prohibiting, specifically, “profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on 
the basis of special categories of personal data”. 
172 GDPR, Article 22 
173 GDPR, Article 11 
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 The right to non-discrimination exists in EU law and was already well-established since 
well before even the Data Protection Directive, being  referenced at Article 14 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights174, Articles 18-25 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union175, and Article 21 of the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union176. Individual profiling is inherently challenging to 
informational privacy because it is a practice which is inherently discriminatory177 in the 
fact that it consists of making assumptions about people based on certain characteristics. 
Because any characteristic about a person is, by definition, “information relating to” that 
individual, profiling is inherently an activity covered by data protection. Particularly, 
profiling is becoming more prevalent as more data about individuals is captured178.  
 
Of course, banning all profiling is not practical. Instead, the focus is on profiling which 
has an “adverse legal effect” on the data subject or “similarly significantly affects him or 
her”. This part, particularly, shows the EU’s wide interpretation of the interests data 
protection is meant to protect. The Article 29 Working Party attempted to clear up this 
definition in an opinion paper179, mentioning child or housing benefits, or being subjected 
to increased surveillance measures, as potential legal effects180. This was then 
expanded by guidance from the Irish data protection authority on data protection impact 
assessments181, which listed factors which may be considered to ‘’significantly affect’’ 
data subjects, including ‘’being charged more for good or services than he or she would 
otherwise be charged’’, ‘’being refused unemployment or access to good or services’’, or 
‘’loss of entitled to a particular social benefit conferred by law, such as child or housing 
benefit’’182. 
 
174 ECHR, Article 14 
175 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 22, 2010 O.J. C 83/01 
176 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, 
Article 21 
177 Goodman (n.28) 
178 Koops, B. J. (2014). The trouble with European data protection law. International Data 
Privacy Law, 4(4), 250-261. 
179 Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation, WP251, Adopted on 3 October 2017 
180 Wachter, S and Mittelstadt, B, and Floridi, L. (2016), Why a Right to Explanation of 
Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(December 28, 2016). International Data Privacy Law, 2017. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2903469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2903469 
181 Comisiún Cosanta Sonraí (2018), Draft list of types of Data Processing Operations which 
require a Data Protection Impact Assessment 
182 Ibid 
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The Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion opens up a wide variety of possible factors by 
stating that:  “Processing that might have little impact on individuals generally may in fact 
have a significant effect on certain groups of society, such as minority groups or 
vulnerable adults. For example, someone in financial difficulties who is regularly shown 
adverts for on-line gambling may sign up for these offers and potentially incur further 
debt.” If this definition can apply to a characteristic to which anyone is potentially 
vulnerable to (such as being in financial difficulties), it can apply to any kind of difficulty 
that affects one’s behavior. The line is quite blurry: if one is not meant to target people in 
financial difficulties with gambling advertisements, what kind of financial difficulties 
qualify? This is an assessment and an approach that heavily relies on context, and 
heavily relies on assessing the ability the data controller has to make decisions which 
‘’significantly affect’’ the individual. Despite the fact that data protection has been 
identified as a separate right in its own right, isolated from the difficulties of defining 
“privacy”, context still has to be taken into account, and part of the context is whether the 
data processing is affecting the right to privacy of the data subject. 
 
 
2. The Right to be Forgotten  
 
The right against automated decision-making is not the only new right which is heavily 
reliant on context. Another right, the “right to be forgotten”183, has created challenging 
questions as to where data should and should not be kept.  
 
The “data minimisation” principle stipulates that only the minimum amount of data need 
be kept to accomplish the purposes of processing184. This principle requires that only  
“relevant” data be processed, leading to instant conflicts about what “relevant” means185.  
 
The discussion over what is or is not “relevant” was inflamed by the Google Spain 
case186, in which an individual argued successfully that search engine giant Google could 
be compelled to remove from its search results facts which "appear to be inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant or excessive in the light of the time that had elapsed."187 
183 GDPR, Article 17 
184 GDPR, Article 5 
185 Ausloos, J. (2012). The ‘right to be forgotten’–worth remembering?. Computer Law & 
Security Review, 28(2), 143-152. 
186 Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos 
(2014) 
187 Ibid 
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This statement constitutes direct evidence that the status of data changes with context. 
In this case, an individual’s criminal record could de-indexed from Google after a certain 
amount of time - so that the person can live a life beyond their history, hence the name 
“right to be forgotten”188.  
 
This judgment has important implications, which include freedom of the press, public 
security, and deeper questions about individuality and change. The idea that time can 
allow personal data to be more or less ‘’relevant’’ implies that factors beyond the data 
itself, the context surrounding the processing of this data, changes its relevance. Time 
is just one such factor189, in fact any amount of factors about the data can change the 
rights associated with it. If age is relevant, what about other contextual elements? In the 
same way that we discussed previously with the “similarly affects him or her” element of 
Article 22, the ability to look at any relevant factors is also opening the door to a fully-
contextual approach. Does information about the person’s public involvement with 
political activists, an individual’s shopping list or the car they once drove also become 
irrelevant as time goes by? Is it only for purposes that society frowns upon and thus 
might affect the individual in undue ways, and in which case how far does this go?  
 
Data contextuality seems bound to be an element to be taken into account by attempts 
to regulate it, and so accepting those factors in legal decisions ends up being necessary, 
indicating that the GDPR is showing signs of accepting this contextual approach. 
 
Another aspect where the new provisions of the GDPR touch on new tools to use in the 
goal of protection for individuals can be found, not in the new rights, but in a new 
principle: the principle of accountability. 
 
3.  Accountability: Reinforcing data protection compliance 
social norms 
 
 
The principle of accountability requires a level of awareness and transparency 
throughout the whole organisation of the data controller, and the ability to demonstrate 
188 Ambrose, M. L., & Ausloos, J. (2013). The right to be forgotten across the pond. Journal of 
Information Policy, 3, 1-23. 
189 Korenhof, P., Ausloos, J., Szekely, I., Ambrose, M., Sartor, G., & Leenes, R. (2015). Timing 
the right to be forgotten: A study into “time” as a factor in deciding about retention or erasure of 
data. In Reforming European data protection law (pp. 171-201). Springer, Dordrecht. 
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that the principles of the Regulation are being followed190. This new principle, which did 
not exist in the Data Protection Directive, has entirely changed the way data protection 
regulation is approached by organisations: making compliance about being accountable, 
direct, open191. Transparency, through clear information and notices, is a cornerstone of 
the GDPR192. This idea of increasing trust is directly mentioned in the GDPR’s Recital 7, 
which mentions “the importance of creating the trust that will allow the digital economy 
to develop across the internal market”193. 
 
The idea of “accountability” was primarily driven by a number of factors - such as the 
need to develop a framework ensuring an unfragmented approach to data protection194. 
But additionally, the goal of this new principle is to change a general public perception 
that the rights of individuals were not being protected195. The GDPR attempts to do so 
by ensuring that trust-building between the different parties is strengthened. In other 
words, the new Regulation’s “cornerstone is the concept of trust: trust in data controllers 
to treat personal information responsibly, and trust that the rules will be effectively 
enforced”196. This goes beyond a legal responsibility, and into a greater, socio-ethical 
responsibility to perform tasks in a way which is in line with greater societal goals197. 
 
There was already some element of accountability in the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in 1980, which stated that 
a “data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect 
to the principles”198, though the Data Protection Directive did not explicitly recognize 
accountability. It was in 2010 that the Article 29 Working Party advised that some 
additional tools to ensure the application of privacy laws needed to be added to the 
190 GDPR, Article 5(2) 
191 GDPR, Recital 39 
192 Cradock, E., Millard, D., & Stalla-Bourdillon, S. (2015, May). Investigating Similarity Between 
Privacy Policies of Social Networking Sites as a Precursor for Standardization. In Proceedings 
of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web (pp. 283-289). ACM. 
193 GDPR, Recital 7 
194 Lindqvist, J. (2017). New challenges to personal data processing agreements: is the GDPR 
fit to deal with contract, accountability and liability in a world of the Internet of Things?. 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology. Volume 26, Issue 1, 1 March 2018, 
Pages 45–63 
195 GDPR, Recital 9: “The present differences in the level of protection of the right to the 
protection of personal data may prevent the free flow of personal data throughout the Union and 
therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of economic activities at the level of the Union, 
distort competition and impede authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under Union 
law.” 
196 Buttarelli, G. (2016). The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard, 
European Data Protection Supervisor, accessed at 14/4/2018 at https://edps.europa.eu/press-
publications/press-news/blog/eu-gdpr-clarion-call-new-global-digital-gold-standard_en 
197 Butin (n.29) 
198 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2002). OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. OECD Publishing. 
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regulatory framework199, particularly the recognition of accountability, and stressing that 
“the increase of both the risks and the value of personal data per se support the need to 
strengthen the role and responsibility of data controllers”200 (showing the close links 
between “accountability” and “responsibility”). This Opinion also goes back to the idea of 
“trust”, stating that this principle will be necessary to protect both the public and private 
sector from suffering “significant negative effects”201. Interestingly, it mentions 
“devastating consequences in both in economic and particularly in reputational terms” 
and the need to ensure “the trust of citizens and consumers”202.  
 
We assert that this developing accountability is part of a greater shift203. Businesses are 
not just becoming more accountable for data protection, but for a host of other social 
causes as well204. This is known as the doctrine of “corporate social responsibility”205, 
which encompasses a variety of interests surrounding the pressures put on businesses 
to show awareness and efforts to promote certain social values. This includes interests 
such as “listening to customers; services for disabled customers; healthy living; and data 
protection”206, as well as environmental awareness and gender equality. These values 
are being requested more and more by newer generations, both of customers207 and of 
employees208. This can be seen from concepts like the rise of free-range eggs209 to taxi 
companies offering to plant trees to offset their carbon footprint210. This ‘’social pressure 
has seen a rise in recent years and is being used by the GDPR as a tool to ensure 
transparency and accountability in organisations. This means that businesses now have 
two forces pushing them to be accountable: the GDPR’s legal obligations, and the social 
199 Cerasaro, E. F. (2017), Accountability principle under the GDPR: is data protection law 
moving from theory to practice?, LUISS Law Review, 2/2017 
200 Article 29 Working Party (2010), Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability, WP 273, 
adopted on 13 July 2010 
201 Ibid 
202 Ibid 
203 De Hert, P., & Papakonstantinou, V. (2012). The proposed data protection Regulation 
replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals. Computer Law & 
Security Review, 28(2), 130-142. 
204 Pearson, S. (2017). Strong Accountability and Its Contribution to Trustworthy Data Handling 
in the Information Society. In IFIP International Conference on Trust Management (pp. 199-
218). Springer, Cham. 
205 Jones, P., Comfort, D., & Hillier, D. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and the UK's top 
ten retailers. International Journal of retail & Distribution management, 33(12), 882-892. 
206 Ibid 
207 Pelteret, M., & Ophoff, J. (2016). A review of information privacy and its importance to 
consumers and organizations. Informing Science: The International Journal of an Emerging 
Transdiscipline, 19, 277-301. 
208 McGlone, T., Spain, J. W., & McGlone, V. (2011). Corporate social responsibility and the 
millennials. Journal of Education for Business, 86(4), 195-200. 
209 Smith, N. C. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: whether or how?. California 
management review, 45(4), 52-76. 
210 An example can be found in UK taxi firm CityCabs at 
https://www.citycabs.co.uk/news/general/city-cabs-carbon-neutral/ (last visited on 4/2/2018) 
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pressure coming from individuals (both customers and employees). In a domino effect, 
businesses tend to prefer partners which also follow these norms (a simple example is 
restaurants with “responsible” policies buying products from similarly “responsible” 
suppliers)211. This means that there is now a triple pressure on businesses: the legal 
pressure from the authorities, the social pressure from customers and employees, and 
economic pressure from business partners, all as a consequence of the wording of the 
GDPR and its focus on accountability212. 
 
Overall, as we can see, though the European Regulation is based at its core on a set of 
rules-based principles attempting to set out a self-contained framework, in the end 
practical considerations and contextual elements have made their way into the GDPR. 
We propose that this is evidence of a contextual, multi-faceted approach finding its way 
into European data protection. 
 
These indications are not only found in the rights and principles of the GDPR. We will 
show that when European Law finds itself needing to interact with other legal systems, 
the EU uses every tool at its disposal to achieve compliance – which leads to further 
indications of a contextual approach to protect informational privacy. 
 
II. A Global Instrument 
 
The core assertion of this thesis is that informational privacy can only be adequately 
protected when the ability of data controllers to process data is sufficiently limited by 
various controls, but also that this balance-based approach is already showing signs of 
being adopted by the EU. The rights and principles we have analysed in the previous 
section show that through a number of its new rights and principles, the GDPR 
recognizes the need to use a number of different controls. These controls take into 
account not just legal tools, but also market forces, social norms, and new technologies, 
both to protect data subject rights directly and to incentivize data controllers to do so. As 
we will show, this strategy of the EU to move towards creating incentives for compliance 
with the tools it introduces in the GDPR is consistent with the approach developed in this 
thesis.  
211 Maloni, M. J., & Brown, M. E. (2006). Corporate social responsibility in the supply chain: an 
application in the food industry. Journal of business ethics, 68(1), 35-52. 
212 Koops, B. J., & Leenes, R. (2014). Privacy regulation cannot be hardcoded. A critical 
comment on the ‘privacy by design’provision in data-protection law. International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, 28(2), 159-171. 
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1. The “Adequacy Test”: Multiple paths to compliance. 
 
One of the most important goals of the GDPR is to be able to protect the data of European 
residents anywhere. Because of that, sending personal data of European residents 
outside of the EU is subject to strict requirements, and can only be sent under a set of 
conditions laid out in Chapter V of the Regulation213. These include numerous 
mechanisms, such as binding corporate rules to allow transfers between branches of the 
same entity214, standard data protection clauses approved by the European 
Commission215, or approved certifications216. However, countries which are considered 
to have “adequate” protection (as decided by the European Commission) can simply 
receive and transfer data from EU countries with no additional requirements. The 
Commission takes into account various factors to see whether the other State is 
adequate. This includes respect of the rule of law and human rights217, having relevant 
data protection rules, as well as effective individual rights towards data218.  
 
However, many of these countries have legal frameworks which are based on different 
foundations. For example, Canada has a number of legal acts governing the privacy of 
information, the main one being the federal “Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act”219 (also known as “PIPEDA”). Though this act was originally 
passed to obtain an adequacy decision in the EU220, it is very different from data 
protection as understood by the EU. It focuses on the concept of “data privacy”, which, 
as the name suggests, only covers the “privacy” dimension of data protection. This 
means that the other dimensions of data protection, such as non-discrimination, 
individual self-empowerment, or competition law, are not included in PIPEDA221. Despite 
this, Canada has been held to be an “adequate” country for data protection purposes.  
 
“Adequacy” was always a nebulous concept, and was only first fully detailed in the 2015 
Schrems decision222 which invalidated the Safe Harbour Agreement. In that case, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union established additional criteria for adequacy, 
213 GDPR, Chapter V, Articles 44-50 
214 Ibid 
215 Ibid 
216 Ibid 
217 GDPR, Article 45 
218 Ibid 
219 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
220 Austin, L. (2006). Reviewing pipeda: Control, privacy and the limits of fair information 
practices. 
221 Ibid 
222 Case C-362/14, Schrems, 6 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:650) 
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which included that the country ensure a level of protection of fundamental rights 
“essentially equivalent” to the EU’s, that this protection apply to limitations on the powers 
of public authorities, and that individuals have legal remedies for access and correction 
of data. The Directive, and the GDPR after it, have not been particularly clear about what 
is meant by “essentially equivalent”, though the Article 29 Working Party has issued 
guidance on the topic223, based on three core criteria: “content principles” (such as the 
core rights and principles), “additional principles” for special cases such as sensitive dad 
or direct marketing, and “procedural/enforcement/remedial mechanisms” which must 
achieve “a good level of compliance”, provide “support and help to individual data 
subjects”, and “appropriate redress to the injured parties”224. Importantly, this 
assessment shows that there is more than one way to be adequate. This includes saying 
that “Basic data protection concepts and/or principles should exist. These do not have to 
mirror the GDPR terminology but should reflect and be consistent with the concepts 
enshrined in the European data protection law.”; and giving examples of parts of the data 
protection framework that are, essentially, “non-negotiable”, such as the ability to object 
to direct marketing and the need to follow the principles of data quality, data security, or 
data retention225. As G. Greenfield puts it, “Assessment of adequacy is therefore a 
complex matter, a question of balancing positives and negatives, and without black-and-
white criteria for inclusion or exclusion.”226  
 
The primary cause behind the need for the matter to be this complex is that that Europe 
is a precursor in this notion of “data protection” as a unique, separate right. Even 
countries which accept taking on data protection legislation will not have the same 
historical and cultural development as Europe has had, and as such will have differing 
legislation. If not, differences will appear, whether in application, enforcement, or case 
law227. Overall, this shows that the EU accepts that there are multiple paths to protecting 
individuals, and as long as some core provisions are followed, some leeway can exist. 
 
223 Article 29 Working Party (2014), Adequacy Referential (updated), WP254, Adopted on 28 
November 2017 
224 Greenleaf, G. (2017), Questioning 'Adequacy' (Pt I) – Japan (December 7, 2017).150 
Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 1, 6-11; UNSW Law Research Paper No. 1. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096370 
225 Article 29 Working Party (2014), Adequacy Referential (updated), WP254, Adopted on 28 
November 2017  
226 Greenleaf (n.224) 
227 Curtin, D. (2018). Does the GDPR Change the World or is the World Changing Beyond the 
Regulation?. In Das öffentliche Recht vor den Herausforderungen der Informations-und 
Kommunikationstechnologien jenseits des Datenschutzes| Information and Communication 
Technologies Challenging Public Law, Beyond Data Protection| Le droit public au défi des 
technologies de l'information et de la communication, au-delà de la protection des donnés (pp. 
35-48). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. 
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One place where some have argued that there is, if anything, too much leeway, is the 
US/EU Privacy Shield agreement, the successor to the Safe Harbor agreement which 
was struck down by the Schrems decision mentioned above228. In November 2017, the 
Article 29 Working Party released their first annual Joint Review on the topic of the 
Privacy Shield229. In this review, the Working Party recognizes that “some of the main 
points of concern for the WP29 in [the area of access by public authorities to data 
transferred under the Privacy Shield], have yet to be fully resolved.”230 Data transfers 
between the EU and US are necessary for the economy of both blocks231. Meanwhile, 
the US will not stop snooping on data coming in from the EU. This causes a stalemate 
where the European authorities are not satisfied with the transfers, but have to let them 
continue for the time being. In other words, market forces are too strong for legal forces 
to be effective, creating an imbalance. 
 
This discussion over international transfers of data tells us three things. One, that the 
Article 29 Working Party recognizes that there are multiple paths to protecting 
individuals, as long as they are indeed sufficiently protected - showing hints of an 
adaptable approach. Second, that practical concerns such as the demands of the market 
can hinder data protection efforts. Third, that while the EU is alone in its understanding 
of a separate “right to data protection”, it has managed to push forward this concept 
through various means, one of those being the market. In the following section, we take 
a closer look at this tool in the EU’s toolbox of data protection, as it highlights perfectly 
the ability of using law to influence other forces in order to protect informational privacy. 
 
 
2. The Market as a tool for EU Rule-making: The Brussels 
Effect 
 
Like Canada, many countries have changed their legal provisions in order to align with 
European data protection law. This is part of a wider approach in EU law, in the same 
way that the rule of law “‘is undoubtedly a value that the EU relentlessly seeks to export 
“beyond the borders of the Union by means of persuasion, incentives and negotiation, 
228  Case C-362/14, Schrems, 6 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:650) 
229 Article 29 Working Party (2017), EU - U.S. Privacy Shield – First annual Joint Review 
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231 Alo, E. R. (2013). EU Privacy Protection: A Step Towards Global Privacy. Mich. St. Int'l L. 
Rev., 22, 1095. 
61 
 
                                               
but other more “punishing” means have also been used…’’232 Thus, EU Law is dedicated 
to upholding its principles, and where the global nature of the Internet come into conflict 
with it, its law should prevail233, as stated by the European Court of Justice itself in the 
Schrems case234. This constant drive to establish EU standards of individual protection 
throughout the world is also part of the GDPR, and the phenomenon of countries 
changing their laws to be in accordance with the EU’s is not a coincidence, but a 
dedicated effort to globalize these norms235. Even as recently as last year Japan 
announced it will be working to reach a level of data protection high enough to be in line 
with the GDPR and receive an adequacy decision236. 
 
Why is it that so many countries are working on achieving the European standard? And 
why is it that at the same time, many companies worldwide, from Microsoft to Amazon, 
are rushing to comply with the GDPR on a global level despite being US-based 
companies?237 
 
Getting back to the roots of the European project is necessary to understand this 
dynamic. It has always been the drive of the EU to use “strength in numbers” to develop 
enough influence to shift global trends to its advantage238. The simple reality is that 
businesses go where they have an economic interest to go, and so the EU’s goal has 
always been to put companies (and States) in a situation where trading with the EU while 
following EU standards of rights is their best option239. When the Data Protection 
Directive passed, many third party countries became “inadequate” for purposes of data 
transfers, data transfers which were an important component to trade between these 
third countries and the EU240. This meant that these countries rushed to adopt relatively 
similar legislation to reach adequacy and resume the transfers without hindrance. The 
232 Pech L. (2012), The Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of the European Union's External 
Action. CLEER Working Paper 2012/3. The Hague: Asser Institute 
233 Kuner, C. (2017). The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law, LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 4/2018, London School of Economics and Political Science 
234 See Case C-362/14, Schrems, 6 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:650), at paras. 84-87, 
which criticize the Safe Harbour Agreement for giving US law primacy over EU rights. 
235 Greenleaf, G. (2012), The influence of European data privacy standards outside Europe: 
implications for globalization of Convention 108’, 2 International Data Privacy Law 68 .  
236 Greenleaf (n.224) 
237 A particular example of that phenomenon is Cloud providers. For more information, see the 
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reason behind so prompt a reaction is because data protection compliance has a heavy 
cost for companies - the closer the two legislations are (even without an actual adequacy 
decision), the less the cost involved in joining the European market241. This was 
especially true of small companies, which did not (and still do not, if GDPR compliance 
for SMEs is to be believed242) have the tools to achieve compliance. This meant that any 
company wanting to trade with the EU would have in its best interest the adoption of a 
European standard. 
 
The idea of pushing the EU as a regulatory powerhouse is part of a deliberate, stated 
strategy. An article, published in Politico on the 31st of January 2018243, elaborated on 
the very open way in which the EU is stating this goal. From Věra Jourová, the European 
commissioner for justice, stating that “We want to set the global standard”244, to John 
Bowman, former lead negotiator for the U.K. government on Europe’s new data 
protection rules, asserting that “Europe wanted to be seen selling a global standard”, 
“that’s crystallized through its adequacy decisions.” Incidentally, the same article shows 
how successful this strategy has become, with Pansy Tlakula, chairperson of South 
Africa’s Information Regulator (South Africa’s newly created data protection regulator), 
stating that “We regard Europe’s directives as best practice”245. In short, the GDPR is 
becoming a global standard for data protection due to a strategy adopted by the EU to 
use legal tools to influence Market incentives. 
 
In conclusion, the clash of conceptions that come with cross-border data transfers has 
pushed EU authorities to allow some flexibility (in the form of the adequacy test and the 
use of various tools to increase the regulatory influence of the GDPR) where normal legal 
tools would fail. In other words, where one safeguard is ineffective, European authorities 
have used others to ensure data protection. As we will show in Chapter 4, this mindset 
comes in conflict with some core pillars of the European data protection regulatory 
system.  
 
The new trajectory for EU data protection law can also be found in the GDPR’s new ‘’risk-
based’’ approach. As we will show, this new approach is aimed specifically at protecting 
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243 Scott, M. and Cerulus, L. (2018), Europe’s new data protection rules export privacy 
standards worldwide, POLITICO, last accessed on 3/2/2018 at 
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informational privacy by identifying situations where a data controller has a potentially 
dangerous power over information, and limiting it through a number of safeguards. 
 
 
 
III.  Informational Privacy in the GDPR’s Risk-Based 
Approach: the Separation of “Risk” and “Harm” 
 
1. ‘’Risk’’ in the GDPR 
 
While the Data Protection Directive only referred to ‘’risk’’ in relation to the security 
principle, the notion of ‘’risk’’ appears a number of times in the GDPR. Data controllers 
have to take into account the risks to data subjects when they implement measures which 
protect the rights and freedoms of the data subject246, which means that every decision 
made by data controllers as to how to protect the data subject has to incorporate an 
assessment of risk. This alone places risk at the core of the GDPR and its commitment 
to data protection by design and by default247. 
 
Various derogations to obligations of the GDPR are negated if a risk to data subjects is 
present, such as the derogation to the need to appoint a representative in the EU for 
non-EU data controllers248 and the derogation to document data processing activities for 
organisations with fewer than 250 employees249.  
 
Risk also extends to whether certain types of processing require extra measures to 
protect individuals. Certain data breaches have to be reported to the ICO if they are likely 
to result in a risk for the rights and freedoms of natural persons250, and have to be 
communicated directly to data subjects if they represent a high risk to data subjects251. 
Similarly, if the data controller is about to engage in a type of processing which is likely 
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, that controller is legally 
required to perform a data protection impact assessment252. Additionally, if that 
246 GDPR, Article 24 
247 GDPR, Article 25 
248 GDPR, Article 27 
249 GDPR, Article 30 
250 GDPR, Article 33 
251 GDPR, Article 34 
252 GDPR, Article 35 
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assessment results in a high risk in the absence of enough measure to mitigate it, the 
data controller has to consult the supervisory authority253. It is also part of the role of the 
data protection officer to have ‘’due regard to the risk associated with processing 
operations’’254. 
 
The GDPR has some examples of what risks could materialize, which include 
‘’discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, loss of 
confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorised reversal 
of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage’’255. This 
touches on certain privacy interests, such as proprietary privacy (damage to reputation), 
or decisional privacy (identity theft), but only gives some examples without defining the 
scope of the concept, leaving room for interpretation. 
 
What constitutes ‘’risk’’ was later clarified by the Article 29 Working Party Opinion on 
Data Protection Impact Assessments256. In this paper, the Article 29 Working Party laid 
out a set of 10 criteria which may present a ‘’high risk’’ to data subjects. As we will show, 
the risks established in this paper are all directly linked to informational privacy, and very 
rarely linked to a particular interest, whether it is a privacy interest of an interest linked 
to another right. Studying these ‘’high risk’’ factors is vital to understanding the GDPR’s 
risk-based approach and how it links to the approach developed in this thesis. 
 
The first criteria is ‘’evaluation or scoring, including profiling and predicting’’257, especially 
concerning someone’s location, movements, interests, and other types of information. 
This criteria does not specify why certain types of information should be more protected, 
or which interests their lack of protection would infringe upon. As such, the only interest 
that this criteria protects explicitly is informational privacy, while specifically avoiding 
addressing which other interests may be impacted. 
 
The second criteria includes ‘’automated-decision making with legal or similar significant 
effect’’258, which as we have seen in this section is a largely undefined notion with the 
potential to include a variety of possible interests. While some examples were given of 
particular harms (such as adverts for online gambling being targeted at individuals in 
253 GDPR, Article 36 
254 GDPR, Article 39 
255 GDPR, Recital 75 
256 Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) 
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financial difficulties), no clear scope of interests has been defined for what is covered by 
‘’significant effect’’. Meanwhile, informational privacy, the ability to create and use 
information about individuals, is unequivocally present. 
 
The third criteria covers ‘’systematic monitoring’’259, particularly monitoring publicly 
available spaces. This brings in a connection with the ‘’public’’ space, which once again 
proposes a link between this criteria and privacy interests. 
 
The fourth criteria includes data that is ‘’sensitive’’, which includes any information that 
‘’may more generally be considered as increasing the possible risk to the rights and 
freedoms of individuals’’260. This admission of generality and non-definition of interests 
shows how the EU legislators are purposefully refusing to define which interests to 
protect. Nevertheless, once again this activity relates to the ability of data controllers to 
obtain and use information, and as such is related to informational privacy. 
 
The fifth and seventh criteria (the sixth, concerning aggregation of datasets, is the subject 
of a separate analysis in the following section of this chapter) concern the data itself: 
whether it is data that is ‘’large scale’’ and whether the data concerns ‘’vulnerable data 
subjects’’261. These both are based on the ‘’power’’ of the controller, whether that power 
comes from having more data (for large-scale processing) or from the data subject being 
in a position of less power than the data controller (for a vulnerable data subject). This 
‘’vulnerable’’ status is contextual - an employee can be ‘’vulnerable’’ towards their 
employer, or children towards their teacher. This ability of the data controller to obtain 
and process data of individuals that do not possess the power to stop them is another 
sign of an approach based on contextual guarantees. If the right controls were in place, 
vulnerable individuals would not be vulnerable. The fact that this is considered to be a 
‘’high risk’’ practice shows that according to the Article 29 Working Party, an imbalance 
of control over the data between the data controller and data subject is a danger to data 
protection. This shows again the link between informational privacy (control over 
information) and data protection, as well as the recognition of an approach which is 
based on a balance between what the data controller can do with the data, and the 
guarantees against that ability. 
 
The eighth criteria concerns innovative use of technology or applying new technological 
solutions, such as face recognition or fingerprinting. These might represent a high risk 
259 Ibid 
260 Ibid 
261 Ibid 
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because ‘’the personal and social consequences of the deployment of a new technology 
may be unknown’’262, with a particular example, the Internet of Things, considered to 
have ‘’a significant impact on individuals’ daily lives and privacy’’. The mention of privacy 
shows, once again, that data protection and privacy are still linked - through informational 
privacy. 
 
The ninth criteria is based on transfers of data beyond the EU (which touches on 
measures the EU takes to protect their residents outside the EU, as we explored in the 
previous section of this chapter), while the tenth is based on processing which ‘’prevents 
data subjects from exercising a right or using a service or a contract’’263 such as a bank 
screening. 
 
In conclusion, the way that ‘’risk’’ is defined in the GDPR shows a move towards the 
protection of informational privacy specifically. Even though data protection covers 
interests beyond informational privacy, the GDPR focuses on it when considering what 
‘’risks’’ can result from data processing. This shows that a core focus of data protection 
is protecting informational privacy, and that focusing on protecting informational privacy 
will allow other privacy interests to be protected as well. In the following section, we will 
see how the GDPR sets out that in order to limit risk, some safeguards can be 
implemented which compensate for risk-prone processing. As we will show, this 
approach to protecting data (and thus informational privacy) is aligned with the 
framework developed in this thesis, showing that EU data protection law is already 
moving towards that framework. 
2. Risk-mitigating Safeguards and Informational Privacy 
 
The sixth ‘’high risk’’ factor defined by the Article 29 Working Party covers the 
aggregation of datasets originating from different operations. This sixth factor, in 
particular, becomes high risk when the data is used for purposes ‘’that would exceed the 
reasonable expectations of the data subject’’264. This ‘’reasonable expectation’’ for 
purposes was clarified in another opinion of the Article 29 Working Party regarding 
purpose limitation265 which showed that one of the factors is the context in which the data 
has been collected, which includes the nature of the relationship between the controller 
262 Ibid 
263 Ibid 
264 Ibid 
265 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 
WP203, Adopted on 2 April 2013 
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and the data subject as well as the balance of power between the data subject and the 
data controller.  
 
This context element also includes the impact of the further processing of the data 
subjects, which takes into account ‘’both positive and negative consequences’’, including 
emotional impacts, irritation, fear and distress ‘’that may result from a data subject losing 
control over personal information, or realising that it has been compromised.’’266 This is 
a direct acknowledgment that not only does the EU legislator stay away from defining 
the scope of interests that should be protected, but instead makes a direct reference to 
informational privacy, the control over information, as the core element defining whether 
behavior is permissible or not. 
 
The last element of the purpose limitation’s  ‘’reasonable expectation’’  test is perhaps 
the most significant. It that not only is the core interest that data protection aims to protect 
informational privacy, but that the EU recognizes that protecting informational privacy is 
best done with a balance between the ability of data controllers to process data and the 
safeguards limiting that ability. This last element is based on ‘’the safeguards applied by 
the controller to ensure fair processing and to prevent any undue impact on the data 
subjects’’267. The Article 29 Working Party asserts that additional measures could serve 
as ‘’compensation’’ for a change of purpose, including additional steps such as better 
transparency, anonymisation measures, or the ability to object to processing. Further 
guidance on what the safeguards should achieve focus on two aspects: data security 
(which includes availability, confidentiality, and integrity of personal data) as well as data 
protection (which includes transparency, isolation and ‘’intervenability’’) with a focus on 
the isolation element. This element is about limiting what information exists, how 
available it is to be used by the data controller, and whether any privacy enhancing 
technologies are applied.  
 
In other words, to ensure whether datasets can be combined together in a way that the 
data subject can ‘’reasonably expect’’ without creating a risk to the data subject, a 
number of guarantees can be applied to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in 
place in order to protect informational privacy. This approach can also be found in data 
protection impact assessments, where having sufficient safeguards can mitigate risk and 
allow processing operations to be carried out despite representing a risk268. This 
266 Ibid 
267 Ibid 
268 Van Dijk, N., Gellert, R., & Rommetveit, K. (2016). A risk to a right? Beyond data protection 
risk assessments. Computer Law & Security Review, 32(2), 286-306. 
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approach, allowing or disallowing processing based on whether sufficient guarantees are 
in place, is new to the GDPR and shows that the framework which will be developed in 
this thesis is already being implemented by the EU. 
 
 
IV. The Balancing Approach in the GDPR: the 
“Legitimate Interests” Test 
 
The idea of regulating the processing of data based on a balance between the 
Information and Guarantees limiting that processing is not only found in the GDPR’s risk-
based approach. As we will see, the principles-based approach of data protection, 
reinforced in the GDPR, is made up of a balance between risks and safeguards limiting 
thost risks. 
 
This can be identified by studying the legal bases for processing personal data. A legal 
basis in the GDPR already present in the Data Protection Directive is whether the 
controller has “legitimate interests” for processing data269. Legitimate interest as a legal 
basis requires a balancing test of the interest of the data controller and the risk to the 
data subject270. Particularly, whether a risk is present to the data subject partly depends 
on how “identifiable” the data subject is. For example, December 2013 comments by 
Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda, stated271: 
 
“Sometimes, full anonymisation means losing important information, so you can no 
longer makethe links between data. That could make the difference between progress 
or paralysis. But using pseudonyms can let you to analyse large amounts of data: to 
spot, for example, that people with genetic pattern X also respond well to therapy Y. So 
it is understandable why the European Parliament has proposed a more flexible data 
protection regime for this type of data.Companies would be able to process the data on 
grounds of legitimate interest, rather than consent. That could make all the positive 
difference to big data: without endangering privacy.”272 
269 GDPR, Article 6 
270 Furey, E., & Blue, J. (2018). She Knows Too Much–Voice Command Devices and Privacy. In 
2018 29th Irish Signals and Systems Conference (ISSC) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
271 Hintze, M. (2016). Viewing the GDPR through a De-Identification Lens: A Tool for 
Clarification and Compliance. preprint, 1-22. 
272 Kroes, N., “Data isn't a four-letter word,” IAPP Europe Data Protection Congress/Brussels, 
11 Dec. 2013.Available athttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1059_en.htm. 
69 
 
                                               
 This shows that the legitimate interests legal basis was intended, at least in part, to allow 
for greater flexibility and breadth of processing where sufficient safeguards would ensure 
there is no risk to data subjects. This flexibility however means legal uncertainty, as limits 
of this flexible legal basis have not been strictly set, such as in the case of Asnef and 
Fecemd v. Administración del Estado273 where the ECJ supports a wide interpretation of 
legitimate interests which allows the credit industry to process negative financial data of 
consumers based on legitimate interests274. The Article 29 Working Party similarly 
acknowledged that Google was able to base most of its business needs on legitimate 
interests including providing, maintaining, protecting and improving services275. 
 
More guidance over the “legitimate interests” legal basis was developed by the Article 
29 Working Party in a dedicated opinion276. In it, the Article 29 Working Party “recognises 
the significance and usefulness of the Article 7(f) criterion, which in the right 
circumstances and subject to adequate safeguards may help prevent over-reliance on 
other legal grounds”. In other words, whether processing can be allowed on “legitimate 
interests” grounds depends on a balance between how much information can be 
processed, and the safeguards on that processing. It is the processing itself which 
requires safeguards, not specific harmful events that may materialize which need to be 
prevented. This, we argue, is the direction EU data protection law is inevitably moving 
towards. 
 
A test of whether there is an appropriate balance between the information and 
safeguards does includes factors such as “the impact of the data subject”277, but as is 
the case where we discussed “risk” in the previous section, what constitutes “impact” 
remains largely undefined.  
 
A strong statement related to the need for a flexible approach is detailed by the Article 
29 Working Party in that Opinion:  “[...] the need for some flexibility also comes from the 
very nature of the right to the protection of personal data and the right to privacy. Indeed, 
273 C-468 & 469/10, ASNEF and FECEMD v. Administración del Estado, [2011] ECR I-12181. 
274 Ferretti, F. (2014). Data protection and the legitimate interest of data controllers: much ado 
about nothing or the winter of rights?. Common Market Law Review, 51(3), 843-868. 
275 Article 29 Working Party, “Letter from the Article 29 Working Party addressed to Google 
along with the recommendations” (Brussels, 16 Oct. 2012), at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20121016_letter_to_google_en.pdf 
276 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate 
interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, WP217, Adopted on 9 April 
2014 
277 Ibid 
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these two rights, along with most (but not all) other fundamental rights, are considered 
relative, or qualified, human rights. These types of rights must always be interpreted in 
context. Subject to appropriate safeguards, they can be balanced against the rights of 
others. In some situations-and also subject to appropriate safeguards-they can also be 
restricted on public interest grounds.”278 
 
This balance between the information and the safeguards can also be found when 
studying Article 9 of the GDPR, which lists the exemptions which allow a data controller 
to process special categories of personal data279. Some extra safeguards are 
implemented (for example, consent is replaced by “explicit” consent, and “public interest” 
is replaced by “substantial public interest”) which show, as we discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter, that higher-risk processing is offset by additional guarantees. 
Additionally, legitimate interests do not appear in that Article, which means that special 
categories of personal data cannot be processed using “legitimate interests” (unless 
another Article 9 exception allows it, such as if the data controller is a foundation or not-
for-profit). This shows that according to the GDPR, some processing can be made 
legitimate by sufficient guarantees, but some cannot if it is too high risk. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party, in an attempt to clarify where the concept of ‘’legitimate 
interests’’ applies, developed its various elements, especially what “Interests or rights of 
the data subject” means. As we will see however, that notion remains largely undefined 
even after the Working Party’s attempts at clarifying it. 
 
An important mention when discussing these interests or rights is that it is necessary to 
pay particular attention to the interests and rights of data subjects because: “At a time of 
increasing  imbalance in 'informational power', when governments and business 
organisations alike amass  hitherto unprecedented amounts of data about individuals, 
and are increasingly in the position  to compile detailed profiles that will predict their 
behaviour (reinforcing informational imbalance and reducing their autonomy), it is ever 
more important to ensure that the interests of the individuals to preserve their privacy 
and autonomy be protected.”280 This shows that there exists a balance of power between 
data controllers and data subjects, and that processing can be made legitimate where 
the balance of power is equal (as in these cases, “legitimate interests” can be used as a 
legal basis). This also shows that not only the processing itself, but also all elements of 
278 Ibid 
279 GDPR, Article 9 
280 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate 
interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, WP217, Adopted on 9 April 
2014  
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the power balance between the controller and data subject should be considered. This 
also shows the wide scope of what “interests and rights of the data subject” can 
encompass. 
 
The elements of the test developed by the Article 29 Working Party when balancing the 
interests of the controller with the rights of the data subject have a very broad scope. The 
impact on the data subject is meant to assess “both positive and negative 
consequences”281 of the processing, which may include discrimination, defamation, 
damage to reputation or to the autonomy of the data subject. Adverse outcomes can 
include irritation, fear, the chilling effect on “freedom of research or free speech that may 
result from continuous monitoring/tracking”, and should be considered “much broader 
than the impacts that may result from a data breach”282. Importantly, this wide notion of 
harm is very similar to the one found in privacy cases such as the UK case Gulati & Ors 
v MGN Limited283 in which “harm” to the right to privacy in the context of a phone-hacking 
case included elements such as “loss of privacy or “autonomy” resulting from the hacking 
or blagging that went on; there is compensation for injury to feelings (including distress); 
and there is compensation for “damage or affront to dignity or standing”284.  
 
The judge in the case mentioned that “While the law is used to awarding damages for 
injured feelings, there is no reason in principle, in my view, why it should not also make 
an award to reflect infringements of the right itself, if the situation warrants it.  The fact 
that the loss is not scientifically calculable is no more a bar to recovering damages for 
“loss of personal autonomy” or damage to standing than it is to a damages for distress.  
If one has lost “the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private 
life” then I fail to see why that, of itself, should not attract a degree of compensation, in 
an appropriate case”285. The judgment, especially its acknowledgment of “loss of 
autonomy” as a specific harm, shows both the link between data protection and privacy 
through the similarity between their related harms, but also the difficulty and subjectivity 
in assessing these harms - in this case, the defendant argued that only “distress or injury 
to feelings” should be a harm worth compensation286. 
 
281 Ibid 
282 Ibid 
283 Gulati & Ors v MGN Limited5 (confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Representative Claimants 
v MGN Limited [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 
284 Ibid 
285 Ibid 
286 Ibid 
72 
 
                                               
The Working Party goes beyond even that scope of privacy or data protection harms:  
“relevant 'impact' is a much broader concept than harm or damage to one or more 
specific data subjects. 'Impact'  as used in this Opinion covers any possible (potential or 
actual) consequences of the data processing.”287 This includes positive or negative 
consequences of not just one processing, but an accumulation of separate occurrences 
which together may have an impact on the data subject. It can extend from annoying 
marketing phone calls to loss of life, it can change based on the nature of the data itself, 
but also how it is being processed288. It can also take into account the status of the data 
subject and data controller, particularly whether the data controller is in a position of 
power to the data subject. The balancing test is based in principle on the “average 
individual”289 but may incorporate a case-by-case approach in some specific situations, 
particularly vulnerable persons (mirroring the “high risk” processing areas covered by the 
Working Party when detailing situations where a DPIA may be necessary). 
 
This reinforces our findings in the previous section of this thesis: “impact” is largely 
undefined, its scope so wide as to encompass a great number of rights or interests with 
no clear definition of where it applies. In order to handle this scope, the Article 29 Working 
Party is showing hints of moving towards a definition of “risk” not based on the actual 
impact, but on the types of processing involved, such as whether sensitive data or data 
about vulnerable persons is processed. This approach, basing impact not on actual harm 
or consequences but on the balance of power between holders of information and 
subjects of that information, is what we argue in this thesis is the natural and necessary 
way forward. This move is not yet fully realised, but strong signs are clear in the way the 
GDPR approaches the “legitimate interests” legal basis. 
 
The fact that this approach is not fully realised, and that the Article 29 Working Party still 
attempts to base the decision on “impact” and “likelihood” despite how broad these 
concepts are means that “legitimate interests” as a legal basis remain undefined and too 
tempting for data controllers looking for an easy way to process data without obtaining 
consent. While a flexible approach is necessary in the Big Data age, “legitimate interests” 
attempt to cover all possible interests and rights that may be impacted as a result of 
processing, all possible harms and consequences that may materialise, leading to too 
wide a scope. Instead, we argue that the focus should continue to move towards 
287 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate 
interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC 
288 Ibid 
289 Ibid 
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informational privacy and a balance between information and limits on the use of that 
information. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The GDPR makes some moves towards a contextual approach with notions such as 
“significantly affects data subjects”, with some leeway when it comes to the “adequacy” 
requirement, and particularly with the move towards a risk-based approach which is 
based on a balance between risk-prone data processing activities and the safeguards 
against these activities. The need to accept a more contextual and multi-factor approach 
comes from the fact that some problems cannot be solved with legal tools alone, and 
need to incorporate other safeguards to protect individuals. 
 
On the other hand, the GDPR also relies on the existence of these different forces in 
order to push forwards its objectives. Whether it is by using “accountability” to include 
market forces and social trust into the legal framework or by using the political and 
economic power of the EU to ensure other countries attempt to align their legislation with 
the EU’s, the European data protection authorities have shown that protecting 
informational privacy through data protection can be done using a number of tools from 
multiple disciplines. 
 
As such, the GDPR makes protecting informational privacy the focus of data protection, 
instead of defining a strict scope of what information should be protected and what 
harmful consequences could occur. This focus on informational privacy to address the 
challenges of the modern age, and use of safeguards to balance out the risks involved 
in data processing, all show that European data protection law is moving towards a 
balance-based approach between the ability of data controllers to process data, and 
guarantees against that processing breaching informational privacy. 
 
In the next chapter, we will analyze the transformations that have led to the challenges 
to informational privacy: the phenomenon of Big Data and the new way data and 
information have transformed. 
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Chapter 3. Information in the Age of Big Data  
Introduction: Big Data and “Information” 
 
The fact that this approach is not fully realised, and that the Article 29 Working Party still 
attempts to base the decision on “impact” and “likelihood” despite how broad these 
concepts are means that “legitimate interests” as a legal basis remain undefined and too 
tempting for data controllers looking for an easy way to process data without obtaining 
consent. While a flexible approach is necessary in the Big Data age, “legitimate interests” 
attempt to cover all possible interests and rights that may be impacted as a result of 
processing, all possible harms and consequences that may materialise, leading to too 
wide a scope. Instead, we argue that the focus should continue to move towards 
informational privacy and a balance between information and limits on the use of that 
information. 
 
Big Data is often characterised as the “Three V’s”: Volume, Velocity and Variety290. 
Volume is the most familiar understanding of Big Data, and refers to that ever-bigger 
amount of data being created. Simply storing and accessing that data is a new challenge. 
 
Meanwhile, Velocity is fast becoming the most difficult of the challenges to meet. To 
process, move and use that amount of information is just as - or even more - useful than 
having that data in the first place. Processing and understanding it takes complex 
technology, and it is the development of such technology which currently is the main 
obstacle to the expansion of Big Data291.  
 
290 Tene, O., & Polonetsky, J. (2011). Privacy in the age of big data: a time for big decisions. 
Stan. L. Rev. Online, 64, 63. 
291 Ibid 
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Finally, Variety is what expands Big Data to a wide array of fields: data can come from 
many sources, be they in a different language, or different types: visual (photos and 
films), audio (sound files), spreadsheets, paper files, etc. Aggregating many types of data 
together creates an exponential amount of possibilities in what can be deciphered from 
the data, and overcoming the technical challenges in doing so is a main avenue of 
expanding the size of “Big Data”. 
 
Above all, Big Data is a matter of scale. Individually, every part of what constitutes “Big 
Data” existed before it. The recording of “Data” has always existed, in the form of 
bookkeeping or censuses, photographs and recordings. Over the last half-century data 
began to be accumulated and analyzed in new ways due to the rise of computers in 
every part of our lives, as well as the appearance of new ways to collect data - cheap 
electronics from sensors to smartphones and cameras292. This led to an exponential 
growth of the data and its analysis over time: it is estimated that 5 exabytes of data (1018 
bytes) were created by humans in all of history up to 2003293, while it had expanded a 
thousand fold by 2012 to 2.72 zettabytes (1021 bytes). It is estimated to double every two 
years, which creates opportunities never before possible294. With the rise of Big Data 
came the expansion of the Information Age. 
 
“Information”, as understood in this thesis, will be capitalized when referred to as 
opposed to the common meaning of the word “information”. We will first study the basics 
of what Information is, and what makes it different from “data”. We will then assemble a 
conception of Information from the various developments made earlier in this thesis, from 
the conceptual levels of definitions of informational privacy all the way to the modern 
understandings of the “suitable safeguards”. This will provide a thorough description of 
Information, which will then be expanded by the implications of such a notion and why it 
allows for a better insight informational privacy issues in the Digital Age.  
 
American organizational theorist Russell Ackoff delimited a “scale” from “data” to 
“wisdom’’295. Under that understanding, “data” is raw, exists objectively, and can have 
any and every form, whether it can be used or not. “Information”, meanwhile, is data 
292 Smith, M., Szongott, C., Henne, B., & Von Voigt, G. (2012, June). Big data privacy issues in 
public social media. In Digital Ecosystems Technologies (DEST), 2012 6th IEEE International 
Conference on (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
293 Intel IT Center, Planning Guide: Getting Started with Hadoop, Steps IT Managers Can Take 
to Move Forward with Big Data Analytics, June 2012 
294 Sagiroglu, S., and Sinanc, D. (2013) Big data: A review. Collaboration Technologies and 
Systems (CTS), 2013 International Conference on. IEEE. 
295 Ackoff, R. L. (1999). Ackoff's best: His classic writings on management. John Wiley & Sons.  
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which has been given “meaning by way of relational connection”296. This meaning can 
be useful, and allows answering questions such as “who, what, when, where, and how 
many.”297 Meanwhile, “knowledge” is the collection of information into something useful, 
such as “2 + 2 = 4” and requires the ability to store and process information in a creative 
or complex way. Then, “understanding” is a process to create new knowledge from 
previously-held knowledge. Finally, “wisdom” is a further step where new understanding 
is created from previous understanding and judges whether something is right or wrong, 
good or bad298.  
 
These categories go in rather philosophical directions as they reach higher levels of 
abstraction, and we do not need to ask questions of what “wisdom” means in order to 
conceptualize informational privacy. However, it is important to understand that these 
words matter: characterizing the output of data processing as “wisdom” is quite different 
from judging it to be simply “information”. It would be tempting to judge “wisdom” as being 
more valuable than  “data”. However, we would argue that creating layer after layer of 
understanding based on a set of data is not a ladder leading to wisdom, necessarily. 
Instead, every step from the raw data to the decisions made from that data requires the 
input of human beings, whether it be directly - by looking at a list of student grades then 
targeting the worst performers for additional support - or indirectly - by designing an 
algorithm that decides who gets the better rates for insurance. “Information” is the 
combination of data and human agency, and the deeper one goes in the study and 
processing of that data, the more human agency is added in the mix, to the point where 
the end result often is so distant from the original data as to be something altogether 
different. 
 
In this thesis, ‘’Information’’ will relate to any data that has seen an element of human 
agency towards it, which means that it includes ‘’understanding’’ and ‘’wisdom’’. 
 
It is important to note that Information does not have a physical support. Instead, it is the 
result of the data being observed. Nevertheless, it is possible to assess what kind of 
Information can be deduced from what data the individual data controller is holding. 
 
To show why “Information”, and not “data”, is the notion to focus on, an example can be 
useful. If a British individual - with no expert knowledge or experience, speaking only 
English - were to come into possession of a report holding valuable personal data written 
296 Ibid 
297 Ibid 
298 Ibid 
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in German, the data would be sensitive and valuable, but the Information that the 
individual can deduce from it would be non-existent. Without more data, or an 
understanding of German, the data is completely useless to that one individual. This is 
to show the fact that whether “personal data” leads to “personal Information” is highly 
dependant on factors which may have more to do with the observer than with the data. 
With instant translation services now available online, the same data could now lead to 
Information now which would have been more difficult to obtain a decade ago. 
 
With this basic view of Information established, we will now see how Big Data was 
primarily a transformation of the creation and transmission of Information in a way never 
seen before. We will now analyse the new technologies of Big Data from another 
perspective, this time looking at what they mean not for the data created, but for the 
Information. 
 
Data collection is increasing to never-before-seen levels, through technologies such as 
the Internet of Things, smartphones, cookies, or the increasing capabilities of software. 
This increase of the “Volume” and “Variety” aspects of Big Data have been accompanied 
by an increase in the third “V” - “Velocity”, but this increase has not kept up with the 
explosion of the other factors. In “data/Information” terms, this means that despite a huge 
amount of data being collected, the capabilities of data processing do not allow them to 
be fully processed into Information. As such, not only are “data” and “Information” 
separate concepts, but what will lead to the creation of one might not necessarily affect 
the other in a linear fashion. We will now see how the goal of all data processing is to 
create new and more powerful Information, and how viewing Information as a separate 
construct allows for a better understanding of the challenges of Big Data. 
 
 
 
 
A. Data Processing and Information Creation: A 
Combination of Data and Human Agency  
 
Data does not remain the same over the course of its processing. It becomes changed, 
curated, aggregated, translated, moved and otherwise transformed at every stage of 
processing. This has two major effects: it changes the properties of the data, and it 
changes the Information that can be obtained from that data. As we will see, these two 
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effects are at the source of essentially everything that can be done with data, including 
its informational privacy impacts, and so understanding how this process works is 
important. We will start with an overview of the process and what has an impact on the 
data for each stage, then move on to detail how that impacts each of the main effects. 
For each stage, we will analyse the relevant factors which affect the Information which 
can be obtained at that stage. 
 
There is a myriad of such steps and they can occur multiple times in one processing 
activity, but for practical reasons we use this typology: collection, storage, aggregation, 
processing, mining, and use. As we will show, each stage can modify the data and the 
Information it creates. 
 
I. Data Collection and Information: Choosing the 
Data 
 
At the first step of the process is “data collection”. In a way, it is the most important, and 
what brought on the age of Big Data. Data has always existed in the “wild”, but not until 
recently was it possible to collect it efficiently299. It used to be that finding the perpetrator 
of a crime required the imperfect memories of witnesses. Since then, we have learned 
how to collect new types of data: we can search for, and analyze, DNA samples300. We 
can study the CCTV footage of the area. We can look through social media to learn about 
the victim.  
 
Additionally, data is more easy to access than ever because of the rise of computers in 
our daily environment and their ability to record automatically vast amounts of 
information. Written records tend to be slow to prepare: copying one book used to be the 
matter of weeks or months. Now gigabytes of data can be generated, saved and 
searched in a matter of seconds.  
 
 
2. What data exists 
 
299 Tene (n.290) 
300 Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (1998). Human dignity, human rights, and human genetics. 
The Modern Law Review, 61(5), 661-680. 
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First off, what will dictate the Information created is the kind of data from which it is 
created. If no data can be collected, no Information can be created. There are two 
aspects to this: on the one hand, data can be collected that did not use to be collected, 
and on the other, data can now be collected in greater and more reliable numbers, which 
gives it a value it did not use to have. 
 
The first aspect can be seen in the capabilities of new technologies. Obtaining an 
individual’s search engine queries, browser history, IP address or social media data is 
all entirely new data that never existed before. In the Big Data age, much of what we do 
has moved to a digital format – including a large portion of socialising – which has led to 
this outpouring of new data which can be collected. This is a continuing process, but it is 
also important to remember that it has a limit. There is a tremendous amount of data that 
as of yet cannot be collected, and may never be, even though if it could it would have 
tremendous economic value. This includes emotions, dreams, thoughts, urges, and 
more. This data cannot be collected as we simply do not possess the technology to do 
so. Though this seems like the realm of science fiction, so was the idea that it would be 
possible to spy on individuals, seeing and hearing them, through their microphones and 
cameras, without their knowledge or consent, yet that has happened, and is happening 
in a widespread manner301. Data collection is still limited to what can be collected within 
the limits of our current technology, but this can change, and this will affect the 
Information held by various parties. 
 
The second aspect is more indirect, but also more problematic. A vast amount could be 
gathered previously, but was not practical to gather until now. This leads to a complicated 
situation: on the one hand, the data itself was already being gathered, legally, by various 
actors. On the other, it was gathered so sporadically and expensively that any 
widespread, privacy-invasive uses of that data were impossible. This meant that the data 
kept the same legal status while slowly becoming more and more transparent - until a 
breaking point was reached. An example is in United States v. Knotts302, in which 
government agents tracked a drum of chemicals to follow the movements of the 
defendants. The Court held that since the drum’s location was followed through public 
spaces, where agents could have physically tracked it, the data-gathering was held as 
equivalent. This essentially justifies the surveillance of all public spaces, since technically 
it would be possible for a police agent to be present at every street corner and following 
every individual in public.  
301 Kelion, L. (2017), Wikileaks: CIA has tools to snoop via TVs, BBC News, 7 March 2017 
302 United States v. Knotts 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). 
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 The reason behind this change is because in order to obtain Information one needs to 
be able to gather data in sufficiently large quantities and with sufficient reliability. 
Technologies now available for public surveillance don’t just allow the data collection to 
be more accurate and more widespread. They also allow for such data collection to take 
place over longer periods of time, thereby giving a more complete picture – so much so 
that there have been calls to decide whether surveillance goes beyond a reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on that duration factor303. As such, the increase in data 
collection can manifest itself in a number of ways, with the overall consequence that 
more of the same data is being collected, to the point where the Information which can 
be obtained from it can be used in ways that may impact informational privacy. As such, 
the Information that gets created will change based not just on new data that can be 
collected, but also on existing data that can be collected in more efficient ways. 
 
2. What data can be collected 
 
What Information can be created also depends on what data is actually available. 
Though this observation is obvious so far, there is an important factor to take into 
account. What data is “available” will change based on who is doing the data collection. 
Depending on the observer, the means of data collection will be very different, to the 
point where different Information will be created by different parties. Additionally, as we 
have seen, not just the types of data but also the ease of access to it are relevant factors. 
In short, depending on what data can be accessed by different entities, as well as how 
advanced their data gathering tools are all, change what Information they can create.  
 
An example can be seen in the observations we have made earlier regarding 
identifiability. Under Article 4 paragraph 1 of the GDPR, “personal data” is based on 
whether the person is “identifiable”304, based on “the means likely reasonably to be used 
either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person”. The “means 
likely to be used” will change depending on which controller is attempting to obtain 
Information. 
 
Gathering data can be expensive, and data controllers will only do so if it is useful for 
their purposes and worth the expense. As such, whether data will be gathered – the 
303 Bellovin, S. M., Hutchins, R. M., Jebara, T., & Zimmeck, S. (2013). When enough is enough: 
Location tracking, mosaic theory, and machine learning. NYUJL & Liberty, 8, 556. 
304 GDPR, Article 4 
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“means likely to be used” – is based on a number of factors. First, whether the data 
gathering tools exist. Second, whether gathering that data is possible using the 
resources available to the entity. Third, whether these resources are worth the price the 
entity is willing to pay for that data. The last factor, in particular, is very important, as it 
means that the “means likely to be used” test will depend not just on what the current 
technological environment permits, and not even just what various entities could 
potentially do, but additionally whether they are likely to go through the expense of 
gathering those tools. For example, a large company only interested in customers’ 
purchases for inventory purposes will be unlikely to use data collection tools to gather 
vast amounts of other data on their customers, while companies which base their 
business model on creating detailed profiles of their customers to sell to advertisers 
(such as Facebook) will go through a lot more effort to gather all possible data. In such 
a situation, though both entities have a vested interest in data-gathering, and both have 
the resources and tools to do so, one’s “means likely to be used” are at a 
disproportionately high standard.  
 
Because of those factors, we can already see that the concept of “personal data” or 
“public/private” spaces is beginning to be ineffective when considering the fact that 
Information, and the means one can use to procure it, changes from individual to 
individual. Privacy in public still exists against those who do not routinely use trackers to 
follow people, while one’s personal social media data is still well-hidden from the 
strangers one passes on the street. However, that informational privacy protection is not 
there against police authorities or Facebook. Since the State, under the national security 
exception in Article 23 of the GDPR, “may restrict by way of a legislative measure the 
scope of the obligations and rights”305 provided by the Regulation, and since the State 
has a massive amount of tools available to carry out such data collection, is there privacy 
in public if the government has access to that data? As we will show, just because one 
entity is able to obtain vast amounts of Information on individuals does not necessarily 
have an impact on informational privacy. After all, one’s partner or family also holds huge 
amounts of personal information about an individual - yet that is not considered a major 
privacy concern. 
 
3. How is the collection performed 
 
305 GDPR, Article 23 
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As we have seen, data collection will depend on what data the observer has the ability 
to collect. Additionally, however, the means behind that data collection will change what 
will be collected and how. We have studied how data collection is now ubiquitous through 
various tools including the Internet of Things. However, it is important to remember that 
“data” is not a perfect reflection of our world, but a translation of real world phenomenon 
into another form. For example, a smartphone’s GPS location data is not literally a log of 
the phone’s location - it is a log of results from computations done using the phone and 
the satellites it is linked to. GPS is not perfect, and depending on the position of the user, 
the data may be inaccurate to some degree, with forests or weather patterns affecting 
this accuracy306. As such, the data is not a perfect representation of the phone’s 
movement, which in turn is not a perfect representation of the movements of the 
individual who carries it. This is important because it means the Information created from 
the data will be inaccurate as well, and every step following that, which uses that data, 
will carry on these inaccuracies. 
 
In the case of GPS, of course, such an issue might seem minor - if one is only interested 
in a general idea of their location, a few meters of inaccuracy might not matter. However, 
every piece of technology has its limitations, and no matter how data is collected, there 
will be a chance for inaccuracies. We have a tendency to assume that the data is correct, 
because computers have no reason to hold bias and are perceived as unable to make a 
mistake307. If one follows this tendency, the Information one will create will be inaccurate. 
Meanwhile, the same data, captured with less inaccurate means, would lead to different 
Information - an example would be tracking an individual’s purchase habits using data 
from stores at which they purchase at against using an online questionnaire to ask the 
person what they buy - individual memory is not as accurate as the actual record of what 
is purchased. 
 
4. Who is doing the collecting, and why 
 
This leads us to the last of our factors: we have previously established that depending 
on the observer’s technological skills, different data can be collected. However, 
additionally, what data will be collected will also depend on the purpose of that collection. 
Because different data leads to different Information, while a different purpose for 
306 Wing, M. G., Eklund, A., & Kellogg, L. D. (2005). Consumer-grade global positioning system 
(GPS) accuracy and reliability. Journal of forestry, 103(4), 169-173. 
307 Soffer, P. (2010). Mirror, mirror on the wall, can i count on you at all? Exploring data 
inaccuracy in business processes. Enterprise, business-process and information systems 
modeling, 14-25. 
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collection leads to different data being collected, naturally a different purpose will lead to 
different Information at the end of the process. 
 
This is particularly important to mention in the context of human bias. If the data collector 
is looking for particular Information, they will look only for data which creates that 
Information. For example, if a company is interested in knowing what their customers 
buy, they will only gather data which they believe will lead to that Information. This is 
important because it affects the “means reasonably likely to be used” by the company - 
it is not likely for such a company to gather data it has no use for or reason to gather. 
Looking for particular Information is not a problem in itself, but problems arise when one 
is looking for certain conclusions. This phenomenon is essentially a confirmation bias, 
where the individual or company will only integrate the data which, in a vacuum and 
ignoring data which might contradict it, leads to Information which confirms those biases. 
Examples can be an individual who dislikes their neighbor and remembers every 
possible transgression while forgetting any acts of kindness or mitigating circumstances, 
or a company convinced in a product’s future success with a target market only taking 
into account surveys which reinforce that conclusion308. 
 
This bias can also be present in the data-collecting tools. Tools and programs are 
designed by individuals, and aimed at specific uses, sometimes in specific contexts. A 
rough example would be using a GPS tracking of a cell phone to ascertain its owner’s 
location. There are a number of factors which may make the Information inaccurate, and 
as such the tool used is imperfect in its own right. 
 
5. New Knowledge: ‘’N=All’’ and the Internet of Things 
 
In the age of Big Data, creation of data is constantly expanding into new directions, with 
processes such as the Internet of Things309. The Internet of Things has been defined as 
“ a dynamic global network infrastructure with self configuring capabilities where physical 
and virtual ‘things’ have identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities. They use 
intelligent interfaces, and are seamlessly integrated into the information network”.310 Any 
item can be part of the Internet of Things: clothes, headphones, fridges, lamps, cars or 
308 Krumholz, H. M. (2014). Big data and new knowledge in medicine: the thinking, training, and 
tools needed for a learning health system. Health Affairs, 33(7), 1163-1170. 
309 Sarkar, S., Chatterjee, S., & Misra, S. (2018). Assessment of the Suitability of Fog 
Computing in the Context of Internet of Things. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 6(1), 
46-59. 
310 Hoepman, J. (2012). In things we trust? Towards trustability in the internet of things. 
Constructing Ambient Intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 287-295. 
84 
 
                                               
whole buildings all can tap into this new architecture311. The Internet of Things is finding 
its way into more and more aspects of our everyday lives, interacting with each other to 
combine data, creating more powerful tools - exploiting the “Variety” aspect of Big 
Data312.  
 
Internet of Things devices can be used for any number of purposes313, which can end up 
gathering very powerful data on individuals314. An example that is becoming more and 
more common is the use of monitoring devices to gather information about the 
individual’s behaviour in order to adjust prices, such as in “Pay-as-You-Drive” 
insurance315. These types of insurance have been including black boxes in cars, which 
monitor an array of data types such as where the car is, where it is parked or how fast it 
was going, and can lead to changes in pricing to disincentivise certain behaviours316.  
 
This highlights one of the two major sides of the impact of Big Data on privacy: the ability 
of monitoring individuals in the public sphere no matter where they are. This does not 
only come from pressure on the side of industry with phenomena such as “Weblining”, 
but also from products which draw their functionality and use from their ability to gather 
data automatically. The most obvious is smartphones: equipped with a wide array of 
devices able to locate and track the individual in real time and record sound and images, 
smartphones and their many apps using these functionalities obtain access to an 
unprecedented amount of personal information. These devices go beyond simply the 
smartphone. From health trackers such as FitBit and FuelBand to smart objects such as 
smartwatches or even smart clothes317. 
 
Though it is still a very young field, technologies such as “augmented reality”, 
“geolocation” or “QR codes”318, as well as the development of permanently-online 
devices from phones to cars, have resulted in a new level of data collection. Instead of 
311 Ibid 
312 Treacy, B. and Bapat, A. (2013). The 'Internet of Things' — already in a home near you?, 
Privacy and Data Protection, 14 2 (11) 
313 Ford, D. T., & Qamar, S. (2017). Seeking opportunities in the Internet of Things (IoT):: A 
Study of IT values co-creation in the IoT ecosystem while considering the potential impacts of 
the EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). 
314 Treacy (n.312) 
315 Wilson, S. (2014), The Collision between Big Data and Privacy Law. Australian Journal of 
Telecommunications and the Digital Economy, Volume 2 Number 3, October 2014. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548079 
316 Ibid 
317 Peppet, S., Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, 
Privacy, Security & Consent (March 1, 2014). Texas Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409074 
318 Ibid 
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data being entered by individuals into databases through the intermediary of a computer 
terminal, data now is created by the devices themselves, without human input. A 
company at the forefront of these technologies, Tesla, has recently boasted about their 
data-gathering capabilities having extended to 1.3 billion miles of autopilot data319, 
something not possible only a few years ago.  
 
There is a double trend in IoT devices. On the one hand, they capture more and more 
data and are more and more common, which create a ubiquitous web of data collection. 
On the other, however, these sensors become more and more personal, intimate, and 
integrated in our lives. Examples are inventions such as the PillCam or the SmartPill, 
ingestible technologies which can monitor bodily functions or sensors such as the 
BioStamp, a device which can be worn like a Band-Aid and measures various health-
related metrics such as brain activity or hydration levels320. Recently, an individual was 
charged with arson using evidence from their own pacemaker321. As these devices 
become more and more common, the question becomes not whether data will be 
generated and collected, but how to control this flow of data. 
 
A particular phenomenon which has changed the way we understand data is the concept 
of “n=all”. On any normal research project, a sample “n” is used from which to gather 
data from. Countless challenges have stemmed from choosing how to select “n” and get 
sufficient high-quality data322. These challenges are disappearing as we grow closer to 
“n=all”: a stage at which the sample size will be every single individual. Tesla uses their 
cars currently on the road, driven by consumers, to gather data. In the same way, Google 
obtains data from every Google search, Facebook from every one of its users, and so 
on323. A noteworthy example came from the Google Flu Trends324 project in 2009: using 
searches for popular terms linked to flu, such as “flu symptoms” or “pharmacies near 
me”, the Google team used a database of 50 million searches, letting their algorithm 
identify the patterns. This early example of “Big Data” was extremely successful, able to 
319 Lambert, F. Tesla has now 1.3 billion miles of Autopilot data going into its new self-driving 
program, Electrek, 13 November 2016, found at: https://electrek.co/2016/11/13/tesla-autopilot-
billion-miles-data-self-driving-program/ 
320 Ibid 
321 Varghese, S., Cops use pacemaker data to file arson charges, iTWire, 2 February 2017, 
available at: https://www.itwire.com/data/76677-cops-use-pacemaker-data-to-file-arson-
charges.html 
322 Mayer-Schönberger, V., and Cukier, K. (2013). Big data: A revolution that will transform how 
we live, work, and think. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
323 Harford, T. (2014) Big data: A big mistake?. Significance 11.5: 14-19. 
324 Lazer, D., Kennedy, R., King, G., & Vespignani, A. (2014). The parable of Google Flu: traps in 
big data analysis. Science, 343(6176), 1203-1205. 
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predict when a flu outbreak was going to happen and where with better accuracy than 
the government’s health services, and much faster325. 
 
This ubiquitous web of data collection can be found in one particular type of innovation, 
which has been gaining traction in EU communities: “Smart Cities”. Increasingly, IoT 
devices are being proposed as the solution to the intricate problems of cities, such as 
traffic congestion, lack of services, crime, or pollution326, leading to the notion of “smart 
cities”. There is no clear definition of what a “smart city” is, but some of their principal 
features have been catalogued by Lilian Edwards in “Privacy, security and data 
protection in smart cities: A critical EU law perspective.”327 Such cities include in their 
infrastructure networks of IoT devices including “roads, cars, fridges, electricity meters, 
domestic appliances and human medical implants” in order to gather the data (the 
“Variety” of Big Data’s “3 V’s”, networks of digital communications to allow real-time 
analysis and use of that data (the “Velocity”) and the high-capacity infrastructure that can 
accommodate such a high amount of data (the “Volume”)328. 
 
All of these technologies not only are able to collect and analyse a huge amount of data, 
but are also generally compliant with the existing privacy and data protection framework 
for two reasons: first, the data collection is done in public, and as we will see later on in 
this thesis privacy in public is a notion that is quickly becoming outdated. Second, the 
data collection is based on a public good, social and economic welfare of the city’s 
denizens, which is a powerful interest, justifying its superseding of privacy. 
 
This leads to the question of surveillance by the State creating these smart cities, as well 
as that data being transmitted to third parties, the private entities and contractors 
necessary for any smart city project. Without careful consideration, this smart city might 
end up having all of its data in the hands of technological monopolies329.  
 
A major challenge to informational privacy in this mixture of public and private bodies 
working together to create a “smart city” is that currently, the technology behind it is 
fragmented across all of those entities. This leads not only to possible leaks at some 
point in the many transfers of data between entities, but also security vulnerabilities. 
325 Ibid 
326 Edwards, L. (2016), Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: A critical EU law 
perspective. Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 2 (2016): 28. 
327 Ibid 
328 Ibid 
329 Ibid 
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These vulnerabilities are well-known330, such as a report by the FTC in 2015 on the 
Internet of Things noting security risks as its greatest worry both in terms of vulnerability 
of these actual devices and their potential to spread vulnerabilities through networks to 
other systems331. 
 
The Internet of Things is made up of a great number of small devices, each of which 
collects data but does not necessarily have a host of security measures to prevent it from 
being used for the wrong purposes; and these devices are usually “only secured as an 
afterthought, or worse, not secured at all, transmitting data in the clear.”332 Adding to that 
the fact that the devices’ users have little understanding of their functioning (or even of 
their existence in certain cases) and are unable to make them more secure, IoT devices 
are a magnet for cybercrime. 
 
Overall, new processes and technologies are working together to change how 
knowledge is created. This transformation is unprecedented and profound, and its 
consequences for the boundaries separating the public and private spheres and personal 
and non-personal data challenge these legal notions. We will now analyse the current 
European data protection framework, and how these technological developments are 
challenging its core principles. 
 
The ability to gather data from everyone, all the time, is an entirely new way of gaining 
knowledge. It is no surprise that a new way of gaining knowledge requires similarly new 
means of regulation. 
 
6. New Knowledge: Browsers and Cookies 
 
Outside the Internet of Things, the primary contact individuals have with the realm of Big 
Data is through their devices, especially smartphones and computers. Every single 
action made on a computer may be recorded, whether it be something that clears as a 
survey or an order form asking for personal information for a delivery, clicks on a 
webpage or the movement of a mouse. Through the various interactions individuals have 
330 Ibid 
331 FTC Staff report Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World, January 
2015 at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-
report-november-2013- workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf (herafter 
FTC, 215). 
332 Akamai, akamai’s [state of the internet] report (2014), p. 1, at 
https://www.antel.com.uy/wps/wcm/connect/2e38bd0047ad6c9682d3e7af6890d810/q3-2014-
state-of-the-internetreport+(2).pdf?MOD=AJPERES . 
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with their devices, the controllers of those websites can easily record and track 
individuals333. Because any connection requires identification, some exchange of data is 
necessary. In order to identify the individual over multiple visits, a website will install a 
cookie on the user’s computer, a small text file which will contain information about the 
website and the user. Cookies can be stored for a lengthy amount of time, and most 
users are not aware of how to find, much less review or remove, these cookies334. 
Cookies can also be shared through multiple websites and across various services335, 
which creates an invisible web in which individuals are reinforcing the data profiling 
operations of various third parties without being aware of it. 
 
Originally, cookies, much like the rest of the Web, were varied and tailored to and by 
each website. As time went by, unified protocols and standards - Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), Uniform Resource Locator (URL) - ensured that everything about the 
connections between computers became easier336. As websites became more complex, 
organisations started creating cookies which could be identified through their multiple 
servers337. This laid the groundwork for the modern cookie: a tool which can be used to 
communicate from the user’s computer with various servers to transmit information. 
 
Through the use of cookies, it is possible to track individuals through multiple websites: 
if an individual has a cookie from website X, and then visits website Y, it is possible for 
website Y to identify the individual from that cookie338. Many online advertisers have such 
cookies, tracking and identifying individuals throughout multiple websites, and using the 
cookies to record data about user activity339. Variety being a major theme in the trends 
of Big Data, the ability to link together data from multiple sources is vitally important, and 
has exponential effectiveness as the number of sources grows. 
 
333 Hirsch, D. (2011), The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-
Regulation? Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758078 
334 Nenoist, E. (2008) Collecting Data for the Profiling of Web Users, in Profiling the European 
citizen. Springer Netherlands 
335 Brimsted, K. (2010), Behavioural Advertising: time to tame the cookie?, Privacy and Data 
Protection, 11 2 (, 7) 
336 Kristol, D. (2001). HTTP Cookies: Standards, privacy, and politics. ACM Transactions on 
Internet Technology (TOIT) 1.2 : 151-198.  
337 Ibid 
338 Lin, D., & Loui, M. C. (1998). Taking the byte out of cookies: privacy, consent, and the Web 
(Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 39-51). ACM. 
339 Brimsted (n.335) 
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This practice has become very common across the industry340. Because more and more 
consumers have been deleting cookies on a regular basis in response341, finding cookies 
which last longer and are more reliable has been the source of much research. Because 
cookies are a main way in which websites track the number of visitors to a website, in 
particular in order to attract advertisers towards a website, being able to gauge traffic 
accurately has an important impact342.  
 
Several practices have sprung up in order to create ‘’stickier’’ cookies. An example is an 
online advertising company named “United Virtualities”, which developed a “Persistent 
Identification Element”, tagged to the user’s browser but not deletable343. These “Flash 
Cookies” first came to prominence in 2005: they cannot be removed, have no expiry 
date, are stored in a different location from regular cookies, and are not controlled by the 
browser (and as such cannot be removed through clearing browser history). Even 
“Private Browsing” included in most browsers does not deter Flash Cookies, and a 
majority of major websites use them344. 
 
Cookies are being used in increasingly-creative ways to collect data. For example, some 
ultrasonic pitches have been embedded in various audio media - into TV commercials, 
browsers or apps - which are then detected by nearby devices, allowing cookies to pair 
a single user to multiple devices and keeping track of what the individual sees, how long 
they watch the ad, and how the person acts in reaction to the ad (such as buying a 
product, for example)345. There is a vast amount of value in creating a cohesive net 
capturing all the data linked to one individual, which prompts such creations346, but also 
represents a challenge to one’s informational privacy. 
 
This cross-linking of data to ensure one individual is identified is not only limited to 
cookies, and is clearer than anywhere in the example of Google. In 2012, Google 
announced that all its accounts would be merged into one, whether they be Google+, 
Gmail, Youtube, or any other Google services347. One of the purposes of this ambitious 
340 Soltani, A,, et al. (2010). Flash Cookies and Privacy. AAAI spring symposium: intelligent 
information privacy management. Vol. 2010. 
341 Ibid 
342 Pierson, J., & Heyman, R. (2011). Social media and cookies: challenges for online privacy. 
info, 13(6), 30-42. 
343 Ibid 
344 Ibid 
345 Soltani (n.340) 
346 Ibid 
347 The Guardian Staff and agencies (2012), Google user data to be merged across all sites 
under contentious plan, The Guardian, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jan/25/google-merge-user-data-privacy 
90 
 
                                               
move was, once and for all,  to have only one individual, one identity, and one account 
owner to apply one profile to348, giving Google a very strong competitive position, to the 
point that Google was fined €4.34 billion for abusing its competitive position in favor of 
its search engine349. This move has been followed by multiple platforms, including 
Microsoft, uniting such wide services as Microsoft Office, Bing, Skype, MSN, or 
Microsoft’s Cloud service OneDrive (the name “One Drive” being another indicator of this 
trend to unite, aggregate, centralise a full suite of services).  
 
This push towards creating one entity, one account, and merging digital and real-world 
identities has several implications, but the most important one is that it becomes possible 
for one entity not only to possess tremendous amounts of data about a person’s habits - 
tracking them from their e-mail to their office work all the way through their Cloud storage 
and online chat - but also become gatekeepers of that knowledge. 
 
As we can see, data is being collected and centralised in wholly new ways, ways which 
allow us to gather a myriad of small, previously-unrecorded data points. As we will show 
later on, this change is part of what makes the notion of “personal data” more and more 
obsolete. 
 
Overall, as we have seen, the “data collection” step, which should in principle be as 
unbiased and objective as possible since the data that is collected is raw, unchanged, 
actual data, in fact has a large number of factors which will determine what kind of 
Information can be created from that data. Depending on what data can be collected in 
the first place, what means the observer has to collect it, the limitations of the technology 
and the possible biases which drive the collection, the Information which will come out 
of the data collection will be entirely different.  
 
This modularity of Information undermines the idea of “personal data” as understood by 
European data protection regulation. Under the “Information” paradigm, the same data 
can lead to privacy-invasive Information or not, depending on these factors. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that at the collection stage, the data collected can still be 
classified as “personal” and “non-personal”. It is in the following stages that things 
become even more difficult. We will now investigate the storage and aggregation steps 
and show how the resulting “sculpture” becomes more and more uncertain. 
 
348 Ibid 
349 Commission Press Release, IP/18/4581 (Jul 18, 2018) 
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II. Storage and Aggregation: the “Volume” and 
“Variety” elements of Big Data 
 
In order to explain the importance of the storage and aggregation steps, it is necessary 
to reiterate the fundamentals of Big Data: Volume, Velocity, Variety. The storage step is 
what dictates the “Volume” factor, as if data cannot be stored, it cannot be used, while 
the aggregation stage is where data from a Variety of sources come together in one 
database. Even though at that stage nothing is done to the data in and of itself, the simple 
fact that more data exists in one place is important, mainly due to issues of access. 
 
1. What data is being stored 
 
In the early days of computing, data was stored without much structure. Tailor-made (and 
time-consuming) programming models were necessary in order to understand the 
data350. The core limit here was the third “V”: Velocity. The data was there, but not in a 
format that could be used effectively. This led to the rise of databases, and in turn to the 
appearance of data warehouses, buildings entirely dedicated to storing all that data in 
one place where it can be examined as a whole. At the same time, data became 
processed into forms which could make easier the linking of various pieces of data 
together: “structured data” started to appear351. 
 
Most data remains unstructured, generally, which means it does not follow a specified 
format352. Until recently, not much could be done with raw, unstructured data beyond 
manual analysis. This includes raw data, weather data, CCTV, seismic imagery, and so 
on: data which is created automatically by machines and captured in a form meant for 
using, not analysing, that data353. Unstructured data also comes from human action, 
whether it be social media, text messages, written forms, or e-mails.  
 
Structured data systems are generally preferred by data analysis, as they are easier to 
mine for data, which has driven a push to make structuring data easier354. Nevertheless, 
structured data is not “superior” data; instead, it is simply data which has been processed 
350 Katal, A,, Wazid, M., and Goudar, R. (2013) Big data: issues, challenges, tools and good 
practices.Contemporary Computing (IC3), 2013 Sixth International Conference on. IEEE. 
351 Ibid 
352 Ibid 
353 Ibid 
354 Ibid 
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and modified in order to fit with a specific ability to analyse it. As such, this involves a 
variety of methods, which may impact the data and the outcome of the data analysis. 
This means that the structured data may be vastly different from its unstructured origins, 
and no method of structuring data is perfect or without bias or room for human error355. 
 
As technology advances, data becomes more and more structured, because of the value 
residing in such data. Nevertheless, some challenges exist which hamper this 
development. Studying these challenges, and the consequences were they to be 
overcome, is vital.  
 
The main challenge facing Big Data today is not Volume or Variety, but Velocity. The 
amount of data being collected, and its variety, cannot be handled efficiently by the 
current systems, hence the push for more structured data, but some analyses require 
both a huge amount of data, and data that is very structured356. Satisfying both 
requirements presents technical difficulties, especially when it comes to various types of 
data each with its own specific features357. 
 
This is not the only challenge, however. The storage required for that huge amount of 
data is expensive, in particular due to social media and its various sensory data types, 
such as geolocation data or audio and video data. Because Big Data requires this large 
amount of data to be linked together, uploading, accessing and studying it takes a 
prohibitive amount of time358. Transportation of data between where it is stored and 
where it is studied can be done in multiple ways, but limitations in network speeds have 
led some companies physically transporting hard drives in trucks, such as Amazon’s 
AWS Snowmobile359. 
 
“Big Data” groups together a vast array of tools and processes, all of which change what 
data is created and how. As we will show in later chapters, this means that traditional 
understandings of how to handle data may be outdated. 
 
Data gathering has increased exponentially with the advent of the Internet of Things and 
the ubiquitous nature of smartphones, but data storage requires actual physical 
355 Tene, O., & Polonetsky (n.8) 
356 Ibid 
357 Ibid 
358 Ibid 
359 Miller, P., Amazon wants to ship your data to the cloud using a literal truck,  The Verge, 30 
November 2016,  Available at: 
http://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2016/11/30/13797212/amazon-aws-snowmobile-
snowball-cloud-storage-truck 
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infrastructure, servers to hold the data, as well as ways to move these huge amounts of 
data from server to server. Because of that, eventually data storage becomes too 
expensive, and the idea of storing everything that can be collected is ill-advised. For 
example, Amazon has recently showcased a service called the AWS Snowmobile: 
instead of transferring one’s data to Amazon’s Cloud service directly and suffering the 
bandwidth limitations making this transfer impractically slow (when talking about 
petabytes of data), the AWS Snowmobile is a truck that will drive up, plug itself into the 
data controller’s network, and store up to 100 petabytes of data360. It will then drive to 
Amazon’s cloud storage data warehouse, and upload the information there for the data 
controller to access through Amazon’s cloud service. 
 
The fact that this is required is important to showcase the limits of Big Data technology - 
data collection has expanded to the point that it is faster to put it on a truck and drive it 
somewhere else than actually transfer it. The physical infrastructure has to take over 
where the digital one has failed. Meanwhile, some ventures are being made into whole 
fields such as using DNA for data storage361, while flash storage, a faster but more 
expensive type of data storage than the traditional spinning hard drives, are considered 
by 40% of business owners to be too expensive to be practical362. 
 
This are just some examples of the roadblocks which limit the breadth of Big Data. It 
doesn’t matter how much data is collected if it cannot be stored. These roadblocks are 
being overcome quickly, year after year, but there is no certainty that this will go on 
indefinitely. 
 
The cost and logistical difficulty of data storage has some implications for every data 
controller, which means it has implications for the Information that becomes available. 
Storing and keeping huge amounts of data is more of a problem for some entities than 
others, while some entities do not actually need all of the data that they could collect to 
be stored. For example, a smartphone app could have permission to collect all manners 
of data, such as camera or GPS localisations. However, when that is not useful 
360 Hern, A. (2017), Amazon's Snowmobile will let you upload stuff by the truckload – literally, 
The Guardian, 5 December 2016, accessed 20/3/2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/05/amazon-snowmobile-upload-truckload 
361 Patel, P. (2017), Tech Turns to Biology as Data Storage Needs Explode, Scientific 
American, 31 May 2016, accessed 20/3/2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tech-
turns-to-biology-as-data-storage-needs-explode/ 
362 Bourne, J. (2017), Two in five execs grumble flash technology is too expensive, research 
finds, CloudTech, 29 July 2016, accessed 20/3/2017, https://www.cloudcomputing-
news.net/news/2016/jul/29/execs-grumble-flash-technology-too-expensive-research-finds/ 
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whatsoever to the data controller, there is no reason to collect it, as its storage will be an 
unneeded expense. 
 
2. What data is aggregated 
 
Aggregation, incarnating the “Variety” aspects of Big Data, is where the exponential 
value of data is achieved. There, through the aggregation of various types of data, a new 
database is created which has the potential to create new, powerful Information. 
Nevertheless, at the storage and aggregation stage, that Information has yet to be 
actually created - this is the role of the mining stage. Nevertheless, an important feature 
of aggregation is where the data comes from. The true power of data is in its ubiquity - 
individual and group profiling both work best when they have as clear as possible a 
picture of what they are looking for. This is a true challenge for data controllers, as while 
it is true that everything we do online and much of what we do in the physical world is 
monitored, there is no one observer, but a myriad of them. 
 
Overall, the greatest scandals and upsets surrounding data protection did not revolve 
around just data collection, but about how that data aggregated. A recent example is the 
“Snoopers Charter”, which allowed the UK government, on the one hand, to gather more 
data through requiring Internet service providers to store for a certain time many types 
of data, while allowing a large number of public authorities to access that data363. These 
organizations range from the police forces of every part of the UK, to the Department of 
Health, Home Office, or the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority364, and all can 
access the same pooled data.  
 
The Snoopers Charter has led to severe criticism365, but it is important to remember that 
little to none none of this criticism is directed at new collections of data. Instead, it is an 
increase in both storage and aggregation: storage because data is kept for longer and 
more diligently by these data controllers, and aggregation because all of these individual 
agencies can now aggregate that data with their own data to create new, powerful 
Information. As such, the Snoopers Charter does not actually involve a significant 
amount new collections of data or deployment of new data-collecting technologies.  
 
363 Cellan-Jones, C. (2016) Snoopers law creates security nightmare, BBC News, 29 November 
2016  
364 Ibid 
365 Ibid 
95 
 
                                               
Meanwhile, the power of aggregation is not missed by data controllers. Every major 
software company is working on consolidating platforms that aggregate all of their data 
for profiling purposes. An example is Facebook, which has made very costly purchases 
in Instagram in 2012 ($1bn)366 and WhatsApp in 2014 ($19bn)367. Through these 
purchases, not only has Facebook opened itself up to larger data collection, but then 
revealed that it would share data between the different services for ad targeting - in other 
words, data profiling of users throughout these platforms368. Additionally, “WhatsApp will 
also be sharing the data with the “Facebook family of companies”369, which includes the 
aforementioned Instagram, as well as Oculus VR, which signals their clear intentions 
towards the aggregation of that data. The amount of money Facebook has invested to 
acquire these companies shows how important not just data profiling, but accurate and 
complete data profiling, is to their objectives and business model. In these cases, once 
again, there is no new data gathering taking place. The data Facebook, Instagram, and 
WhatsApp collect remains the same. However, once that collected data is aggregated, 
it leads to being able to create much more powerful, and much more valuable, 
Information.  
 
A similar practice that we have studied previously is the use of cookies, not just to collect 
data, but to identify individuals across devices to link these devices together. In that case, 
once again, the ability to link devices together allows for the aggregation of data for data 
controllers to use to create new Information. 
 
Finally, a relevant example, showing how ubiquitous is this push towards aggregating as 
much data as possible into one identity for better profiling, can be made from essentially 
all of the major software companies currently on the market. Microsoft has over the last 
few years united its accounters over various programs and services into one - Xbox Live, 
Skype, Microsoft Office, Windows, OneDrive, Bing and more, in order to (among other 
purposes) aggregate data over these various services370. Google has done the same, 
creating one account for Google Drive, Gmail, Google Search, Youtube and others. 
366 BBC News (2012), Facebook buys Instagram photo sharing network for $1bn, BBC 
Technology, 10 April 2012, accessed on 22/3/2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
17658264 
367 BBC News (2014),  Facebook to buy messaging app WhatsApp for $19bn, BBC Business, 
20 February 2014, accessed on 22/3/2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26266689 
368 Lomas, N. (2016), WhatsApp to share user data with Facebook for ad targeting — here’s 
how to opt out, Techcrunch, 25 August 2016, accessed on 22/3/2017, 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/25/whatsapp-to-share-user-data-with-facebook-for-ad-targeting-
heres-how-to-opt-out/ 
369 Ibid 
370 Dailey, K. (2012), Could Google's data hoarding be good for you?, BBC News Magazine, 
accessed on 17/6/2018 at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16749076 
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Facebook is promoting its “logging in through Facebook” functionality and the 
aforementioned WhatsApp and Instagram. Apple, which has been known for a long time 
to have a strategy based around “owning the consumer”371 and having a separate, 
complete environment providing all of the services an individual needs through one 
platform, has the Apple ID through which the consumer logs in to iTunes, the iCloud, 
FaceTime, Apple’s App Store, etc. 
 
 
In conclusion, we can see that even after data is gathered, its ability to create Information 
will depend on what data is being stored and aggregated. Two data controllers with 
powerful data gathering processes might keep different data depending on their storage 
capabilities (leading to different Information which can be created), while two data 
controllers with the same data collection capabilities would find themselves with entirely 
new Information if they chose to aggregate that data in a shared platform. 
 
So far, however, the data itself remain largely unchanged, despite being aggregated 
among other forms of data. As such, concepts of “personal data” can still hold, and 
attaching legal obligations to such data based on “localising” it in previous steps (whether 
consent was obtained during collection, whether it constitutes “personal data”, whether 
the data collected follows data minimisation purposes, and so on) is still possible. 
However, as we will show, the next step, that we call ‘’processing’’, and its transformation 
of data use the previous steps to create something that is altogether new. Put back into 
the terms of the “Sculptor’s Work”, if data collection is gathering the raw materials to use 
in the sculpture, storage and aggregation is the sculptor assembling all of those materials 
in one place, ready to begin the work.  
 
 
III. Processing: Transformation Through Human 
Intervention  
 
Once data is aggregated, it is processed into a form that can subsequently be mined for 
valuable Information. Because of how “big” Big Data is, human beings are completely 
unable to process that huge amount of data, and so leave the task to a wide world of 
software, professional data processors, or other data management services.  
371 Montgomerie, J., & Roscoe, S. (2013, December). Owning the consumer—Getting to the 
core of the Apple business model. In Accounting Forum (Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 290-299). Elsevier. 
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 1. How is the aggregated data processed 
 
Processing Big Data is not a simple process. It requires complex software, trained 
personnel, and very powerful hardware. As such, once again, the limitations of cost 
restrict what the data controller may do, which brings to mind the “means likely to be 
used” test used for anonymised data. In this case, depending on the value the processor 
is expecting to gain from the Information obtained by the processed data, the tools used 
by the data processor will change, and with them the chances of informational-privacy-
challenging Information to emerge. 
 
There is a plethora of tools and methods used to process data and make it ready for 
mining. The objective is to obtain data that is both accurate, and valuable. Behind this 
seemingly-simple goal lies a highly-complex architecture, with constant innovation 
changing the status quo. The first main hurdle is to obtain the relevant data, and that 
hurdle is the one which is being resolved with the greatest speed, as we have seen (even 
if non-homogeneously). The next hurdle is to process that data into not just a readable 
and understandable form, but one that provides the highest possible value. 
 
In the previous age, the age of “small data”, the goal was to have the most precise data 
possible: few points of data meant that accurate data was vital, as any error in one of the 
data points would have a strong impact372. However, in the Big Data age, allowing for 
imprecision (what Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth  Cukier describe as 
“messiness” in their paper “Big data: A revolution that will transform how we live, work, 
and think.”373) allows for the processing of much more data. If less work has to go into 
ensuring the relevance and accuracy of each data point, more data can be processed, 
and this idea was embraced quite thoroughly by the Big Data community, hoping that the 
greater amount of data processed would allow for more-accurate Information to be 
produced, offsetting the loss caused by the messiness.  
 
Additionally, messiness is introduced based on the Variety of data points used. For every 
point of data introduced in the processing attempt that is of a different type, there is a 
chance that the tools used to process it are inefficient or inaccurate, which only becomes 
more likely for data which is very hard to process. For example, voice data is difficult to 
process if one is trying to use voice recognition, because voice recognition technology 
372 Mayer-Schönberger (n.322) 
373 Ibid 
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is, as of yet, imperfect. However, voice data is easy to process if one is only interested 
in the volume of the voice, as the tools to capture that data are more accurate. As such, 
a company recording phone conversations with customer service trying to process calls 
automatically using voice recognition might open themselves to a higher degree of 
inaccurate Information than one only trying to process the same calls to, for example, 
identify wheter individuals are talking loudly to their customer service (such as to identify 
patterns of potential staff abuse).  
 
There are, along the same lines, certain types of data which are easier or harder to 
process. We have mentioned before that there exists “structured”, “semi-structured”, and 
“unstructured” data. Though the goal of processing is to produce structured data, the 
data used for the processing exercise can itself be any of these types. For example, two 
databases of structured data can be processed to create a new database combining 
them, while a myriad of unstructured data groups can be processed into one new 
structured database. In this example, the first case is generally much easier to process 
than the second one.  
 
Between unstructured data types, as well, there are differences. Text-based unstructured 
data, such as e-mails, books or Word documents, can be processed relatively well due 
to the amount of support that exists for text search. Meanwhile, images, audio or video 
are much more difficult to process as the means to process them completely are not 
always as advanced374.  
 
The advantage of Big Data in terms of “messy” data is the law of large numbers - 
accuracies can be rectified by an overwhelming amount of positive data. This rule has 
been enormously successful. An example is the spell checker in Microsoft’s Word 
program in 2000375. Two researchers trying to improve it ended up failing to find a good 
solution through sophisticated algorithms, ended up feeding the program huge amounts 
of data, by a factor of a thousand, with amazing results such as accuracy increasing from 
75% to 95%376. Because the data used there was very messy, it showed that it is possible 
for very unstructured data to lead to very powerful, useful and accurate Information. As 
such there is no clear rule for how to create accurate Information - it can come from 
unstructured data or structured data, from large amounts of data or small ones. Overall, 
however, there is a tendency for structured data, lending itself to well-developed tools, 
in large quantities, to construct good Information. 
374 Ibid 
375 Ibid 
376 Ibid 
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 What does that mean in terms of informational privacy? The main observation is that 
tools that the data controller has at his disposal, or chooses to use, will significantly 
change the Information obtained. Some programs are better for unstructured data, while 
some are designed to handle structured data. Some programs are good at financial data 
while some are best used to identify language patterns. Data processing is a complex 
environment, and as such the same aggregated data can lead to different Information 
based on how the processing is done. 
 
 
2. Who is doing the processing 
 
We have mentioned how the processing stage, due to its complexity and the need for 
expertise for it to function, can be delegated to third parties. These third parties - data 
processors - are specifically targeted by the GDPR because of their unique situation - 
holders of large amounts of data without having the responsibility of being the data 
controller. As such, despite technically being third parties, they are under the GDPR 
responsible for many of the same obligations as data controllers. An important factor is 
that despite being contracted by the data controller to study the data, the decision-
making process of the data processor is different from the data controller’s377. Biases in 
data analysis in either of the parties are compounded when they are both involved in the 
processing. 
 
Meanwhile, this raises the issue of aggregation once more - the same data processor 
might have a myriad of data points from various controllers. If they were to combine that 
data, though they might have more complete Information, it would be a breach of privacy. 
This is usually remedied by contractual clauses, however, showing that restrictions over 
what data is shared depends on not just regulatory restrictions, but contractual ones as 
well. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the processing 
 
377 Article 29 Working Party (2010), Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and 
"processor" WP 169, 16 February 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf 
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Finally, it is vital to note that because processing is usually aimed at discovering specific 
Information, the transformation of the data is not a simple ‘’increase’’ of the Information 
which can be obtained from it. In the case of sensitive data, for example, this processing 
can involve anonymization which attempts to keep some value in the data while 
protecting individual privacy. In this way, depending on the aims of the processing and 
the priorities of the data controllers and processors, the result of the processing can take 
different forms. Importantly, this means that a lot of the data gets discarded over the 
course of processing. Let’s take the example of a company trying to track the popularity 
of a certain product. Aggregating the sales records of its stores, that data is then 
processed to output only one statistic - how much of that product was sold over a certain 
period. In this example, the processing stage strips out almost all of the data. It does 
creates very accurate Information, the Information that the data controller was interested 
in, yet the data produced by this processing has very little chance of infringing the privacy 
of customers. Indeed, as the processed data is just a metric of products and quantities, 
all of the data which relates to them is trimmed out of the analysis. 
 
The idea of various possible purposes changing the data analysis is reflected in the 
GDPR as well, since one of the major notions is the idea of ‘’purpose limitation’’ - under 
Article 5 of the GDPR, each purpose of processing has its own legal basis378, determines 
what the data retention period should be, as well as how much data can be processed 
to accomplish this purpose. Ideally, each purpose of processing will be a flow, from 
collection to deletion, all following one distinct purpose. However, practices such as data 
aggregation and group profiling can take these flows and muddle them, mixing data and 
creating new Information from it379. This new Information, new ‘’data’’, may well be 
‘’personal data’’ but is not covered under the purpose for which the data was originally 
collected. In those cases, and considering that this Information can appear even without 
the data processor having intended to create it, trying to limit data processing to one 
‘’purpose’’ may be impossible380. These kinds of issues are one of the reasons that the 
oft-criticized ‘’legitimate interest’’ ground for processing data has been included in the 
GDPR, as a begrudging admission that some flexibility will be necessary381. 
 
378 GDPR, Article 5 
379 Rauhofer, J. (2015). Of Men and Mice: Should the EU Data Protection Authorities' Reaction 
to Google's New Privacy Policy Raise Concern for the Future of the Purpose Limitation 
Principle. Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev., 1, 5. 
380 Goodman (n.28) 
381 Moerel, L., & Prins, J. E. J. (2015). Further Processing of Data Based on the Legitimate Interest 
Ground: The End of Purpose Limitation, IAPP News, accessed at https://iapp.org/news/a/on-the-
death-of-purpose-limitation/ on 11/10/2018 
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The fact that data, under the GDPR, is held to be personal or not at the collection stage 
overlooks the importance of this processing stage: processing personal data might lead 
to non-personal data, while processing non-personal data, through the finding of unseen 
correlations, may create personal data. But more importantly, every instance of 
processing changes what the data is, and this change needs to be taken into account, 
regardless of whether it crosses the boundary between personal and non-personal data. 
 
Overall, processing and how it is performed changes what Information can be obtained 
from it, depending on the means used by the data controller or processors. There are 
many types of data and ways it can be processed, based on the existing technologies, 
which ones are available to the controller or processor, which ones they actually choose 
to use, how they use it, and for what purpose. The fact that these decisions can be split 
between various parties - data controllers and processors - only adds to the variance in 
how the data is transformed and what Information can be created from it. 
 
Going back to the Sculptor’s Work analogy, there are infinite forms a sculpture can take 
from the same materials, and every sculpture fulfills a different purpose. As such, the 
materials the sculpture is made of can be of less importance than the way it is shaped. 
 
 
IV. Data Mining: Further Opportunities for Bias  
 
Once data is collected, aggregated, stored, and processed into a structured or semi-
structured database, it becomes mined for valuable information. That data mining is 
where value is extracted from the data - the “mountain” of data being “mined’’. In that 
stage, the processed data is studied to create finally the Information which the data 
controller is looking for. As such, the data mining and processing stages are intrinsically 
linked and are often performed by the same entity. Nevertheless, it is important to 
separate them because the data mining can be performed by anyone who has access 
to the processed data. The basic consequence of this is that some data can essentially 
only be mined appropriately by the processor, if the formatting is done in a certain way. 
An example is pseudonymised data: data which can only be identifiable if one has access 
to additional Information. The same database processed into pseudonymised data can 
lead either to no or complete Information in the data mining stage depending on whether 
the observer has access to that additional Information. 
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Going back to the Sculptor’s Work analogy for the data/Information conundrum, the data 
mining stage is the one most prone to bias. At this stage, the sculpture is finished, and 
the sculptor looks at his work, hoping to find in his complete work what he built it for. 
Because “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, whoever will look at that structure may 
have a different vision of it. Their own expertise, their experience, their biases, 
expectations, and contextual information will all come into play when it comes to 
evaluating that structure and using it for their purposes. Because of the amount of 
subjectivity that comes into data mining and how varied the Information that it creates is, 
the data mining stage has many facets. 
1. How is the data mined 
 
Mining the data can be done in a vast number of ways, which has a strong impact on 
what the outcome of that mining is. Because each method of data mining changes the 
information created by it, and suffers from different limitations and biases, the term 
“mining” - which puts in mind the idea of an external effort on a mountain of data - is 
inaccurate. A preferable term is “data sculpting”: select pieces of the mountain of data 
are used to construct something specific the creator had in mind, which changes 
depending on the sculptor and the observer, created for a purpose and function. The 
same mountain can lead to an infinity of different sculptures depending on these factors, 
and the same data can lead to different Information. 
 
The most simple type of data mining does not require particular expertise and is done 
every day - taking two data points and creating a correlation from it: “A happens in 50% 
of cases when B happens”. These correlations are “linear correlations”, with a clear 
pattern of cause to effect382. Data mining uses many tools, primarily found in the AI 
community - which develops processes such as machine learning and pattern 
recognition - and the mathematics community. There are two main approaches to data 
mining: top-down and bottom-up383. 
 
Top-down analysis starts by looking for confirmation (or lack thereof) from established 
patterns and models of behavior. This allows for the identification of patterns which follow 
the norm, or depart from it384. As such, it primarily aims at identifying and understanding 
behaviors. Because it tests a hypothesis, when the data becomes too complex and too 
382 Hildebrandt M., Backhouse J. (2005), Descriptive analysis and inventory of profiling 
practices. In FIDIS Project Deliverable 7.2. Available at: http://www.fidis.net 
383 Ibid 
384 Ibid 
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many variables are involved, accuracy drops. This is an issue because it is often the 
case that important variables which impact the outcome of the study are either not 
considered, or not kept through the collection, storage, and aggregation phases and as 
such not included in the data mining process. 
 
Bottoms-up analysis manipulates the data itself to uncover patterns, attempting to 
generate hypotheses that can explain behavior or predict future behavior385. This type of 
analysis has no real interest in causation: it observes behaviors and the link between 
them without looking at the reason why these links are the way they are, leaving the 
interpretation to the observer. As interpretation can be flawed or biased, bottoms-up 
analysis is also imperfect. 
 
For Big Data analysis, use of computer algorithms is almost always required, as manual 
analysis is prohibitively time-consuming and expensive as the Volume and Variety of 
data increases. Nevertheless, dealing with complex data holds complexities at every 
level. Choosing the framework in which the analysis is performed - whether it be which 
program is used, which data is examined, or what to do if unexpected events occur and 
how best to direct the algorithm - are all major factors in deciding what happens to the 
data386. 
 
The use of more and more data in data processing can reveal new, unexpected 
correlations, depending on the tools used for the data mining; and as the phenomenon 
of Big Data expands, these unexpected correlations become more common387. Because 
the conclusions might not necessarily match what was expected of the mining, there can 
come a time where a data controller, who has agreed not to use the “personal data” in 
ways beyond the stated purpose (according to the purpose limitation principle388 found 
in the GDPR389), finds him/herself with new Information, that goes beyond that purpose, 
without even meaning to do so. Meanwhile, that Information was obtained while using 
the data for its stated purposes – in that case, is there a breach of purpose limitation or 
not? The difficulty to outline properly what can be obtained from data processing causes 
privacy statements to be vague in order to give data controllers room to manoeuvre, 
385 Ibid 
386 Tene, O., & Polonetsky, J. (2013). Judged by the tin man: Individual rights in the age of big 
data. J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L., 11, 351. 
387 Colonna, L. (2013), Mo’ Data, Mo’ Problems? Personal Data Mining and the Challenge to the 
Data Minimization Principle, Conference proceedings of Big Data and Privacy: Making Ends 
Meet hosted by Stanford Law School and The Center for Internet and Society 
388 Mayer-Schonberger, V., & Padova, Y. (2015). Regime Change: Enabling Big Data through 
Europe's New Data Protection Regulation. Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev., 17, 315. 
389 GDPR, Recital 28 
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weakening their overall effectiveness and transparency, while making it harder for 
individuals to understand the processes involved.390 According to the Article 29 Working 
Party, the purpose limitation is quite strict in that the GDPR Article 5(1)(b) requirements 
of the purpose being “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”391 require 
the purpose of the collection to be “clearly and specifically identified” and “detailed 
enough to determine what kind of processing is taking place”392.  
 
As such, there is an irremediable limitation there, where data controllers are forced to 
stretch as much as legally possible their purpose specification, just in case the data they 
discover happens to go beyond the scope that was originally planned. This is, once 
again, because “data” and “Information” are different constructs, and the final construct 
is so different that binding it by the rules of the raw data it was built from makes less and 
less sense as these constructs become more elaborate. In other words, going back to 
the Sculptor’s Work analogy, the GDPR asks the sculpture’s commissioner to decide 
exactly what they will see in the completed work even though at that point all they have 
is the raw materials in a pile. 
 
Thus, depending on what data is used, unexpected correlations can appear. However, 
these correlations are not necessarily correct, either. Because the tools used to mine the 
data are varied393, and because the Information which can come from it can be complex, 
unexpected, or incomplete, data mining can lead to inaccuracies394. Data analysis is a 
whole set of skills which requires expert knowledge, and as such the same data might 
lead to different Information depending on how these skills are applied. 
 
This is an important reason behind the separation between “data” and “Information”. 
“Data” is rarely inaccurate: it is how that data is framed, interpreted, understood, 
contextualised - the “Information” - which can be inaccurate. Data mining produces 
Information, not necessarily facts. 
 
 
390 Mantelero, A. (2014). The future of consumer data protection in the EU Re-thinking the 
“notice and consent” paradigm in the new era of predictive analytics. Computer Law & Security 
Review, 30(6), 643-660. 
391 GDPR, Article 5 
392 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 
WP203, Adopted on 2 April 2013 
393 Altman, M., & McDonald, M. P. (2001). Choosing reliable statistical software. PS: Political 
Science & Politics, 34(3), 681-687. 
394 Mohan, P., Thakurta, A., Shi, E., Song, D., & Culler, D. (2012). GUPT: privacy preserving 
data analysis made easy. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM SIGMOD International Conference 
on Management of Data (pp. 349-360). ACM. 
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2. Who is doing the mining 
 
On top of the purpose limitation considerations come the aforementioned fact that 
different observers might have different understandings of the same data. This simple 
observation, which we will develop further in the coming section, means that the 
Information can be misunderstood or manipulated depending on what Information the 
observer wants to obtain. An example is confirmation bias395, and is found in every level 
of data processing, from individuals self-monitoring their activity and limited by their 
limited sample size of 1396 to large corporations looking to prove the worth of certain 
products despite signs to the contrary, to political parties only taking into account 
statistics that match their worldview397. 
 
Because of this, data mining is not as simple as making a conclusion based on the 
processed data. Instead, interpreting the data in order to obtain relevant and accurate 
Information is a whole world unto itself. This is another reason for the importance of 
distinguishing “data” and “Information”. “Data” in and of itself says nothing - it is only 
through the “Information” we create from it that decisions are made, that inaccuracies, 
prejudices and biases show their effects. 
 
 
Through this section, we have gone over the major stages of the processing of data. As 
we can see, this process is not a clear line from “messy data” to “clean facts”. It is not 
mining a mountain to uncover a hidden gem. It is in fact a lot more akin to sculpting the 
data in a specific shape: the work is just as much based on the materials you start with 
as it is on the person doing the sculpting, and how and why they do so. There is a whole 
host of decisions that are made at every stage that will influence the final output, every 
single one changing, in subtle or not-so-subtle ways, the Information that can be obtained 
from it. We will now look deeper into specific issues and patterns that find themselves 
present in every stage of the process, in order to discuss architectural facts which mean 
the “personal data” binary is unable to reflect that reality and even attempting to anchor 
data points to an individual is unsustainable. 
 
Overall, as we have seen, the process of data analysis is complex, and involves many 
steps, each of which relies on various different pieces of technology which themselves 
395 Swan (n.7) 
396 Ibid 
397 Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769. 
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have inherent limitations, but together constitute an extremely powerful tool which 
creates knowledge in entirely new ways. This new knowledge brings to light underlying 
data protection challenges. We will now study a particular type of data processing 
exercise which creates the ability to obtain information about individuals, in a way that 
was never possible before. 
 
B. Profiling and Group Profiling: A New Way of Creating 
Knowledge and Predicting Behavior 
 
I. Defining Profiling  
 
We will now study a few of the distinctions in profiling, to highlight the opposition between 
the types of profiling that came before, and the ways profiling has changed and is now 
challenging traditional understandings of data. The GDPR  defines profiling as ‘’any form 
of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to 
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person’’398 A more thorough 
definition was outlined in “Defining Profiling”399 along these lines: “Profiling is a technique 
to automatically process personal and non-personal data, aimed at developing predictive 
knowledge from the data in the form of constructing profiles that can subsequently be 
applied as a basis for decision-making. A profile is a set of correlated data that represents 
a (human or non-human, individual or group) subject. Constructing profiles is the process 
of discovering unexpected patterns between data in large data sets that can be used to 
create profiles. Applying profiles is the process of identifying and representing a specific 
subject or to identify a subject as a member of a specific group or category and taking 
some form of decision based on this identification and representation.”400 This definition 
gives us further elements which we will develop to assess the impact of profiling on 
informational privacy. 
 
Organic profiling is profiling as performed by non-human entities, which is developed as 
a survival trait. An animal understanding that someone is predator or prey depending on 
398 Ferraris, V. and Bosco, D. and Cafiero, G. and D'Angelo, E. and Suloyeva, Y., Defining 
Profiling (December 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366564 
orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366564 
399 Ibid 
400 Ibid 
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the input of information from its senses is organic profiling. Human profiling, by 
opposition, is different because it is reflective: we can understand the conclusion we 
draw, and study and perfect them401. Finally, machine learning is done based not on 
mechanics decided by survival evolution, but by the input of a man-made software 
architecture402. As we can already see, a vital difference between human and machine 
profiling lies in how decisions are made, and in their accountability - a human may 
understand and rectify their biases, where a computer or animal cannot. 
 
Another distinction regards this factor: the reasoning involved in the decision. Animals 
and machines perform automated profiling - the aggregation and processing of data 
where no decisions are made based on outside reflection403. Meanwhile, autonomic 
profiling is a process where there is human intervention and reflection, but at a low level 
- the machine makes all of the decisions, with a minimized human role. Finally, non-
automatic profiling is where machines are not involved in the decision-making process404. 
As we are focusing on Big Data and its implications, we are focusing this study on 
autonomic profiling. 
 
Finally, an important distinction when it comes to profiling is the difference between group 
profiling and personalised profiling. As mentioned before, profiling creates a correlation 
between pieces of data. Once the data is mined and the correlations established, a set 
of assumptions is created. These assumptions however can be made about two types 
of entities: an individual, or a group. For example, if one finds data correlating incomes 
with shopping patterns, one can either create assumptions such as “Individuals with 
incomes of X or higher buy more of product Y”, or “Particular individual A with income of 
X buys a lot of product Y”. Both profiles - the group one and the individual one - can be 
built on the same data, but have different implications. 
 
To understand the implications of group profiling, a distinction needs to be made between 
distributive and non-distributive profiles. A distributive profiles identifies a group where 
all members share all of the attributes correlated in the profile. These profiles have 
certain implications because all members of the group will be assumed to follow certain 
characteristics, while this is actually rare405. For example, one could assume that all 
individuals in an extremely poor neighborhood would be poor and apply a group profile 
401 Ibid 
402 Van der Hof, S., & Prins, C. (2008). Personalisation and its influence on identities, behaviour 
and social values. In Profiling the European Citizen (pp. 111-127). Springer, Dordrecht. 
403 Ibid 
404 Ibid 
405 Ibid 
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to them, using it for further constructions later on such as targeted advertising. In fact, 
most profiles are non-distributive, which means they are probabilistic: every member of 
the group is likely, not assured, to share certain characteristics406.  
 
This phenomenon is at the source of many instances of data inaccuracy: on the one 
hand, most profiles are non-distributive, which means blanket assumptions made on the 
individuals will be wrong at least some of the time. On the other hand, data controllers 
will want to use them, even when there is a chance their profiles will not apply some of 
the time. When the probabilities are wrong, or even the assumptions are wrong, the 
consequences on informational privacy can be significant. 
 
II. Profiling in the Law  
 
Profiling was not addressed directly in the Data Protection Directive, mainly because the 
Directive was created in a context where profiling and its implications in conjunction with 
Big Data were not a major concern. However, the GDPR now has in its Article 22 
provisions specifically addressing it407. Under this Article, data subjects have a right not 
necessarily to avoid the exercise of profiling, but instead to avoid being “subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”408 Recital 58 
provides as examples the “automatic refusal of an on-line credit application or e-
recruiting practices without any human intervention.”409 
 
In the GDPR, profiling is defined in the context of data protection as “any form of 
automated processing of personal data, intended to analyze or predict the personality or 
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular the analysis and 
prediction of the person’s health, economic situation, performance at work, personal 
preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements.” 
 
This Article has some important implications. A concern about the automation of 
decision-making falls under the field of discrimination, as unthinking machines - 
machines using the automated profiling explained above - use no reasoning to come to 
their conclusions, which means if they are not programmed to avoid discrimination, there 
406 Ibid 
407 GDPR, Article 22 
408 GDPR, Article 22(1)  
409 GDPR, Recital 58 
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can be some breaches of the right to non-discrimination (protected amongst others by 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights410). Specifically, GDPR Recital 
71 states that data controllers need to “implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures” that “prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects” on the basis of 
processing sensitive data (“sensitive data” being data considered especially personal 
such as race or religion)411. 
 
This focus on “sensitive data” in both Article 22 and Recital 71 are relevant. They can 
either be interpreted as applying these extra protections only to sensitive data. This 
would involve carefully piecing together the data points which make up the data 
processing and finding whether some of them are sensitive412. However, a second 
interpretation is that any data processing operation containing some sensitive data needs 
to have this level of protection. In either case, it involves pinpointing the sensitive data 
being examined, which can be difficult - the correlations created by data become more 
and more complex and difficult to identify the bigger the dataset becomes, and the more 
likely it is that both some sensitive data appears, and that sensitive data becomes harder 
and harder to assess. Overall, paradoxically, the bigger the data, the harder it is to find 
specific information within it. 
 
The ability to create profiles about individuals is a new tool in creating Information. All of 
this new Information has been considered to be increasing and improving human 
knowledge, but that is not necessarily the case413. In fact, what makes data different from 
Information is the human element, which leads to the potential for human error414. 
 
C. The Uncertainty of Human Agency 
 
Now that we have gone over each part of data processing, we will study several global 
factors which are present across various stages, and which ensure that what comes out 
of the processing of data is not simply “better” data, but instead is a whole new construct. 
Because of how different that construct can be, any ties to the individual can end up 
410 ECHR, Article 14 
411 GDPR, Recital 71 
412 Goodman (n.28) 
413 Pauleen, D. J., & Wang, W. Y. (2017). Does big data mean big knowledge? KM perspectives 
on big data and analytics. Journal of Knowledge Management, 21(1), 1-6. 
414 Carmichael, L., Stalla-Bourdillon, S., & Staab, S. (2016). Data mining and automated 
discrimination: a mixed legal/technical perspective. IEEE Intelligent Systems, (6), 51-55. 
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disappearing, making some data which seems “non-personal” still able to allow the 
creation of very personal Information. 
   
I. Data and Information Inaccuracy 
 
The first of those factors is data inaccuracy. Because the various steps in the process 
are fraught with choices, complexities and biases, the data obtained and processed at 
various stages can end up inaccurately representing reality.  
 
Data inaccuracy is a major concern for controllers for a simple reason - data accuracy is 
a legal requirement under Article 5(1) of the GDPR, which states that “Personal data 
shall be [...] accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date”415. Data inaccuracy also 
has economic downsides, as inaccuracy leads to less benefit and less utility to the 
Information it creates. However, when it comes to informational privacy, several issues 
arise, the main one being the potential tarnishing of one’s reputation by wrongful but 
negative facts being treated as accurate. Another issue is discrimination based on 
inaccurate data, such as an individual being wrongfully considered to have bad credit 
because of a mistake somewhere in the data gathering or mining process. 
 
As we have seen, how you create your Information is as important as how you create 
your data, and despite it looking like data is a mountain that has to be mined, there is a 
lot more human involvement at every stage of the process - including the creation of 
these algorithms. As such, evaluating all Information creation under the same rules, be 
it by an algorithm or an individual, and taking into account the fact that there is no such 
thing as objective Information, would allow one to succeed where the GDPR struggles in 
dealing with accurate data leading to inaccurate or discriminatory Information. 
 
An example can be seen by going back to the Google Flu Trends example we have 
outlined earlier in this thesis. Though Google’s attempt at discovering outbreaks of the 
flu using search engine data was quite successful, the way the data was analysed 
deserves a second look. 
 
Google’s engineers obtained their results by going through millions of searches looking 
for 1152 data points416, removing the data points that they deemed irrelevant. However, 
415 GDPR, Article 5 
416 Ibid 
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that method failed to detect a non seasonal influenza pandemic in 2009, because it was 
mainly interested in seasonal patterns and could not predict such a pandemic which 
would happen outside of winter. Meanwhile, despite improvements in the service, 
Google’s service has overestimated flu trends consistently, with certain patterns: for 
example, the direction and magnitude of the errors varies with the season, showing that 
these inaccuracies could have been avoided by other research methods417. 
Unpredictable behavior such as sudden media frenzies, unexpected weather patterns, 
or the appearance of whole new terms not taken into account by the model are all able 
to render Google Flu Trends’ results inaccurate418. 
 
Meanwhile, Google has been attempting to extend the reach of its predictions by 
modelling software through the Google Correlate tool, which can be modified by service 
providers according to their business model419. This leads to so-called “blue team” errors, 
where the service providers’ changes and decisions on what data to take into account or 
not for their data mining efforts are mistaken. This means that data that has been 
collected, stored, aggregated, and processed correctly, using Google’s experienced, 
powerful tool, can still, nevertheless, lead to inaccurate Information based on who uses 
it. 
 
To add to the complexity, there is the possibility of “red team” attacks. This case, a true 
example of the wider digital world in action, is what happens when the subjects of the 
research themselves attempt to manipulate the data for their own goals, whether for 
economic or political benefit. An example is attempting to make one’s interests trend on 
Facebook or Twitter, to spread rumours, smear political candidates, or change 
perceptions of what is happening based on what is shown through various services420. 
The brigading of online polls is a common example of this. 
 
II. Technical Limitations of Big Data 
 
In addition to the uncertainty linked to the human-error element of data processing comes 
the difficulty in the process itself. There is a wide variety of tools, with various degrees of 
reliability and complexity, with various possible uses and requiring a whole array of skills 
to use effectively. A simple look at the vast literature related to data mining techniques 
417 Ibid 
418 Ibid 
419 Ibid 
420 ibid 
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is enough to show this, as well as the fact that data science in and of itself is an entire 
scientific discipline421. Because of this, and because of the inherent difficulties in 
assessing what kind of Information can be obtained from various data processing 
exercises, there is a lot of variance in every step of the process.  
 
This is a limitation we have mentioned before, when discussing anonymisation, which is 
a type of data processing in and of itself. Because of the various possible processes 
involved, we held that anonymisation was not an ultimate solution, did not lead to certain 
results, and as such cannot be trusted to protect privacy on its own, a view which is 
gaining support in the privacy community422. The exact same is true of all aspects of data 
mining, and this complexity, especially at steps which happen after the collection stage 
(at which the current regulatory system decides if data is personal or not), means that 
how the data is “sculpted” changes not just based on the biases of the observer, but also 
on the resources they use and how they use them. 
 
Finally, a common theme in every step of the data processing is the fact that the forces 
attempting to improve and expand the capabilities of data gathering activities are getting 
better and better at it in an exponential way - the rapid progress of Big Data. That does 
not mean that data is becoming more accurate - as we have seen more data analysis 
does not necessarily imply more data accuracy - but it does mean that the power of these 
processes, and the Information created from them, are becoming greater and greater. 
This creates changing power dynamics. The different speeds at which different 
developments occur each change the balance of Information creation: giving more power 
to those who can benefit the most from these innovations, while not necessarily 
compensating it with safeguards for those whose data is being processed. As such, it is 
not just the case that Information creation is uncertain because of inaccuracies based 
around human error and bias, and because of the complexities of data science. It is also 
uncertain in a third dimension, time. 
 
421 For some examples, see “Berry, M. J., & Linoff, G. (1997). Data mining techniques: for 
marketing, sales, and customer support. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.” for an early example from the 
late 90s, “Berkhin, P. (2006). A survey of clustering data mining techniques. Grouping 
multidimensional data, 25, 71.” for a specific look at how complex various parts of the process 
are, or “Agrawal, R., & Srikant, R. (2000, May). Privacy-preserving data mining. In ACM Sigmod 
Record (Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 439-450). ACM.” for a look at how data mining practices attempt to 
preserve privacy. 
422 See “Ohm, P. (2010), Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymisation. UCLA Law Review, Vol. 57”, or  “Barocas, S., & Nissenbaum, H. (2009). On 
notice: The trouble with Notice and Consent.” 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter so far, we have shown how the raw data present in the world - the ‘’raw 
materials’’ the sculptor will use - leads to a unique data set which contains a number of 
elements affecting its contents and characteristics - the “sculpture”. We have shown that 
the process which leads from one to the next transforms, transfers, prunes and 
aggregates the data in a way which can be so profound as to render it wholly 
unrecognizable. Compounded with the complexities of interpreting data, this also means 
the Information obtained by this process, given the same data, can be completely 
different. This has many effects, chief amongst which being the fact that “personal” data 
can lead to non-personal Information, and vice versa. However this is a mere side-effect 
of the huge difference between the data before and after the application of the various 
steps. In fact, this difference means that it is often pointless to judge the data and the 
Information which can be created from it based on its state in previous stages.  
 
It is important to remember that this phenomenon is not always so pronounced as to be 
very noticeable. Most of the time, the database will be a list of consumer addresses, or 
the aggregation of user feedback forms showing clear patterns. The fact that the 
transformation of data throughout the different stages is usually not so drastic is a main 
reason why the current regulatory framework has continued relying on the personal data 
binary. It is the age of Big Data, and the increasingly-complex tools used to process it, 
which has changed the status quo, and even then most data operations are still akin to 
the relatively-simple ones described above. 
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Chapter 4. Informational Privacy in EU Law: 
Challenges in Data Protection and Privacy Law 
Introduction 
 
Earlier in this thesis, we have laid out an analysis of what privacy and data protection 
are. We have then set into place the various stakeholders and the processes which have 
created the environment in which we are evolving. We have shown that new technologies 
which are being developed create new ways to approach data, and that the processes 
of data collection, aggregation, mining, and use are becoming more complex and wide-
reaching. 
 
We will now analyse how this new reality is clashing with the classical EU approach to 
data protection and privacy. We will do so by identifying how some essential parts of the 
EU framework protecting those rights are facing challenges, and then identify the roots 
of those various challenges. Through this, we will show that there are architectural 
limitations to this classical framework, and that the signs of a new approach show that 
the EU is shifting away from this classical framework. 
 
This new approach to data protection (and informational privacy), as we have shown in 
previous Chapters, consists of assessing the ‘’risk’’ involved in processing and mitigating 
risk-prone processing with additional safeguards. 
 
 
A. Challenges to EU Data Protection Law 
 
The first aspect of EU Data Protection Law we will examine is the main way that data 
which holds some of the value of “personal data” can be examined without the dangers 
to informational privacy associated with the processing of that personal data, and as 
such a vital tool in ensuring the protection of individuals: anonymization. As we will show, 
anonymisation is limited, which highlights the limitations of the concept of ‘’personal 
data’’. We will then analyze another such core part of EU data protection law, consent, 
and similarly show its limitations in regards to protecting informational privacy in the age 
of Big Data. 
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I. The Limits of Anonymisation  
 
In the European context, anonymisation is the set of technological practices aimed at 
ensuring that personal data is separated from its “personal” component, which is 
achieved in the EU conception by ensuring individuals cannot be “identified”423. The 
Article 29 Working Party published an Opinion in 2014 on anonymisation424. In this 
Opinion, the Working Party argued that the concept of “anonymisation” in the European 
view is closely linked to that of “identification”. This shows that European authorities 
approach anonymisation with the same view as the one behind the distinction in what 
constitutes “personal data”: the “identified” requirement. Because personal data can be 
mined for great monetary value, but at the risk of endangering individual privacy, 
anonymization - ideally - would allow one to obtain that value while protecting the right 
to data protection (ie without identification).  
 
1. The “Means likely to be used” test.  
 
The GDPR refers to anonymisation in its Recital 26, and excludes anonymized data from 
its framework: 
 
“To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the 
means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by 
another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly.  
 
To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural 
person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the 
amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available 
technology at the time of the processing and technological developments.  
 
The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, 
namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or 
423 GDPR, Recital 26 
424Article 29 Working Party (2014), Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, WP216, 
Adopted on 10 April 2014 
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to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or 
no longer identifiable.425”. 
 
The extra test which Recital 26 of the GDPR specifies for identifiability, “the means 
reasonably likely to be used”, shows that the regulators are aware of an ever-present 
technical risk: anonymisation is not one barrier which stops all possible identification 
attempts, but rather a set of various technical practices which may protect data from 
identification to a certain (or uncertain) extent426. If an entity deploys “unreasonable” 
efforts in ensuring identification, the failure to stop it is not a violation under the GDPR.  
 
Finding where anonymisation becomes sufficiently protective can be challenging. To the 
Article 29 Working Party, even de-identified data is still personal if it can be attributed to 
one person, whether or not any other characteristics apply - the only way to make that 
type of data anonymous would be to aggregate it to the point where no identification is 
possible427. Essentially, to the Article 29 Working Party, there is no such thing as a non-
personal dataset created from only one data subject428. This means that as long as the 
data set is made from one individual, no matter how anonymized or innocuous, it 
constitutes personal data. 
 
Even when data is anonymised, there is still a possibility of de-anonymization or of re-
identifying the individual from other, less obvious pieces of data. This makes it very 
difficult to turn personal data into ‘’non-personal’’ data falling outside the scope of the 
GDPR. 
 
Anonymisation is only effective at limiting identification when the effort needed to de-
anonymize data is prohibitively time- or resource-intensive compared to the effort needed 
to anonymize that data in the first place. However, in the last couple of decades, research 
into anonymisation has shown that true anonymisation is impossible, and the means of 
re-identifying are becoming easier to obtain429. This puts anonymisation in a difficult 
425 GDPR, Recital 26 
426 Bayardo, R. J., & Agrawal, R. (2005, April). Data privacy through optimal k-anonymization. In 
Data Engineering, 2005. ICDE 2005. IEEE. 
427 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, WP216 
428 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, WP216 
429  Ohm, P. (2010), Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymisation. UCLA Law Review, Vol. 57, p. 1701; U of Colorado Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 9-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450006  
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situation, as the practice is widely used to protect personal information, especially in the 
medical and research contexts430, but cannot be completely trusted. 
 
The distinction based on “means likely reasonably to be used” provides some flexibility 
since anonymisation only needs to protect up to a certain threshold, but the shift in 
balance of power between anonymization and de-anonymisation means that under this 
distinction, anonymisation technology does not mean de-identifiability, and as such does 
not change the legal nature of the data, and is simply a security measure. 
 
“Anonymisation” is not one process which when applied “increases anonymity”. Instead, 
it is a wide array of different technologies, each of which has its own advantages, flaws, 
and methods. For example, the process of “k-anonymity” is aimed at ensuring that the 
information of each person in the data set cannot be distinguished from other individuals 
in that data set, but achieving that (or coming as close as possible, as no anonymisation 
is perfect) can be done in multiple ways.  
 
Because of this, re-identification can also be done in various ways. The main difficulty is 
that with enough other pieces of data being aggregated, as long as the data has any 
relation to the individual (which is always true, since the data is generated by the 
individual’s behavior), there will be pieces of data which may allow re-identification. 
Because of the unpredictability of that process, efforts to ensure true anonymity are 
never perfect. 
 
An example of how the “means likely to be used” can be unpredictable is the AOL search 
data situation431. In 2006, AOL had released twenty million search queries for 
researchers to mine for data. At that point, in the view of AOL, that data was considered 
fully and irremediably anonymised - meaning they did not have the “means likely to be 
used” to re-identify it432. However, as they quickly realized, this did not mean 
anonymisation: reporters from the New York Times showed that they could easily re-
identify parts of the information. They were able to identify an individual based on their 
searches:  
 
“[S]earch by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 became easier 
to discern. There are queries for "landscapers in Lilburn, Ga," several people with the 
last name Arnold and "homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia."  
430 Ibid 
431 Schwartz (n.17) 
432 Ibid 
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 It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year old 
widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., frequently researches her friends' medical ailments and 
loves her three dogs. "Those are my searches," she said, after a reporter read part of 
the list to her.'433 
 
Meanwhile, another example involved the popular streaming website Netflix in a study 
by Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov434. At the time that Netflix was still a DVD 
rental business. Their research demonstrated that some people in a supposedly 
anonymised data set could be identified through their ratings on the website IMDb. The 
researchers demonstrated that “Given a user's public IMDb ratings, which the user 
posted voluntarily to selectively reveal some of his […] movie likes and dislikes, we 
discover all the ratings that he entered privately into the Netflix system, presumably 
expecting that they will remain private.”435 
 
According to a study by computer science professor Latanya Sweeney, all it takes is a 
ZIP code, birth date, and gender to identify 87% of Americans436. When considering how 
unexpected correlations can came out of unexpected places, the fact that there is no 
algorithm or program that can take into account every piece of data and what can be 
deduced from it, the idea that any data is truly “anonymous” becomes doubtful. 
 
So as we have seen, anonymisation is a set of techniques aimed at ensuring that 
individuals cannot be identified, while nevertheless using the data to extract value, but it 
is not perfect and is getting weaker as re-identification technology improves. 
 
 
2. The status of pseudonymised data  
 
The limitations of anonymization are problematic because they dispel the conception that 
personal data and data value can co-exist without conflict. The goal of anonymisation 
was to create sets of data which could be left to be used and mined free of protective 
433 Barbaro, M. & Zeller, T. (2006), A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al. 
434 Narayanan, A. & Shmatikov, V. (2008), Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets 
(2008 IEEE Symp. on Sec. and Privacy 111, Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www. 
cs.utexas.edu/-shmat/shmatoak08netflix.pdf.  
435 Ibid 
436 Sweeney, L. (2000), Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, Carnegie Mellon 
Univ., Sch. of Computer Sci., Data Privacy Lab., Working Paper No. 3, 2000. 
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restrictions and limitations437. This idea of “release-and-forget anonymization”, data 
which can be anonymized then released into the wild with no further oversight, cannot 
have been fully effective as data can often be re-identified, and there is no way to know 
with certainty whether re-identification is possible438. 
 
If anonymisation fails, then data sets used in certain sectors, including healthcare, cannot 
be used to create useful information, as the sensitivity of the data is too important to 
warrant the risk of re-identification. As long as data created by individuals is involved, 
identification will be a risk - the only real way to be perfectly sure the data will be protected 
is by not collecting it at all. This means that either an alternative to anonymisation needs 
to be found - another process which can protect data while allowing the data to be used 
for creating value - or a balance needs to be struck between the right to data protection 
and the responsibilities imposed on data controllers. 
 
An alternative has been proposed, taking into account the fact that the main factor in re-
identification is the combination of “anonymized” data with other data439. This alternative, 
“pseudonymised data”, has been primarily proposed in fields where studying data is 
necessary, but where the data is also very sensitive - including, in particular, 
healthcare440. Pseudonymised data is data which, on its own, is anonymised (by 
removing personal identifiers) but which may be re-identified if it is linked to other pieces 
of data, kept separately. It is appropriate that this concept be prominent in the medical 
field, as it is akin to isolating a patient in a germ-free room: the data is safe and protected 
as long as it is not “infected” by “foreign agents” - other pieces of data441. It is defined by 
the GDPR’s Recital 26 in these terms: “Personal data which has undergone 
pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional 
information, should be considered as information on an identifiable natural person.”442 
 
The ICO’s “Code of Practice on Anonymisation”443 makes a distinction between data 
aggregation exercises which result in non-individualized data (and as such anonymised 
under the DPD’s definition) and processes which remove certain identifiers from person-
437  Ohm (n.429) 
438 Stalla-Bourdillon, S., and Knight, A. (2016), Anonymous data v. Personal data–A false 
debate: An EU perspective on anonymisation, pseudonymisation and personal data. Wis. Int’l 
LJ. APA 
439 Ohm (n.429)  
440 Ibid 
441 Tsakalakis, N., Stalla-Bourdillon, S., & O'hara, K. (2016). What's in a name: the conflicting 
views of pseudonymisation under eIDAS and the General Data Protection Regulation. 
442 Recital 26, GDPR 
443 Information Commissioner’s Office, Code of Practice on Anonymisation: Managing Data 
Protection Risk, (2012). 
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specific data but leave individual-level information (carrying higher risks)444. The later 
includes pseudonymised data, which is defined as “distinguishing individuals in a dataset 
by using a unique identifier which does not reveal their ‘real world’ identity.”445 What the 
ICO envisions as a means to turn this pseudonymised data into anonymised data is not 
specified.446 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation gives some leeway to pseudonymised data, in 
order to incentivize the use of the practice. Nevertheless, as established, it is not enough 
to exempt the data processing operation from the GDPR: pseudonymised data is still 
often personal data447. 
 
This shows that the European regulators are aware of the evolution of the Data 
Protection landscape, and that the binary approach of the Data Protection Directive is 
gaining some shades of grey, emphasising the “means likely to be used” as a prominent 
criteria in what constitutes enough protection or not.  
 
The limitation of pseudonymised data is that it only protects data as long as it stays 
isolated from “contamination” by other data. As such, pseudonymisation provides limited 
usefulness, especially in the wider commercial online context, where data is frequently 
sold and combined with other pieces of data without the inherent protective apparatus 
found in fields like healthcare. 
 
In conclusion, anonymisation has not been successful in creating “privacy-free” data. 
Data can never be truly free of the possibility of endangering informational privacy, no 
matter what techniques are used, because unexpected Information can always result 
from it.  Pseudonymisation actually only proves that further with its protection which, 
while promising, is threatened by contact with external data. As long as complete non-
identification is the requirement, anonymisation will fail to achieve it. 
 
3. The Risk-Based Approach to Identification: 
Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation  
 
444 Stalla-Bourdillon (n.438) 
445 Information Commissioner’s Office, Code of Practice on Anonymisation: Managing Data 
Protection Risk, (2012). 
446 Stalla-Bourdillon (n.438)  
447 Recital 23, GDPR 
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We have previously identified that the GDPR is moving to a risk-based approach, 
protecting informational privacy through a contextual, safeguards-based approach. As 
we will now see, this risk-based approach extends to the ‘’identification’’ criteria, with the 
chance of identification increasing the risk. This shows that even in the ‘’identifiability’’ 
criteria, which is on the face of it a binary test (either data is personal or it is not) the 
GDPR recognizes that certain guarantees, such as tools to make identification more 
difficult, do have an impact on the protection the data needs to be given. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party’s opinion on anonymisation seems to make suggestions 
towards a risk-based approach to anonymization, such as with a statement that “legal 
regulations…must therefore be formulated in a technologically neutral manner and 
ideally take into account the changes in the developing potentials of information 
technology.”. However, it requires an almost-null probability of re-identification for the 
criteria of anonymization to be fulfilled. In the Big Data era, this is nearly impossible. 
Additionally, only if the initial raw dataset is destroyed can the data be considered 
anonymized. As such, despite some indications that the risk-based approach would be 
used in the context of anonymization, the fact of the matter is that it seems rather limited 
at present.  
 
Nevertheless, some provisions of the GDPR seem to go beyond the binary approach of 
“personal data” or “anonymised data”448. While acknowledging the binary approach, the 
GDPR allows for a wider spectrum of de-identification449. Besides the pseudonymisation 
mentioned above, further types of data were identified in the GDPR by scholar Mike 
Hintze450, which include “identified data”, which directly identifies a specific person (such 
as a name or e-mail address), and “identifiable data” which related to a specific person 
whose identity is not clear but there is a reliable way to create a link with identifying data 
(pseudonymous data is considered by Hintze as a subset of identifiable data).  
 
Besides those two relatively general types of data, Article 11 of the GDPR451 adds data 
which resembles identifiable data, but where there is no way for the data controller, using 
his available means, to actually identify the data - this includes data sets which used to 
be considered anonymous (because the data controller did not believe they could be 
identified) but ended up actually having some re-identification, such as cases with AOL 
search data or Netflix Prize data452. Finally, “anonymous/aggregate data” is data that 
448 Hintze (n.271) 
449 Ibid 
450 Ibid 
451 Article 11 GDPR 
452 Hintze (n.271) 
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cannot identify the individual - anonymisation must be irreversible and eliminate any 
potential future re-identification attempts. Of these, only anonymous data is exempt from 
the GDPR. 
 
The idea that the efforts of the data controller with regard to the anonymisation of data 
has an impact over its legal framework leads to an interesting understanding of the 
GDPR’s forays into a more flexible, context-specific understanding of data protection. 
This is not only found in Article 11; in Article 6(4) of the GDPR453, mention is made of de-
identification allowing the processing of data for other purposes, bypassing the purpose 
specification principle. Under that Article, “Where the processing for a purpose other than 
that for which the personal data have been collected is not based on the data subject's 
consent . . . the controller shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another 
purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, 
take into account, inter alia . . . (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may 
include encryption or pseudonymisation.”454.  
 
This is important because it means that there is an acknowledgment of encryption and 
pseudonymisation efforts being part of a spectrum of “safeguards” which improve the 
chances of a processing beyond the original purpose being considered compliant with 
the GDPR, beyond the binary approach. As we will see later on, this is a symptom of the 
larger trend surrounding the need for an overhaul of data protection which embraces fully 
a conception taking into account all relevant factors instead of a binary approach.  
 
Besides anonymisation, a pillar of EU data protection law is using consent: getting the 
consent of individuals allows for the processing of their personal data legitimately. 
However, we will show that this pillar, too, is failing, and will only keep failing more over 
time.  
 
 
II. The Role of Consent: A Control and Autonomy Tool 
Facing Challenges in the Big Data Era  
 
Now that we have shown that anonymisation is failing in the world of Big Data due to the 
blurring of the line between “personal” and “non-personal” data, we will show that this 
453 Article 6 GDPR 
454 Article 6 GDPR  
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blurring, and this ever-increasing complexity, is endangering another pillar of data 
protection legislation: consent. We will show that in this the age of information, the 
intricacies of data processing have rendered the idea of consent as a means to ensure 
autonomy ineffective. Showing consent is failing will prove two things: first, that the idea 
of putting the main legislative barrier to data processing at the collection stage (where 
consent is obtained) is ineffective. Second, it will show that the widening expertise gap 
between individuals and data controllers in terms of data processing is eroding the very 
idea of autonomy as a pillar of the data protection framework. Thirdly, it will show that 
the ‘’control’’-based approach to protecting informational privacy faces difficult 
challenges in the age of Big Data. Control requires the ability to make significant, 
informed choices, which may not be possible as the technological literacy divide between 
data processing and the subjects of that processing is ever-widening. 
1. Consent in the EU Data Protection Regulation  
i. The role of consent in data protection and elsewhere  
 
Consent has always played a central role in conceptions of informational privacy. 
According to J. Feinburg, “The root idea … of privacy is that of a privileged territory or 
domain in which an individual person has the exclusive authority of determining whether 
another may enter, and if so, when and for how long, and under what conditions. Within 
this area, the individual person is… boss, sovereign, owner.”455 A report by privacy 
advocate Simon Davies compiling the opinions of over 180 privacy specialists from 19 
countries listed consent as the third most influential privacy theme for 2013 – after data 
aggregation and regulatory changes456. 
 
This reliance on consent is based on the image of consent as the expression of an 
individual’s autonomy457. However, despite its influence in the European context, it is 
debatable whether “consent” should be a fundamental principle of data protection in its 
own right or whether – because it is so difficult to define and apply in practice – it should 
only play a supportive role to the package of other principles458. As consent is frequently 
set aside, and is difficult to obtain, it is open to question whether it should be the basis 
for an informational self-determination foundation of privacy. 
455 Feinberg, J. (1984). Offense to others (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press on Demand. 
456 Davies, S (2013), Predictions for Privacy A report on the issues and trends that will dominate 
the privacy landscape in 2013, LSE Enterprise, the London School of Economics 
457 Le Métayer, D. (2010). Privacy by design: a matter of choice. In Data protection in a profiled 
world (pp. 323-334). Springer, Dordrecht. 
458 Brownsword, R. (2004). The cult of consent: fixation and fallacy. King's Law Journal, 15(2), 
223-251. 
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 As an action expressing the free choice of an individual, consent is linked with personal 
autonomy459. Rawls argues that a person is action autonomous when “the principle of 
his actions are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature 
as a free and equal rational being.”460 Faden and Beauchamp take a similar interpretation 
of personal autonomy, with a more practical formulation: “the personal rule of the self by 
adequate understanding, while remaining free from controlling interferences by others 
and from personal limitations that prevent choice.”461 
 
Generally, consent is a form of autonomous action which is aimed at the authorization of 
another party’s actions. The right for an individual to choose is reflected in their ability to 
consent. Because of how important consent is in expressing an individual’s autonomy 
and ability to choose, those who consent need to do so through an adequately clear and 
affirmative action.462 Because informational privacy means control over personal 
information, taking away that control is a breach of informational privacy, making an 
absence of consent, usually, a breach of informational privacy463. 
 
A survey published in June 2011 suggests that “nearly all Europeans would like to give 
their specific approval before collection and processing of their personal information”464. 
A survey by the European Commission in 2008 showed that 64% of EU citizens are 
concerned about the handling of the personal data gathered by data controllers and 
processors, and also showed that the vast majority of internet users feel insecure about 
the state of their personal data on the internet465. As such, not only is consent a way for 
individuals to express their autonomy, but it is also the mechanism individuals trust to 
protect their interests through the exercise of such autonomy. 
 
459 Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2007). Consent in the Law. Hart Publishing, Oxford  
460 Schermer, B. W., Custers, B., & van der Hof, S. (2014). The crisis of consent: How stronger 
legal protection may lead to weaker consent in data protection. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 16(2), 171-182. Chicago 
461 Buccafurni, D. (2008) , Reconsidering the Facilitation of Autonomous Decisionmaking in 
Genetic Counseling, ProQuest, p.139 
462 Ibid 
463 Austin, L.(2005), Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada's 
Experience Under Pipeda. 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 181, p.5 
464Special Eurobarometer 359 (2011), Attitudes towards data protection and electronic identity 
in the European Union. Survey conducted by TNS Opinion & Social at the request of 
Directorate-General Justice, Information Society & Media and Joint Research Centre Survey 
465 European Commission (2011), Flash Eurobarometer 225, Attitudes towards data protection 
and electronic identity in the European Union. Survey conducted by the Gallup Organization 
Hungary upon the request of the Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security 
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Because consent has the ability to make an illegal act legal, the one who has control 
over the giving or not of consent has control over this ability, which gives them power. A 
constant issue in subject/controller relationships is the balance of power: for example, if 
one wants to join in on social media, one has to agree to the social media platform 
gathering and processing their data. In most fields, an individual consumer can only 
choose from what the market offers, and to ensure data protection, there needs to be a 
communal push for that protection. Where this is not the case, an individual will have 
little recourse where their preferences differ from the majority of people466. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party issued an opinion on consent in the employment law 
context. In this opinion467, the Article 29 WP explains that consent under Article 7(1)(a) 
of the Data Protection Directive is not a commonly used ground for the processing of 
personal data in the employment context468. Instead, the other grounds listed in that 
Article are commonly used.  
 
Because it is possible to use the grounds of Article 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) for most 
processing purposes (contractual and legal obligations), the Article 29 Working Party 
maintains that consent should only be used as a basis when the other options are not 
available. The reason behind the use of these grounds is that they are based not on 
autonomy of the data subject, but on necessity. Consent needs to be freely given under 
the definition of consent in Article 2(h), but this can only happen if this consent can be 
given without outside influence. This is problematic in employment law as the bargaining 
powers of the employer and employee are usually extremely uneven, with pressure to 
comply with the employer’s wishes, especially if the giving of consent is a condition of 
employment. As such, using more definite grounds for processing, especially an 
obligation laid down in the law or in a contract, is more secure. 
 
This is particularly interesting for our purposes: in the employment context, the 
systematic inapplicability of one of the conditions - “freely given” - challenges consent as 
a basis for processing. It is along this pattern that we will identify the greater limitations 
of consent. Now that we have gone over the basics of the notion of consent, we will show 
how the concept has evolved, particularly in the evolution from the Data Protection 
Directive to the GDPR. 
 
466 Austin (n.463) 
467 Article 29 Working Party (2014), Opinion 08/2001 on the processing of personal data in the 
employment context, WP48, Adopted on 13 September 2001 
468 Ibid 
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ii. Consent in the GDPR 
 
In the GDPR, personal data may only be processed if the data subject has 
unambiguously given his consent, or if the processing is necessary for the performance 
of a contract to which the data subject is party, if the processing is necessary for 
compliance with legal obligations to which the controller is subject, if the processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or if the 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party469. This means that there are multiple grounds for the 
processing of personal data which can bypass the need for consent. Some even argue 
that most instances of processing will be able to be justified outside of consent470. This 
is important because, despite the importance of consent in the autonomy of individuals, 
it is only one amongst other ways of obtaining and processing data under the Data 
Protection Directive.  
 
Consent in the GDPR is defined as “any freely given specific and informed indication of 
his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to 
him being processed’’471. There are two distinct qualifications for consent in the Directive: 
for the processing of “special categories of personal data” - which include “personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life”472 – for 
which the data controller needs to obtain “explicit consent”.  
 
In the GDPR, “unambiguous consent” is where there can be no doubt of the data 
subject’s consent. Doubt is removed when consent is based on an express, positive 
action carried out by the individual473. 
 
Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive defines consent as “any freely given specific 
and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement 
to personal data relating to him being processed”. This highlights the three main 
requirements for consent in EU Law: “freely given”, “specific”, and “informed”.  
 
469 GDPR, Article 4 
470 Bygrave, L., Data Protection Law. Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Kluwer Law 
International, p.66 
471 GDPR, Article 4 
472 Ibid 
473 Ibid 
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“Freely given” means that consent can only be valid if the data subject is able to exercise 
a real choice, with no risk of deception, intimidation, coercion or significant negative 
consequences, if consent is not given. If the consequences of consenting undermine the 
freedom of choice of an individual, their autonomy would not be respected. An example 
is an employment relationship, where the data subject can be in a situation of 
dependence with the data controller. While subordination is often the main reason 
preventing consent from being free, other elements can influence the decision of the data 
subject. The processing being performed by a public authority, for example, can 
influence the data subject474.  
 
“Specific” means that the data processing operation needs to identify clearly its purpose 
and extent. Consent must be intelligible, and refer clearly and precisely to the scope and 
consequences of the data processing475. This means that the context in which consent 
applies is limited. This leads to there being a direct link between the “informed” 
requirement and the “specific” requirement. 
 
The last element of the definition of consent - but not the last requirement for valid 
consent - is that it needs to be informed. According to the Article 29 Working Party’s 
opinion on the Data Protection Directive, this means that "consent by the data subject 
(must be) based upon an  appreciation and understanding of the facts and implications 
of an action. The  individual concerned must be given, in a clear and understandable 
manner, accurate and full information of all relevant issues, in particular those specified 
in Articles 10  and 11 of the Directive, such as the nature of the data processed, the 
purposes of the  processing, the recipients of possible transfers, and the rights of the 
data subject. This  includes also an awareness of the consequences of not consenting 
to the processing in question".476  
 
A new feature of the GDPR is that it introduces a brand new Article relating to consent, 
its Article 7 on “Conditions for consent”477. This provision adds a burden of proof on 
controllers obtaining consent , the requirement for consent to be clearly separated from 
the rest of the agreement , and the right of the data subject to withdraw their consent . 
Finally, according to Recital 43 of the GDPR, consent is not a legal basis for processing, 
where there is a significant imbalance between the data subject and the data 
474 Article 29 Working Party (2014), Opinion 08/2001 on the processing of personal data in the 
employment context, WP48, Adopted on 13 September 2001 
475 Ibid 
476Article 29 Working Party (2007), Working Document on the processing of personal data 
relating to health in electronic health records (EHR), WP131, Adopted on 15 February 2007 
477 GDPR, Article 7 
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controller478. These conditions show that the General Data Protection Regulation’s 
intention for consent is for the “free” and “informed” aspects of consent to be ensured 
through additional protections on top of the Directive’s already-heavy level of protection. 
This shows that the GDPR is aware that “imbalances” are a possibility. What we will 
argue however, is that these “imbalances” are becoming so widespread as to make every 
situation one where consent becomes a non-valid basis for data processing. When this 
becomes the case, paternalistic intervention becomes necessary. 
 
The challenge comes from a dissonance between what legal provisions are considered 
to lead to the best protections to individuals in principle, and the actual technological and 
practical realities. The multiplicity of sources for information gathering, processed by 
layers upon layers of service providers, means the imposition of explicit consent 
requirements at certain control points in the flow of information could frustrate individual 
user experience without increasing their privacy. A common worry of scholars is that 
privacy becomes a “box-ticking exercise”, where data controllers and legal authorities 
would only care for the legal requirements being filled, regardless of actual outcome479. 
 
iii. Consent in the EU’s vision of ‘’Informational Privacy as Control’’ approach 
 
We have seen in previous chapters how the EU is moving towards a new approach, one 
based not on the ‘’personal data’’ binary but on ensuring that appropriate safeguards are 
in place to limit the risk involved in the data controller’s activities. Those safeguards are 
means to prevent negative impacts ‘’that may result from a data subject losing control 
over personal information, or realising that it has been compromised.’’480 This idea of 
‘’control’’ as a core way to protect informational privacy takes inspiration from the 
German vision of privacy as a tool of self-determination: in a 1983 decision, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the right to informational self-determination 
included ‘’basic right warrants (...) the capacity of the individual to determine in principle 
the disclosure and use of his/her personal data’’481.  
 
This idea of ‘’control’’ is a core focus of the GDPR, with rights such as the right to data 
portability being created ‘’[t]o further strengthen the [data subject’s] control over his or 
478 GDPR, Recital 43 
479 Zanfir, G. (2014). Forgetting about consent. Why the focus should be on “suitable 
safeguards” in data protection law. In Reloading Data Protection (pp. 237-257). Springer 
Netherlands., p.5 
480 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 
WP203, Adopted on 2 April 2013 
481 BVerfGE 65, 1 – Volksz¨ahlung Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 15. Dezember 1983 auf 
diem¨undliche Verhandlung vom 18. und 19. Oktober 1983 
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her own data’’482. Consent is the core mechanism which the GDPR relies on to ensure 
control over personal data, as it is a legal basis which is entirely in the hands of the data 
subject. When a higher level of consent is required, such as in the case of ‘’explicit 
consent’’ required in case special categories of personal data are being processed483, it 
is because that processing ‘’poses significant data protection risks and a high level of 
individual control over personal data is therefore deemed appropriate.’’484. This shows 
that not only is consent there to provide control to the data subject, but that the amount 
of control given to the data subject needs to be proportional to the risk involved in the 
data gathering. Research into consent reinforces this view as control being an important 
element of informational privacy: Stewart and Segars found that ‘’consumers are less 
likely to view a given information practice as privacy invasive if they are able to maintain, 
even to a small degree, some measure of control over their personal information’’485. 
Examples of ‘’small degree on control’’ include asking for permission to use data for new 
purposes or providing access to what data is processed. 
 
One main aim of the GDPR is to ensure that the individual can “control” personal data. 
Control is a core aim of the GDPR (as can be seen by the strong rights given to the data 
subject aimed at giving control to the data subject486), and is used as a guarantee to 
protect data subjects. The strongest evidence of the role of control as a guarantee can 
be seen by the fact that one of the core risks to data subjects named in the GDPR is the 
loss of control of personal data: Recitals 75 and 85 mention the inability to exercise 
control over personal data as a type of risk similar to “discrimination, identity theft or 
fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation”487 amongst others.  
 
This idea of “privacy as control” has been part of the privacy debate for a long time488, 
especially in the US489. The first to mention this idea in the EU were cases in Germany 
482 GDPR, Recital 68 
483 GDPR, Article 22 
484 Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP251, Adopted on 3 October 2017 
485 Stewart KA and Segars AH (2002) An empirical examination of the concern for information 
privacy instrument. Information Systems Research 13(1), 36-49. 
486 See Recital 68 of the GDPR on the right to data portability: “To further strengthen the control 
over his or her own data, where the processing of personal data is carried out by automated 
means, the data subject should also be allowed to receive personal data concerning him or her 
which he or she has provided to a controller in a structured, commonly used, machine-readable 
and interoperable format, and to transmit it to another controller.” 
487 GDPR, Recitals 75 and 85 
488 Camenisch, J., Sommer, D., Fischer-Hübner, S., Hansen, M., Krasemann, H., Lacoste, G., ... 
& Tseng, J. (2005, November). Privacy and identity management for everyone. In Proceedings 
of the 2005 workshop on Digital identity management (pp. 20-27). ACM. 
489 Allen, A. L. (1999). Privacy-as-data control: Conceptual, practical, and moral limits of the 
paradigm. Conn. L. Rev., 32, 861. 
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related to “informational self-determination”, which later inspired the Data Protection 
Directive490. 
 
As we have seen throughout the discussion on consent, “control” is also a way to justify 
data processing and ensure that sufficient guarantees are in place: if the data subject 
has complete control over whether the processing takes place or not, there is a strong 
guarantee that nothing will take place that will breach their informational privacy, since 
they should be fully aware (through the privacy notice) of the Information being gathered 
and the Guarantees in place, and thus informed judges on whether they thought the 
Balance adequate. Ideally, consent would thus prove complete control over data, 
allowing each individual to make up their own mind up over where they judge the Balance 
adequate to their sensibilities.  
 
An emphasis on control can be found throughout various parts of the GDPR: beyond the 
consent mechanism, the rights of the data subject strengthened in the GDPR - such as 
the right of access (now to be provided free of charge within a month)491, the 
strengthened right to object492, and a renewed duty to provide information in a way that 
is clear and transparent493 - all show the focus on giving tools to data subjects to take 
control of their data. 
 
These tools are aimed at preventing harm by shifting the balance of power towards the 
data subject through a set of control-based guarantees. The focus on control in the 
GDPR shows that the EU regulator intends to use control as a core element of this 
guarantees-based approach. 
 
The idea of individual control over data as a central guarantee is not just found in the 
GDPR itself. Attempting to rectify the balance by empowering the data subject has been 
suggested in the literature, usually using technological tools494. A section of tools aimed 
at achieving this has been dubbed “Privacy Enhancing Technologies” (PETs)495.  Some 
tools create “noise” to limit the accuracy and thus the value of data obtained about 
individuals (an example is TrackMeNot, a tool developed by Helen Nissenbaum which 
490 Lynskey (n.127) 
491 GDPR, Article 15 
492 GDPR, Article 21 
493 GDPR, Articles 14 and 15 
494 Quelle, C. (2016). Not just user control in the general data protection regulation. In IFIP 
International Summer School on Privacy and Identity Management (pp. 140-163). Springer,  
495 Hansen, M., Berlich, P., Camenisch, J., Clauß, S., Pfitzmann, A., & Waidner, M. (2004). 
Privacy-enhancing identity management. Information security technical report, 9(1), 35-44. 
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performs random searches to muddle the profile created by the user’s activity496). 
However, as we will show through the example of consent, ensuring control and 
autonomy over data is becoming more and more difficult. 
 
As we have shown, ‘’risk’’ is a major focus of the GDPR’s new approach to data 
protection. A major component of ‘’risk’’ is whether ‘’control’’ is taken away from 
individuals. This link between ‘’risk’’ and ‘’control’’ places control at the centre of this new 
approach: under the GDPR, informational privacy is at its core about protecting 
individuals against misuses of their data, and giving them control over it. As we will show, 
though this new, ‘’risk-based’’ approach shows a move towards a framework based on 
what Information is available and the measures taken to mitigate risks stemming from 
the use of that Information (what we call ‘’Guarantees’’); and under the framework 
developed for this work of a balance between Information and Guarantees, ‘’control’’ is 
simply one type of Guarantee and not an end in and of itself. However, the GDPR linking 
risk, and thus informational privacy, to control and consent as a core goal brings a 
limitation: giving data subjects control is very difficult, and as such it may not always be 
possible to ensure effective data subject control over data. 
2. The Limitations of ‘’Informed’’ Consent 
 
i. The Importance of Informing Data Subjects 
 
The central basis of giving power and control to the individual to manage their privacy is 
that it requires that the individual be informed and rational and be able to consent to the 
different forms of collection and processing of personal data497. However, it is a fact that 
most individuals do not use the options that exist to protect their own privacy. Many 
reasons have been given for this, including the argument that the need to read through 
long texts discourages users498. 
 
A difficulty has been that finding effective ways to communicate information to individuals 
is difficult, and individuals do not necessarily understand the information given to them499. 
496 See “Peddinti, S. T., & Saxena, N. (2010, July). On the privacy of web search based on 
query obfuscation: a case study of TrackMeNot. In International Symposium on Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies Symposium (pp. 19-37). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg” for a study of the 
tool, or consult https://cs.nyu.edu/trackmenot/ for information about the tool itself. 
 
497 Berbers, Y., Hildebrandt, M., & Vandewalle, J. (2018). Privacy in an age of the internet, 
social networks and Big Data. Position paper 49b, Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for 
Science and the Arts. 
498 Ibid 
499 Ibid 
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What’s more, the problem is not necessarily that doctors - or in the data protection 
context data controllers - do not try to enlighten individuals, but instead it seems that 
even honest attempts at information have been unsuccessful. Both attempts by individual 
entities and legislative efforts for informed consent seems to have failed to produce a 
significant success500. 
 
An example of this phenomenon is the “informed consent” required in medicine for 
certain actions by the physician. A study showed that only 9% of doctors met the criteria 
for informed decision-making, which includes informing the patient of his role in the 
decision-making process, the nature of the decision, possible alternatives, pros and 
cons, uncertainties associated with the decision, an assessment of the patient’s 
understanding of the decision, and an exploration of the patient’s preferences501.  
 
Under traditional individual theory, individuals are forward looking, utility maximizing 
beings who are fully informed and base their decisions on probabilities coming from 
known random distributions502. This idea is common in the policy debate, where it is 
assumed that individuals and organizations only need the ability to manage their 
information and make choices without regulatory intervention. However, several studies 
have shown that there is an apparent dichotomy between privacy attitudes and actual 
behavior. Individuals exchange large amounts of information for little reward, and are 
rarely willing to adopt privacy protective technologies503. 
 
Many factors hamper individual decision-making. Incomplete information, and 
information asymmetries between a well-informed data controller and a non-informed 
individual make privacy decisions unlikely to be accurate. What’s more, individuals 
cannot properly evaluate possible externalities (third party transfers); risk (privacy risks 
are not easy to estimate), and uncertainties about possible payoffs from their information 
all factor into making calculating the costs and benefits of privacy-intrusive actions 
difficult504. Worsening the effect is the fact that privacy does not have a quantifiable 
monetary cost.505 Even if individuals did have access to complete information, they could 
not process and act on the data optimally.  
 
500 Ben-Shahar, O., & Schneider, C. E. (2011). The failure of mandated disclosure. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 647-749.  
501 Ibid 
502 Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2005). Privacy and rationality in individual decision making. 
IEEE Security & Privacy, 3(1), 26-33.  
503 Ibid 
504 Ibid 
505 Ibid 
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Even if individuals had access to all the information, rationality has its limits. Many 
deviations from rationality affect decision-making, in particular self-control problems and 
the many social norms at play in the making of those decisions. Finally, the ignorance of 
individuals of the dangers that come from privacy invasions is a factor506. 
 
This would not be an issue if the individual could accurately assess harm, cost, and the 
magnitude and probability of the loss. However this is not the case. Consumers lack the 
information necessary to make this decision, and are in a disadvantageous position to 
decide when and how to protect themselves from the harms inherent in behavioral 
targeting507.  
 
Consumers also lack information about what information can be obtained about them by 
data controllers. Their inability to assess the magnitude of loss and understanding the 
possibilities of data collection available to a data controller suggests that consumers 
would be more upset if they understood all those factors - such as phone calls being 
monitored.  
 
ii. The Paradox of Informing Users 
 
It would be easy to conclude that data controllers are intentionally keeping users 
uninformed  for their own benefit. However, as we will, show, this increasing gap, the 
same gap blurring the concept of “personal data”, is present even where efforts are made 
to keep users up to date. The main paradox is called the “transparency paradox”, where 
the more information is shared, the less understandable this mass of information is508. 
Because of the complexity of online tracking and surveillance, it is practically impossible 
for privacy policies shared by data controllers to be both accurate, and understandable 
by every user509.  
 
The consequence of this overload of information, intrusive pop-ups screens and lack of 
choice is “consent desensitisation”: users are no longer used to making active, informed 
506 Ibid 
507 Politou, E., Alepis, E., & Patsakis, C. (2018). Forgetting personal data and revoking consent 
under the GDPR: Challenges and proposed solutions. Journal of Cybersecurity, 4(1) 
508 Schermer et al. (n.460) 
509 Van Alsenoy, B., Kosta, E., & Dumortier, J. (2014). Privacy notices versus informational self-
determination: Minding the gap. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 28(2), 
185-203. 
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choices when confronted with a consent situation510. This will only be exacerbated with 
the added requirements from the General Data Protection Regulation. 
 
Another difficulty comes from the scale of Big Data - the number of entities collecting and 
sharing data for individuals to keep track of. A survey has shown that the average US 
citizen, for example, visits almost a hundred websites a month, doing business online 
and offline with countless companies, each of which has the potential to hold, use, 
transfer, or sell personal data511. This extends to data that individuals might not even be 
aware exists, such as metadata for phone calls or websites tracking every click and 
second spend on their site by each individual512. 
  
This means that even if the option existed to protect one’s privacy, and even if every 
company provided informed and reasonable choices to manage and protect one’s data, 
this challenge would persist: individuals do not have the time or energy or willpower to 
manage all of the entities holding their data513. 
  
As an example of the difficulty individuals face in using their ability to consent, one study 
explained that it would cost 781 billion dollars in lost productivity if everyone were to read 
every privacy policy they visited in a one-year period514. 
 
This is the main issue with the idea of consent as an expression of one’s true intentions: 
attempts to inform the public and lead to pertinent decision-making are not effective. 
Individuals do not read the information provided to them. If they read it they do not 
understand it. If they read it and understand it, they do not have the knowledge to make 
an informed choice515. If they read it, understand it, and have the knowledge to make an 
informed choice, that choice is very likely skewed by obstacles to decision-making. 
 
In conclusion, the GDPR creates stronger consent requirements, demanding individuals 
be more and more informed in order for consent to be given. However, it is fast becoming 
impossible for individuals to understand the issues they are faced with because of the 
510 Bergemann, B. (2017). The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role of Consent 
in Data Protection. In IFIP International Summer School on Privacy and Identity Management 
(pp. 111-131). Springer 
511 Ibid 
512 Ibid 
513 Solove, D. J. (2012). Introduction: Privacy self-management and the consent dilemma. Harv. 
L. Rev., 126, 1880. 
514 McDonald, A. M., & Cranor, L. F. (2008). The cost of reading privacy policies. ISJLP, 4, 543 
515 Custers, B., van Der Hof, S., Schermer, B., Appleby-Arnold, S., & Brockdorff, N. (2013). 
Informed Consent in Social Media Use-The Gap between User Expectations and EU Personal 
Data Protection law. SCRIPTed, 10, 435. 
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complexity both in the processing of the collected data, and in what information may be 
created by data processing later on (too complex and too unpredictable). This shows at 
the very least that consent as an instrument fails to ensure the protection of autonomy, 
but we would go further and argue that because of the ever-widening gap between 
individual knowledge and the complexity of data processing, free autonomy is going to 
become increasingly challenging to prove. This also challenges the conception of 
informational privacy as ‘’control’’, since achieving such control is difficult, or even 
impossible. 
 
We argue that any attempt to move European data protection towards adapting to the 
Big Data age will mean a move towards top-down regulation, instead of a focus on fixing 
consent and reinforcing the control of individuals. Though such efforts are important and 
have a place (as we will show later on) they are likely to fail if data processing practices 
remain the same as they are now. As we have shown in our third Chapter, data 
processing is increasingly elaborate and complex, worsening the existing limitations 
developed in this section. 
 
 
In this Chapter so far, we have gone over how the technical challenges involved in the 
rise of Big Data technology have affected two pillars of EU data protection regulation: 
anonymisation (and with it the ‘’personal/non-personal data’’ paradigm) and consent (and 
with it ‘’control’’ as a focus of data protection). We have shown that these technologies 
provide tremendous power to parties which can use it to their benefit, and that this power 
involves threatening informational privacy by giving more power to data controllers 
without giving sufficient Guarantees to data subjects. Meanwhile, “personal data” is hard 
to define, and limitations in fields such as anonymisation and consent both in defining 
personal data and handling the changes that come from its further processing will get 
more prominent as dat processing continues to increase in complexity. 
 
We have now identified some key challenges in European data protection regulation. We 
will now synthesize and analyze the deeper issues which have led to this problem, in 
order to understand the core reason behind these limitations. We will also study how the 
European framework of privacy is also showing signs of being affected by the changes 
Big Data has brought but has handled them in an approach which supports the 
‘’Information/Guarantees Balance’’ approach. 
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B. Challenges in Informational Privacy Protection: 
Transparency and Obscurity 
 
Over the course of this thesis, we have shown that the appearance of Big Data has 
changed what we understand about traditional conceptions of how data is created and 
spread, while core pillars of EU Data Protection - consent (and with it the ‘’control’’ focus 
of data protection) and anonymisation (and with it the ‘’personal data’’ focus of data 
protection) - are facing important challenges. We will now analyse what we argue to be 
the core of this limitation: “Identifiability” and the binary vision of data it creates, as well 
as the ‘’public/private distinction’’ of privacy, and its similarly-binary vision. However, as 
we will see, unlike data protection law, privacy law is showing signs of moving beyond 
this binary vision and towards adapting to the age of Big Data. As we will show, this 
change is slower in the context of data protection, because of the importance of the 
‘’identifiability’’ test. 
 
I. The Limits of “Identifiability”: Data and Information 
1. The ‘’Identifiability’’ Test  
 
In the GDPR, “personal data” is defined as “information relating to an identified or 
identifiable person”516. An “identifiable person” is one who can “be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”517.  
 
Guidance on “identifiability” can be found in the UK Information Commissioner’s Office, 
according to which, “identifiability” is the first criteria of determining whether data is 
“personal”518. If it is not fulfilled, then the data is not personal data for the purposes of the 
UK’s Data Protection Act.  
 
516 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281 of 23.11.1995, Article 2(a) 
517 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 
WP136 
518 Information Commissioner’s Office (2012), Determining what is personal data, accessed at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1554/determining-what-is-personal-
data.pdf on 13/6/2018 
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The ICO defined “identified” by whether “you have distinguished that individual from other 
members of a group.519” For guidance, the ICO mentions that a name, if not unique, 
might not be enough and might need to be aggregated with more data (such as an 
address) to satisfy the “identification” threshold. According to the ECJ, the name of a 
person combined with “his telephone number or information about his working 
conditions or hobbies“ will satisfy the “identifiable” requirement520. 
 
In Recital 26 of the GDPR, guidance was given on how to determine wheter a person is 
“identifiable”: “to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of 
all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the said person”521.  
 
That wording, “means likely reasonably to be used”, is where the “identified” requirement 
sees its biggest limitation. As we will see, and as we saw when discussing 
anonymisation, powerful means are becoming more and more widespread, rapidly 
reaching the point where it is reasonable for a data controller to use tools which might 
identify individuals from very little data. At that point, every data gathering could 
potentially be fully protected, and the link between data protection and privacy protection 
would be weakened. Whether or not it is possible for data to lead to personal information 
does not necessarily mean it will. This difference is an issue in the current regulatory 
framework. 
 
The “identifiable” requirement was indeed useful when the information creation process 
was difficult and limited and it took extensive means to obtain relevant information, but 
this is becoming less and less true as Big Data becomes a part of day-to-day life. 
 
The European data protection framework comes into effect when the data is 
“identifiable”. The limitation is that though data which does not fall under this requirement 
is considered “non-personal”, it can be used to create new information, which itself might 
have a “personal” quality. An example is in the practice of profiling. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, through aggregating data on an individual, each piece being either not 
personal or having been given with consent or another legal ground, a data controller 
can piece together a much more revealing picture than what each single data point might.  
 
519 Ibid 
520 Bodil Lindqvist v Aklagarkammaren i Jonkoping – Case Commissioner - 101/01 – European 
Court ofJustice delivered on 19 September 2002 
521 GDPR, Recital 26 
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At that point, this “new information” has already passed the tests under the European 
Data Protection system - aggregation of data invalidating the previous legal bases for 
processing would be impractical, and more importantly unenforceable. As such, this “raw 
data”, despite not being personal, is free to be used to create personal “information”. 
 
At the same time, even when personal information is gathered, the danger it represents 
to informational privacy can be slight or nonexistent. An example is a website monitoring 
customers’ debit card purchases to find out which products are selling the most: the 
“personal” part of that data is trimmed out of the analysis as irrelevant, and the 
information created at the end of the process has no impact on privacy. 
 
Finally, data gathering can impact privacy even with no identification of individuals. The 
best example is the practice of group profiling: information about groups (based on area, 
post code, population, etc) which identifies no one individual inside that group.  In that 
situation, no one is “identified”. Nevertheless, assumptions about individuals built on that 
data can impact their informational privacy522. In 2012, a Wall Street Journal report found 
that many major companies would use information on the physical locations of their users 
to display different online prices to different consumers, with potential implications for 
discrimination and detrimental impact on consumer welfare. In particular, better deals 
were offered to high-income locations523. Yet group profiling is not effectively addressed 
by the GDPR524 because there is no “identification”. 
 
There are many circumstances where there is a very tenuous link between “personal 
data” and a practice breaching informational privacy because of this recent 
transformation, which has been brought about by the advent of new technologies. These 
processes are continuously improving and expanding, further eroding the link between 
the two concepts. We need to change our perception of “personal data” and “personal 
information”: they are two different (though related) concepts, and need to be considered 
as such. 
 
2. The Contextual Approach to ‘’Identifiability’’  
 
522 Wachter, S. (2018). Normative challenges of identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, 
profiling, discrimination, and the GDPR. Computer Law & Security Review, 34(3), 436-449. 
523 Valentino-Devries, J., Singer-Vine, J. and Soltani, A., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on 
Users' Information, Washington Street Journal, 24 December 2012, available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534 
524 Hildebrandt, M., & Gutwirth, S. (2008). Profiling the European citizen (pp. 17-45). Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
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In order to understand “identifiability”, it is important to outline the types of data that are 
recognized by the GDPR and how they relate to this requirement. We have studied the 
main types of data understood by the GDPR: “identified data” which directly identifies an 
individual, “identifiable data” where the individual’s identity is not clear but a link to it can 
be reliably found (such as pseudonymous data) - Article 11 de-identifies data which could 
identify the individual but where the data controller has no means to do so - and 
anonymous data where the individual cannot be identified. Under the GDPR, only that 
last type is immune from the Regulation. 
 
A difficulty in “identifiability” is in what information can identify an individual or not. 
Examples have been given at various stages by regulatory or advisory authorities, but 
no clear rule has appeared to decide what constitutes “identifiable” or “identified” data. 
Instead, we can see that this distinction is highly contextual. Data that are not identifiable 
for one person may be identifiable for another, and some individuals hold some data as 
having a more sensitive status than others. 
 
An additional challenge is that the status of data changes based on the other data it is 
linked with: the aggregation of two ‘’non-personal’’ pieces of information can create 
identifiable information in many, often unforeseen, cases. Because of how much data 
can be collected in the age of Big Data, knowing what the context actually consists of - 
who knows what and what does it mean - can be very difficult. We will show this by going 
through the various steps of data processing that we have previously identified 
(collection, aggregation, storage, processing, mining and usage) to show this 
development and the problem this poses with regards to the GDPR. 
 
In the collection stage identified and identifiable data can be gathered, and will need a 
legal basis for collection and processing. Any such data can be de-identified (using 
anonymization, pseudonymization, or other techniques). If that data is de-identified 
sufficiently to be considered “anonymised data” (or is not linked to individuals 
whatsoever, such as weather sensor data), it can then be sold and transferred to any 
third party. 
 
However, at the aggregation stage, the combination of these data points can create new 
information, even if the data points involved are completely non-personal data. Weather 
patterns in an area can be aggregated with certain risks that allow identification of 
populations which are more likely to suffer a flood - which can affect insurance 
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premiums525. This can happen accidentally as well - as we have mentioned when 
discussing anonymisation, not only is it possible to re-identify data, but it can happen 
without even looking for it when the right patterns emerge. 
 
The data is then curated through the storage and processing phases into a form that will 
be useful for the model that is being used. That is important, because all of the personal 
data collected is not necessarily used in the model. If personal data is not useful to the 
exercise the data controller is performing, then the curated data will not contain that data. 
As such, the Article 29 Working Party has made a distinction on these factors526: 
depending on the purpose of the processing, data can be considered as personal data 
or not. According to the Working Party, if the goal is to identify individuals and treat them 
a certain way, data should be considered identifiable because the controller will make a 
reasonable effort to identify individuals527.  
 
This is not the only time EU authorities have shown themselves to be amenable to a 
more flexible approach to identifiability. Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in 
the Breyer case hints at this possibility by asserting that in order to decide whether certain 
IP addresses are personal data, the context is crucial528. In his opinion in the case, at 
paragraph 68, the Advocate General argues that when it comes to “third parties” being 
considered as capable of re-identifying data for the purposes of the data controller’s 
“means likely to be used” test, that “This will not occur when contact with those third 
parties is, in fact, very costly in human and economic terms, or practically impossible or 
prohibited by law. Otherwise, as noted earlier, it would be virtually impossible to 
discriminate between the various means, since it would always be possible to imagine 
the hypothetical contingency of a third party who, no matter how inaccessible to the 
provider of services on the Internet, could — now or in the future — have additional 
relevant data to assist in the identification of a user.” 
 
Additionally, the Court of Justice of the European Union expressly refers to the paragraph 
of the Advocate General’s Opinion and excludes identifiability “if the identification of the 
data subject was prohibited by law or practically impossible on account of the fact that it 
525 Borgesius, F. Z., Gray, J., & Eechoud, M. V. (2015). Open Data, Privacy, and Fair 
Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework. Berkeley Tech. LJ, 30, 2073. 
526 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, WP136, 
Adopted on 20 June 2007 
527 Ibid 
528 Case C-582/14, Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 
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requires a disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk 
of identification appears in reality to be insignificant.”529  
 
 
3. The “Relating to” Element of Personal Data 
 
The last aspect we will mention when it comes to the wide scope of “personal data” and 
“identification” is that beyond the fact that much more data than before can be considered 
to “identify” an individual, similarly more circumstances than ever before can allow data 
to be “related to” the identified individual. What is “related to” the individual has been 
developed, to some extent, by the Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion 4/2007 on the 
concept of personal data530, explaining that data is “related to” an individual when it is 
“about that individual” - which remains relatively unclear. It then lists some situations 
where it does apply: one’s individual file in a HR department, or an “image of a person 
filmed on a video interview”. The elements taken into account are three-fold - a “content” 
element, a “purpose” element, and an “effect” element. In short, data can be related to a 
person if the content is about a person, if the data is likely to be used to evaluate or treat 
the individual in a certain way, or influence their status or behavior, or if the data is likely 
to have an impact on the individual531. Emphasis is to be placed on the “or” in this set of 
criteria. Any of them is enough to qualify data as “relating to” the individual.  
 
This seems to open the way for a very broad definition. And indeed, a recent decision 
showed this trend continuing. In the Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner case532, a 
trainee accountant who had failed an exam four times wanted to have access to all 
personal data held about them by the exam authority, eventually making his way to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. According to the Court, the purpose of an exam 
is to “identify and record the performance of a particular individual”. As such, an 
examiner’s comments incorporate some element of personal data about a candidate. 
That would be the case even if the candidate’s name were not on the script but s/he were 
instead identified by a unique reference number or barcode533. 
 
529 Stalla-Bourdillon (n.438) 
530 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, WP136, 
Adopted on 20 June 2007 
531 Ibid 
532 Judgment of 20 December 2017, Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner, C-434/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 
533 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data  
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This expansion not only shows how far the reach of the notion of what constitutes 
‘’personal data’’ has gone, but also shows how much this will continue to develop over 
time. Legal decision after legal decision, recommendation after recommendation, a point 
will be reached where many usual business activities will have the potential to collect all 
sorts of sensitive information because of the creep of the definition. 
 
As we can see overall, what is “personal data” is far from a clear distinction. The age of 
Big Data brought more and more Information, which is more susceptible to context and 
biases. Because context changes over the course of the life of data (for example, data 
becomes processed by different entities for different purposes using different curated 
data), whether it is “identifiable” is similarly changing. Because it is possible to re-identify 
data in the later stages of processing, a data protection regulatory system focused on 
the collection stage (especially for the consent test) might be unable to adapt to the rise 
of Information: it is necessary to take into account the data at every stage and the 
surrounding context. Because the nature of the data can be so changing as to become 
unrecognizable, such an analysis needs to look beyond what can be directly linked to an 
individual. 
 
This is true of all personal data, and not just “identified” or “identifiable” data. As we have 
seen when discussing anonymisation, all data, even anonymised data, has the potential 
to, depending on context, to link back to individuals and endanger informational privacy. 
Because the lines between the types of data are very blurry, making sure that 
anonymised data are also considered in the equation is necessary. 
 
This phenomenon explains why anonymisation is failing: identifiability is not binary. It is 
also why consent is failing: the data involved is often collected without actually being 
identified, which means it bypasses the consent requirement.  
 
Now that we have identified this limitation of the EU data protection regulatory 
framework, we will show the other major way in which the changing technological 
environment cannot be dealt with by the current European data protection conception: 
the public/private distinction, and how it affects data protection. 
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 II. The Limitations of a Public/Private Distinction: Privacy’s 
Binary Test  
 
Introduction: When Private Goes Public 
 
Informational privacy can be endangered in a number of ways. As we will show, while 
informational privacy was originally relatively well divided into a public and private 
sphere, this distinction is increasingly blurred. 
 
The first example we will use is a story that made the news in 2005, the story of “dog 
poop girl”534. A young woman in South Korea was filmed not picking up after her dog 
defecated on a train, and the footage went viral online. Concerns for the woman’s privacy 
quickly became secondary to her “crime”, and very quickly her personal information was 
spread online and she was subjected to threats and harassment535. Acts committed in 
public view are held as public, and so there would seem to be no privacy issues in the 
footage being released online. Nevertheless, this led to her informational privacy being 
invaded. This shows both the fact that “public” can have a variety of meanings, and that 
it is not just from companies and governments that privacy invasions can come. They 
can come from random strangers on the Internet, and be the most damaging form of 
informational privacy invasion - in this case even including death threats. 
 
Privacy concerns of individuals are generally considered in terms of their “private life”, 
while public surveillance tends to be less noticed. This is due to a variety of reasons. 
One is that the main way privacy is understood publicly is as a “private sphere” that one 
should be able to have control over, and when that sphere is breached we feel a very 
strong and sudden aversion - that is why stories of police breaking into homes reach us 
more than police surveillance of CCTV footage536. The idea of a distinction between the 
“private” and “public” sphere is prevalent, and has a long history, such as a perception 
that the “private” sphere is the one of family and intimacy while the “public” sphere is the 
534 Solove, D. (2007). The future of reputation: Gossip, rumor, and privacy on the Internet. Yale 
University Press. - Part 1 
535 Ibid 
536 Nissenbaum, H. (1998). Protecting privacy in an information age: The problem of privacy in 
public. Law and philosophy, 17(5), 559-596. 
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realm of work, citizenship, and community537. This division is even essential to the legal 
system itself, which distinguishes between “public” and “private” law. By definition, 
“privacy” would seem to be applicable to the “private” sphere only. 
 
A link however can be made to privacy in public thanks to the American perspective of 
privacy. As we have mentioned earlier in this thesis, the American perspective is based 
on the opposition between the state and the individual, with the sanctity of the “home” as 
a central concept. However, because government interference in individual privacy can 
be found in places other than the home, jurisprudence has been developed that 
surrounds where individuals should or should not have privacy. This doctrine is known 
as the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”, and has had many interesting developments 
in its “native” land of America. We will study this doctrine, and why its developments 
prove that not only is privacy in public a valid legal concept, it is one that has been - albeit 
implicitly - adopted by regulators.  
 
This will inform our developments over ‘’informational privacy’’ by showing that protecting 
informational privacy can be achieved, and has been achieved in the US with some 
success, through a balance between the information which can be obtained about 
individuals, and the guarantees protecting that information from being collected or used 
wrongfully. 
 
1. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the US: inspiration 
for the transparency/obscurity distinction.  
 
Before we study the American test of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”, we need to 
establish the fundamentals of that test. 
 
There is always a balance to be kept between different rights and obligations. In the case 
of privacy in the US, this right primarily conflicts with the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to freedom of the press when it comes to private actors, and conflicts with 
government intrusion when it comes to state actors538. Because any contact with another 
person, with the outside world, will expose some information about oneself to the world, 
there needs to be a limit to how much of one’s life can be recorded and exposed. That 
537 Ibid 
538 Gorman C. (2011), Is Society More Reasonable than You?The Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy as a Criterion for Privacy Protection LLM Law & Technology Masters Thesis, Tilburg 
University, p.7 
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limit is the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”, and this balance approach, especially 
holding freedom of expression so high, is characteristically American. 
 
The strongest provision in American privacy law is the Fourth Amendment, however it is 
limited in scope, and only protects someone against government searches which violate 
a “reasonable expectation of privacy”539. Under the Fourth Amendment, such an 
expectation of privacy requires both “objective” and “subjective” expectation of privacy: 
one needs to actually expect privacy, and society as a whole needs to deem that 
expectation legitimate. This rule comes from a United States Supreme Court 1967 
decision, Katz v United States540. This case holds that entering a telephone booth, 
closing the door, and making a call, entitles a person to privacy in the sense that the 
government cannot record what that person said without a warrant. This was because 
Katz considered himself to be under a certain expectation of privacy, and the idea is 
usually expressed in the form of “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”541. 
 
Under the American conception, the important distinction on whether privacy was 
breached, due to their torts-based view of privacy, relies on whether the information was 
“knowingly exposed” to a third party542. This is important because unlike the European 
conception which usually relies on a distinction between “private” and “public” 
information, the US approach is based on the context of the exposition of the information, 
and not the nature of the information itself. As such, the question of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy then becomes what is considered “reasonable”, and what 
constitutes “knowingly exposed”. Some Supreme Court cases seem to have gone 
against individual rights since Katz and toward a more government-friendly approach543.  
 
From the case law, two main approaches can be used which establish what is 
“reasonable” and “knowingly exposed”. In the first, the criterion of “knowingly exposed” 
is used on the basis of an assumption of risk - with a person not being able to maintain 
their expectation of privacy where some information will be revealed to the public. This 
approach has been criticized because it allows Courts to restrict privacy whenever a third 
party is involved544. An example is in telephone calls, where one is considered to have 
“assumed the risk” of publicly exposing data and that the metadata - who made the call, 
539 Fourth Amendment, Constitution of the United States 
540 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
541 Ibid 
542 Wilkins, R. G. (1987). Defining the reasonable expectation of privacy: an emerging tripartite 
analysis. Vand. L. Rev., 40, 1077. 
543 Gorman (n.538) 
544 Ibid 
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from where - was going to be shared from the third party to the government545. This 
means that whenever a third party is involved, privacy seems to end. On the other hand, 
in the European system, this is exactly where privacy begins, considering the high level 
of obligations put onto data controllers and processors. 
 
The other approach is a balancing test between “the need to search” against “the 
invasion which the search entails”546. This balancing act is noteworthy because unlike 
the first approach, there is not a distinct point where privacy ends - instead, the 
importance of the right to privacy is included in the analysis. This approach was originally 
provided for in Katz, but then narrowed by subsequent decisions. Outside of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Katz line of case law, there exist limited actions in torts which use 
a test of “reasonable expectation of privacy”, and which follow a similar balancing 
approach547.  
 
From the use of these approaches in the case law, a pattern emerges of how privacy in 
public is understood in the United States. In United States v. Knotts in 1983548, 
government agents tracked a drum of chemicals to track the defendant’s movements. 
Comparing public highways to open fields, the Court held that monitoring the defendant’s 
location does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the tracking was taking place 
on public roads, where the defendants could have been physically tracked by the agents 
- seeing the tracking device simply as a proxy for the agents’ gaze549. Along this line of 
thinking, extending the capacities of data gathering in public is not held as increasing the 
privacy implications of the activity. 
 
In United States v. Karo, just a year later550, this issue appeared again except that the 
tracking device was then transported into a private residence - and the action was 
deemed a “search” since it concerned the interior of the residence. This shows the 
unrelenting focus on the “home” as the core of all privacy issues, as well as the 
paramount importance in US law of the public/private distinction. The tort of “intrusion 
upon seclusion” creates liability when individuals transgress into privates spaces. It is 
545 Surveillance Self-Defense, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, accessible at 
https://ssd.eff.org/your-computer/govt/privacy 
546United States v. Knottes 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). 
547 Gorman (n.538) 
548 United States v. Knottes 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). 
549 Casey, T. (2007) Electronic Surveillance and the Right to be Secure. UC Davis L. Rev. 41: 
977. 
550 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984). 
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possible for that to happen in public, but US Courts rarely afford liability for images 
obtained in public551. 
 
This was then developed in the Kyllo decision, which illustrated the increasing difficulties 
in including new means of surveillance in classic scenarios552. In that case, the use 
without a warrant of a heat sensor to detect marijuana cultivation was struck down as not 
respecting the reasonable expectation of privacy553. Justice Scalia of the US Supreme 
Court held that when “the government uses a device that is not in general public use . . 
. [then it is] unreasonable without a warrant.”554 
 
This means that the meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the US is based 
on whether the technology is commercially deployed. In other words, whether the 
technology is reasonably likely to be used by a third party, which can be likened to the 
European anonymisation test of “means likely to be used” by the data controller. Like 
that test, what is considered likely to threaten the individual’s privacy depends not on the 
motivations or purposes of the processing, but simply on whether the technology to do 
so is likely to be used or not. There is an important distinction, however: in the US 
expectation of privacy conception, once something becomes likely to be used, privacy 
becomes weaker as individuals have a lower expectation of privacy, while in the EU 
anonymisation conception, once something becomes likely to be used, privacy becomes 
stronger as it puts the responsibility for privacy on data controllers. 
 
The similarity between the two concepts allows us to see the same challenges to the 
expectations of informational privacy: what becomes “reasonable” to use is changing in 
the age of Big Data, and eventually the means likely to be used to invade one’s privacy 
will become so cheap, powerful, and widespread that there will be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy left. 
 
As such, under this conception, the reasonable expectation of privacy is bound to be 
profoundly transformed. But another standard has been developing in different contexts, 
as identified by Joel Reidenberg in “Privacy in public.”555 In that work, the change in 
information flows was seen as being taken into account in some Court analyses. An 
example is “U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
551 Kaminski, M. E. (2015). Regulating Real-World Surveillance. Washington Law Review, Vol. 
9, No. 113 
552 Reidenberg (n.85) 
553 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
554 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
555 Reidenberg (n.85)  
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Press”, where the Court denied access to a “rap sheet”, even though every item in that 
sheet was publicly available information556. This meant that in this case, whether the 
information was “public” was not the issue - instead, the information itself was the 
problem, regardless of how it was created. As we will see, this is evidence of the growing 
trend that this thesis argues should be developed further. 
 
The changes identified by Joel Reidenberg that led to the need for this new way of 
understanding privacy in public are mainly based on how not only has information 
changed but how this change has not reached individuals. Originally, whether data was 
public or private was actually whether it was accessible or not. If the data could not be 
gathered, it was “private”. This was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Jones:  “In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were 
neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any 
extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”557  
 
Not only is it possible to discover new information in unexpected ways, but what types of 
data can lead to very personal information can be impossible to predict and depend on 
the different contexts. This is compounded by the increasing complexity of technology 
and data creation, which multiplies the sources of data and how they can combine each 
other in a way which becomes closer and closer to being completely impossible to 
predict.  
 
For example, in Gonzales v. Google, the US government obtained from Google some 
user search queries.558 This was quashed by the government on the privacy grounds 
that “[a]lthough the Government has only requested the text strings entered . . . basic 
identifiable information may be found in the text strings when users search for personal 
information such as their social security numbers or credit card numbers .... The Court is 
also aware of so-called "vanity searches," where a user queries his or her own name 
perhaps with other information.”559. A vanity search is an obvious red flag - yet less 
obvious ones such as Thelma Arnold’s searches on homes for sale near her in the AOL 
search query incident can be just as revealing yet hard to predict560.  
 
As such, the obscurity of information plays a powerful role in what social expectations of 
privacy are. That conclusion follows from the fact that when transparency becomes the 
556 DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Free Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) 
557 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
558 Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
559 Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
560 Schwartz (n.17) 
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norm (under the “general public use” test found in Kyllo) the legal expectations of privacy 
are reduced561. By the same logic, increasing practical obscurity would increase the legal 
protections of privacy. By this logic, the difference between the “public” and “private” 
space is primarily to do with obscurity: privacy in the home was derived from the fact that 
it was possible to obscure one’s actions in one’s home.  
 
In the same way, in public, perfect transparency was never assumed. Instead, it was 
always a balance between what data was transparent or obscured while in the public 
space. The anonymity of the crowds is no longer a given, and the ubiquity of data-
gathering devices such as CCTV has created a broad accessibility to personal data, 
which was acknowledged by the US Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe, where the Court 
considered a challenge to a database where pharmacies reported the prescriptions 
made by physicians. Justice Brennan wrote that “[t]he central storage and easy 
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse”, while Justice 
Stevens argued that “[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computer data banks.”562 
 
Ease of access to information has long been understood as an important factor - 
regardless of whether that information is public or private, such as with the “U.S. 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press” case 
referenced above. In that case, the Court had stated that “there is a vast difference 
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, 
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”563 
 
These cases show the transformation of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test - a 
test that is no longer adapted in a world where so much data is likely to be collected by 
so many means - into a test which is based on appropriate levels of transparency, less 
dependant on whether the individual is inside or outside the home, or whether the data 
is public or private. 
 
In conclusion, this series of cases has shown that the public/private distinction is actually 
an obscurity/transparency distinction, driven not just by law, but also by practical means. 
As practical means change and evolve to make walls and curtains exceedingly obsolete 
as obscurity tools, and as tools of transparency in public become more and more efficient 
561 Reidenberg (n.85) 
562 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) 
563 DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Free Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) 
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and make anonymity in a crowd just as obsolete as obscurity tools, the public/private 
distinction becomes antiquated and in need of replacement. This is extremely important 
when it comes to the European understanding of data protection, as this distinction is 
what the entire doctrine of “identifiability” is based on: whether data is ‘’identifiable’’ 
depends on whether the data required to identify the person is available, i.e. 
‘’transparent’’. In the same way, trying to prevent identifiability is increasingly difficult as 
more information is available to more parties. The focus should not be on that information 
not existing, but on the tools used to obscure it. 
 
 
2. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the EU: A 
Privacy/Data Protection Divide  
 
A “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in the EU was first used in the landmark case 
of Lüdi v. Switzerland564, though the words “reasonable expectation” were not directly 
used, in a case where a Swiss national was convicted in Switzerland of drug trafficking 
primarily based on a written testimony by an undercover agent and phone recordings. 
The Court established that there was a violation of the defendant’s Article 8 right to 
private life due to the telephone interception, but that the goal of “prevention of crime”, 
which was necessary in a democratic society, was more important. The Court stated that 
once Mr Lüdi proceeded to participate in a criminal activity, he “assumed the risk” of 
encountering an undercover police officer. Thus one can assume that committing certain 
actions (such as criminal activity) means that a lesser expectation of privacy can be 
expected. 
 
This has some similarity to the American approach, which also uses certain contexts to 
determine that a person has relinquished their reasonable expectation of privacy when 
certain actions are performed. It is interesting to point out that this “action” in the US can 
be simply using a phone, while in the European context it is pursuing an illegal activity.  
 
The appearance of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in Europe was developed 
after Lüdi in relation to employer/employee privacy issues. In the US, localization tools 
are common practice in a company setting, as well as computer and communications 
monitoring, including e-mails and phone communications, but also software recording 
564 Lüdi v. Switzerland, 1992, ECHR, Series A, No. 238, PN 2004-135 
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every keystroke and mouse click565. On the other hand, the EU Courts - and especially 
the French courts - do not allow a fraction of those employee-monitoring measures566. In 
particular, certain European Union member states (including the United Kingdom, 
Germany and the Netherlands) strictly prohibit the monitoring of employee 
communications and under normal circumstances electronic monitoring is not 
permitted567.  
 
In the Halford v United Kingdom case568, an employer was monitoring an employee’s 
telephone transmissions. This was held to be part of one’s private life under Article 8, 
and that there existed a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when making these calls569. 
In relation to the phone calls the plaintiff was performing, the Court noted that she would 
“have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls, which expectation was 
moreover reinforced by a number of factors.” In this case, it is important to note the broad 
range of the test, when compared to how strictly it is applied in the American system: in 
Halford the test seemed to protect all Article 8 rights including family life, home, and 
correspondence570, which may have been intentional.  
 
That is not to say the European vision of the “reasonable expectation” test is a wall of 
protection that is only breached in overwhelming circumstances. In the case of P.G and 
J.H v. United Kingdom571, the next case to reference a “reasonable expectation” test, 
covert listening devices were planted in the plaintiff’s home, and though the Court ruled 
the measure illegal, it did add that “there are a number of elements relevant to a 
consideration of whether a person’s private life is concerned by measures effected 
outside a person’s home or private premises. Since there are occasions when people 
knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded 
or reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be 
a significant, although not necessary conclusive, factor”572.  
 
This case shows that the European conception of “reasonable expectation of privacy” is 
a balancing test, and not a binary decision. This shows an interesting difference between 
565 Determann, L., & Sprague, R. (2011). Intrusive monitoring: Employee privacy expectations 
are reasonable in Europe, destroyed in the United States. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
26(2), 979-1036 
566 Ibid 
567 Ibid 
568 Halford v. United kingdom (20605/92) 1997 ECHR 32, PN 2003-49 
569 Gomez-Arostegui, H. T. (2004). Defining private life under the European convention on 
human rights by referring to reasonable expectations. Cal. W. Int'l LJ, 35, 153. p.10  
570 Ibid 
571 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, (44787/98) [2001] ECHR 546 2001 PN 2004-199 
572 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, (44787/98) [2001] ECHR 546 2001 PN 2004-199 
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privacy and data protection European law: while privacy law recognises the need for 
balancing interests and contextualising different cases, data protection is still using a 
binary approach for what is or is not personal. This approach was restated in Peck v The 
United Kingdom573, in which CCTV footage of the applicant’s attempted suicide was used 
in news programs without his consent. The Court noted that “the applicant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy, among other factors”574 would be relevant to an Article 8 
analysis. 
 
A major development came in von Hannover v. Germany575. In this case, reasonable 
expectations were reinforced as the benchmark for a violation of Article 8, discussed as 
a “legitimate expectation” of protection of one’s private life. In this case, the Court ruled 
that one has such an expectation despite being a person in the public eye. The 
‘’balancing test’’ between the right of the public to obtain that information and the right of 
the individual to privacy fell on the side of the individual and it was held that the plaintiff 
had a ‘’legitimate expectation’’ of privacy.  In a dissenting opinion, Judge Barreto stated 
that the princess of Monaco’s “legitimate expectation” should not be valid where pictures 
were taken of her in a beach club swimming pool, because there was no possibility of 
entertaining a “reasonable expectation of not being exposed to public view”576. Judge 
Zupančič was even more vocal in asking for the reasonable expectations test as the 
standard for privacy cases, as it “permits a nuanced approach to every new case”577. 
 
However, for this test to be valid, it is important that the exact specification of what 
constitutes “reasonableness” - whether a subjective, objective, or combined approach - 
be cleared by the Court. A possible answer can be found in a UK House of Lords case, 
Campbell v MGN578. In this case, Lord Hope discussed the concept of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”, explaining the House of Lords’ position: “the question is what a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same 
position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity”. This objective view is a good 
indication of the European position. What’s more, the European vision of privacy as a 
“social good” would point towards the same objective approach579. 
 
573 Peck v The United Kingdom, (44647/98) [2003] ECHR 
574 Ibid 
575 von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379; (2005) 40 EHRR 1 
576 von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379; (2005) 40 EHRR 1 
577 von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379; (2005) 40 EHRR 1 
578 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 
579 Custers, B., van der Hof, S., & Schermer, B. (2014). Privacy expectations of social media 
users: The role of informed consent in privacy policies. Policy & Internet, 6(3), 268-295. 
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So we have seen there is at least some understanding of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, which impacts every space including the work space (Halford v. United 
Kingdom580), the private space (P.G and J.H v. United Kingdom581), and the public space 
(von Hannover v. Germany582). We will now see how that expectation works in the public 
space. 
 
An ECtHR case in 2000, Rotaru v. Romania583, confirmed its previous jurisprudence over 
the reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to a file stored by agents of the 
state by stating that this file fell within the scope of Article 8584. As to whether public 
information can be considered part of one’s “private life”, the Court noted that “Moreover, 
public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically 
collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the truer where such 
information concerns a person's distant past.”585  
 
This is particularly relevant because this is the same approach taken to “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” as in the American conception, with the same conclusions to the 
concepts of transparency and opacity. The conclusion was reinforced in the 
aforementioned P.G. and J.H. v The United Kingdom, where the Court defined that 
“There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, 
which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’.”586 Additionally, the Court added elements 
to decide whether one’s private life is affected in public places587:  
 
“Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in 
activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person’s 
reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily 
conclusive, factor. A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any 
member of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the 
same public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit 
television) is of a similar character. Private-life considerations may arise, however, once 
any systematic or permanent rec 
580 Halford v. United kingdom (20605/92) 1997 ECHR 32, PN 2003-49 
581 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, (44787/98) [2001] ECHR 546 2001 PN 2004-199 
582 von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379; (2005) 40 EHRR 1  
583 European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 4 May 2000 (Rotaru v Romania), no. 
28341/95. 
584 Nouwt, S. (2008). Reasonable expectations of geo-privacy. SCRIPTed, 5, 375. 
585 European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 4 May 2000 (Rotaru v Romania), no. 
28341/95. 
586 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, (44787/98) [2001] ECHR 546 2001 PN 2004-199 
587 Nouwt (n.584) 
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ord comes into existence of such material from the public domain. It is for this reason 
that files gathered by security services on a particular individual fall within the scope of 
Article 8, even where the information has not been gathered by any intrusive or covert 
method…”588 
 
Despite this acknowledgment of privacy in public in a similar vein as in the American 
conception, a very big exception based on surveillance is permitted by the ECtHR 
jurisprudence. This includes the case of Perry v. The United Kingdom589, in which the 
Court concluded that camera surveillance in public places without recording visual data 
was fulfilling a legitimate purpose and was not a breach of Article 8.  
 
Overall, as we can see, privacy law in the EU provides a concept of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in public spaces, taking into account the context and in particular 
potential data-gathering and data aggregation by private or public entities. This 
contextual approach to how much something is ‘’private’’ or ‘’public’’ and likely to 
represent a breach of informational privacy has been effective in adapting informational 
privacy to new technological and social trends, yet a similarly contextual approach to 
whether data processing represents a breach of informational privacy has not found its 
way to data protection, despite signs of it with the ‘’risk-based’’ approach. 
 
Indeed, on the Data Protection side, the challenges of the European approach to data 
protection regulation remain true in the public context. Though there remain barriers to 
gathering data from individuals in public, it can be done quite well in certain contexts 
where the infrastructure allows it. Besides the CCTV common in public spaces 
(especially in the UK), collecting information can be done increasingly well by those with 
enough motivation. This includes loyalty cards to track what people buy in stores, 
transport cards that track journeys by the user, and any other IoT-enabled device that 
allows the monitoring of user data throughout their day as they spend time in public 
spaces590. 
 
As we have shown, there is recognition, in privacy law, that informational privacy needs 
to be protected by an opacity/transparency balance of which factors can be used to 
obtain the information. We have also shown that there are signs that the GDPR is 
showing hints of moving towards such an approach. However, as analysed earlier in this 
Chapter, the core pillars of EU data protection law are not adaptable to this new type of 
588 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, (44787/98) [2001] ECHR 546 2001 PN 2004-199 
589 Perry v The United Kingdom: ECHR 17 Jul 2003 
590 Treacy (n.312) 
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approach, which is leading to a conflict between those two approaches in how to protect 
informational privacy. 
 
In conclusion, both the European and American privacy law systems, despite their strong 
differences at both the conceptual and practical levels, have developed an understanding 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, in both jurisdictions, this reasonable 
expectation is separate from the normal system of protection of individuals and not part 
of the main currents of thought and jurisprudence, and in particular in the EU is not taken 
into account in the data protection side of informational privacy. We have seen the 
development of an approach where instead of “public” and “private” spaces, a focus on 
“transparency or opacity” has appeared through judicial decisions brought about by the 
fundamental changes that public spaces are going through. In particular, a recurring 
factor is the aggregation of data into new ways of understanding data, showing that the 
distinction between “personal” and “non-personal” data is increasingly obsolete and a 
similar ‘’transparency/opacity’’ view is necessary and is showing signs of being adopted. 
 
 
3. Public Spaces as Privacy-Neutral Environments: The 
Example of Smart Cities  
 
We have identified that the public/private distinction is quickly becoming less and less 
useful, in particular with the development of new ways to observe individuals online. We 
will now show how the development of “smart cities” - alongside the general development 
of technologies which make public surveillance easier - means that traditional 
understandings of the public/private distinction will face exponentially greater challenges. 
We will also show how to understand the role of these new spaces - dubbed “private-
public-places”591. 
 
As we have seen previously, the reason there has never been a strong need for privacy 
in public is because of the inherent opacity of the individual in a crowd. It used to be that 
following someone around took up tremendous time and resources - not to mention risk 
- and there was little personal information to be gleaned from it. This is changing with the 
“Smart City” phenomenon: increasingly, anonymity in public is disappearing.  
 
591 Edwards (n.326)  
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Because smart cities are by definition in the public space shared by all residents, there 
is no choosing whether or not one is involved in the data gathering activities used by the 
city. One does not choose to be the target of CCTV cameras, reducing the autonomy 
that is often heralded as a major theme in the privacy debate. In the European context, 
this leads to the question: if consent is necessary in private but the government and its 
third party partners in the smart city space do not need consent to gather data, where 
does the value of consent stand? This is another highlight of the dissonance that 
undermines the effectiveness of data protection regulation. 
 
 
 
 
4 . The “Public” Cybersphere: Towards Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy Online  
 
The understanding of a “public space” implies several characteristics, which have 
implications over how privacy functions in those “public spaces”. As we will see, the 
essentials characteristics that impact these spaces exist both in the physical and non-
physical space. Indeed, there are characteristics in common between shopping centres 
and websites592 which can enlighten us on both. These “pseudo-public spaces”593 
reinforce the idea that it is the practical implications of a situation, and not whether it is 
“public” or “private” under the mundane conception of those terms, that should form the 
basis of the applicability of privacy protections. 
 
The spaces in which society evolves in are important, as many human rights are 
organized around them, with examples such as political expression being a feature of 
public spaces (with demonstrations as a further example) and intimate spaces such as 
the home being vital to privacy and personal development. When these spaces undergo 
an upheaval, society is therefore affected in profound and often unexpected ways. As 
the digital space becomes an increasingly-important part of our lives, the way we 
communicate and act changes, and this change needs to be taken into account594.  
 
592 Mac Sithigh, D. (2012) Virtual walls: the law of pseudo-public spaces. International Journal of 
Law in Context, 8 (03). pp. 394-412. 
593 Ibid 
594 Ibid 
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“Public-private spaces” in the digital and physical realms both share a sense of 
community and human interaction, while being under public sector control. They both 
play roles that have been important to governance through providing a place where 
private enterprise and public rights co-exist, and allow public and private broadcasters 
to interact with viewers595.  
 
Because of this, the same rising issues that appear in public spaces do the same in 
private ones - social media being a particularly well-known example. In the same way 
that there is increasing publicity of public actions due to technology, social media is 
becoming more and more analysed and public - an example being the increasing use 
and study of public Twitter tweets for a variety of purposes: the monitoring of individuals 
in a “public” space leading to compilations of data which are as problematic as the ones 
European and American courts have held to lead to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
As such, the conclusions we have reached earlier in this Chapter in terms of the need 
for a reasonable expectation of privacy based on transparency are applicable to every 
space - physical and digital. We can see that a public/private distinction is a misnomer: 
there are spaces where individuals are mostly obscured and gathering data is either 
difficult, or pointless, and as such we have dubbed these spaces “private”. Meanwhile, 
there are places where transparency seemed evident, while in fact individuals were 
obscured by the anonymity of the crowd (now no longer the case), and these spaces 
were dubbed “public spaces”. Moving forward, it is important to take note of these 
nuances, and avoid being limited to a public/private distinction. 
 
 
Over the course of this Chapter so far, we have seen that using “identifiability” as a way 
of determining what is “personal data” is meeting with ever-increasing challenges. This 
is due to a variety of factors brought about by the rise of Big Data. Because all of the 
European data protection regulatory system is based on the binary personal/non-
personal distinction in which the “identifiability” test is absolutely essential, its limitations 
mean that the whole regulatory system is in a situation that cannot be easily fixed. We 
have shown that anonymization and consent, two vital tools of the data protection 
regulatory apparatus, are failing because of this central limitation, and that despite both 
of these instruments being made stronger and more complete with the GDPR, the core 
issues stemming from the limitations of the “identifiability” standard has not been 
resolved. However, we have seen that EU authorities are becoming open to the idea of 
595 Ibid 
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an identifiability standard which takes into account various practical factors, a more 
flexible approach which could be the beginning of a solution. 
 
We have then seen that on top of “personal data” becoming a muddled idea, so is the 
idea of “personal space”. The public/private distinction in terms of public or private 
spaces is increasingly obsolete, mainly because various environments, both physical 
and digital, combine aspects of both. This has challenged traditional understandings of 
how privacy spaces are decided, but at the same time has uncovered interesting 
underlying truths that have laid hidden until this upset. The most important of them is that 
“public” and “private” primarily actually mean “transparent” and “opaque”. The 
transparency/opacity vision of privacy has emerged, and been acknowledged in the new 
conceptions of the “reasonable expectations of privacy”, showing a move of privacy law 
towards an approach based on Information and whether there are enough Guarantees 
(enough ‘’opacity’’) that it will not be used in ways which breach informational privacy. 
 
We have shown that what decides whether something is a “personal” space or “personal 
data” is not just dependant on the data that can be collected by “anyone”, but by those 
who are ‘’reasonably likely‘’ to collect it. This subjective element was shown in Whalen 
v. Roe where the ease of obtaining data, and not the data itself, was problematic as well 
as in the privacy concerns arising from third party involvement in the creation of smart 
cities. This was also shown by the very nature of pseudonymised data: depending on the 
data held by the one holding the pseudonymised data, the same data can be both 
personal or anonymised in that person’s eyes. 
 
The subjective nature of data is a source of difficulties for regulatory authorities. Is data 
personal if there exists one holder (apart from the individual the data pertains to) which 
can identify the individual in the World? Our argument is that there are actually two 
concepts at play here: “data”, and “Information”. While data is the same regardless of 
who observes it, “Information” is the combination of the data and the observer’s 
perception of it. Because any observer will have their own set of data, biases, and 
preconceptions, the same piece of data can create different “Information”. As we will see, 
understanding this difference, and using “personal Information” instead of ‘’personal 
data’’ as the basis for data protection, allows a balance-based approach in data 
protection. 
 
159 
 
C. The Legal Argument for Processed Data as a 
Separate Construct  
 
The idea that data changes over the course of processing is well-established. What we 
intend to show in this thesis is not that data changes. It is that data becomes a wholly 
separate construct, with its own rules, biases, and overall a new legal status. We argue 
that this new construct, “Information”, cannot be held to be inscribed in the continuity of 
what existed in previous stages. This, we will argue, means that any rules that follow that 
data, intending to continue binding it as it is changing, are akin to attempting to take a 
river boat over the delta of a river and into the ocean, and being surprised at being out 
of one’s depth. 
I. Informational Privacy as the Core of EU Data Protection 
Law  
 
The move towards a more flexible approach in European Data Protection regulation can 
be seen in comments by European officials, such as the December 2013 comments by 
Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda:  
 
“Sometimes, full anonymisation means losing important information, so you can no 
longer make the links between data. That could make the difference between progress 
or paralysis. But using pseudonyms can let you to analyse large amounts of data: to 
spot, for example, that people with genetic pattern X also respond well to therapy Y. So 
it is understandable why the European Parliament has proposed a more flexible data 
protection regime for this type of data. Companies would be able to process the data on 
grounds of legitimate interest, rather than consent. That could make all the positive 
difference to big data: without endangering privacy.”596 
 
This comment, which aims to show the need for pseudonymised data, shows the 
difference between “data” and “Information”. In this case, the pseudonymised data is 
useless in the hands of anyone except those who can link the pseudonym back to the 
596 Kroes, N. (2013), Data isn't a four-letter word, IAPP Europe Data Protection 
Congress/Brussels, 11 Dec. 2013. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-
13-1059_en.htm. 
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individual. They have the data, but cannot obtain the Information because of a missing 
piece. 
 
More generally, the understanding of privacy in public and the “personal data” binary are 
shown in the doctrine of reasonable expectations of privacy and its recent developments. 
Specifically, this test was used in numerous cases where the data gathering itself 
seemed to be innocuous, but where other circumstances made the “transparency” of the 
data too high, such as where a tracker on a vehicle provided a large amount of data that 
could still have been gathered by law enforcement by traditional means with enough time 
and effort597, or a database that provided too much insight into the lives of individuals, 
even when that database was composed entirely of public data598. In these cases, the 
issue is not the data itself and its status as personal or not, but the easiness with which 
Information can be created. Even if the data is anonymised, hidden, or otherwise 
obfuscated, the question remains as to whether the opacity is enough, and what 
Information can be created. The same data held by another party or processed by 
another tool creates different Information. This is recognized by the endorsement of the 
“opacity/transparency” paradigm as the direction in which the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” is developing.  
 
Importantly, because the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is not bound by the 
“personal data” test of data protection, it is only is interested by the various factors that 
affect whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is present. This allows for a more 
flexible approach, but more importantly there is no need for the data to have any specific 
status, bypassing the “identifiability” criteria of personal data. Only the Information, and 
who can obtain it, is relevant. This shows that it is possible to protect informational 
privacy without the need for the concept of “personal data”. 
 
In conclusion, the idea that the transformation of data makes it difficult to attach any legal 
obligations to the point at which it is first collected is recognised in privacy law with the 
increasing traction of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. However, this development 
in how to protect informational privacy found in privacy law has not seen an equivalent 
in data protection, despite hints of it such as the ‘’risk-based’’ approach of the GDPR. 
 
Now that we have shown the role of Information, as well as the fact that it is distinct from 
‘’data’’ while being both very powerful and inadequately regulated, we will study how the 
597 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1986)  
598 DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Free Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) 
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GDPR is showing signs of moving towards the protection of not just ‘’personal data’’ but 
instead what we have identified as ‘’personal information’’. 
 
 
II. Linking ‘’Information’’ to Informational Privacy 
  
Not all Information has an impact on ‘’informational privacy’’. In order only to target 
Information relevant for our purposes, we need to identify what Information needs to be 
in scope. In order to capture all relevant data, EU data protection has the notion of 
‘’personal data’’, which needs to be protected without having to define what particular 
societal interests are achieved by protecting it. We argue that this approach is valuable, 
as we have shown in our first Chapter the difficulties of fully defining the scope of the 
right to privacy. However, because ‘’personal data’’ is binary it is a limited concept. It is 
too restrictive, meanwhile the fact that the full extent of the GDPR applies to anyone 
holding any ‘’personal data’’ means that it also too broad, as many holders of data have 
to comply with a burden for which they do not have the resources to, particularly when 
dealing with data which may be combined to create special categories of personal data, 
even where the holder of data has no reason ever to make those connections. 
 
However, a conception which only burdens to the extent of the Information one holds 
and takes into account all the relevant contextual factors allows for a scope which 
captures data that is not relevant or problematic. That kind of data allows little Information 
creation, and as such needs no or few Guarantees. The GDPR acknowledges that, 
indirectly, by putting out of scope any data processed ‘’in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial 
activity.’’599 By targeting only professional or commercial activity, the GDPR is implying 
that some data processing activities exist in social contexts that do not present a risk to 
informational privacy. This, as we will show, fits in with our conception that Legal 
Guarantees appear when others, such as Social Guarantees, are unable to effectively 
limit the ability to process data.  
 
The conception developed in this thesis, thus, has a wide scope, since it needs to include 
all situations involving ‘’Informational privacy’’. This is why my thesis argues for a move 
from ‘’personal data’’ towards ‘’personal information’’, a concept which keeps most of the 
599 GDPR, Recital 18 
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elements of personal data but removes the element of ‘’identifiability’’. Data protection is 
already headed towards a pragmatic, contextual, risk-based approach, and is limited by 
the focus on ‘’identifiability’’, and the focus on ‘’data’’ instead of ‘’Information’’. As such, 
attaching all these tools developed in the GDPR to ‘’personal information’’ instead of 
‘’personal data’’ allows for a ready-made regulatory framework. 
 
The only thing missing is linking that ‘’Information’’ back to the interests that need 
protecting. ‘’Personal data’’ does so by being linked to ‘’an identified or identifiable natural 
person’’600. This goes back to the ‘’identifiability’’ criteria that we have shown is no longer 
fit for purpose. How does one link ‘’Information’’ back to individuals without falling for the 
same limitations? The answer might be in the GDPR itself. 
 
As we mentioned when discussing the limitations of ‘’personal data’’, the ‘’relating to’’ 
element of the definition601 means that data can be related to an individual not only if it 
is ‘’about’’ them602, but also where ‘’data are used or are likely to be used, taking into 
account all the circumstances surrounding the precise case, with the purpose to 
evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual’’603 
or where ‘’[the use of the data] is likely to have an impact on a certain person's rights and 
interests, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the precise case. It 
should be noted that it is not necessary that the potential result have a major impact. It 
is sufficient that the individual be treated differently from other persons as a result of the 
processing of such data’’.604 
 
There are many instances where non-personal data may be used to evaluate or influence 
individuals, or to have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests. However, if 
that data is not ‘’identifiable’’, it is outside the scope of the GDPR. This ‘’related to’’ 
requirement, influenced by the risk-based approach, is what the focus of European data 
protection should be on, looking at the use and impact of the information, instead of trying 
to build a link, however tenuous, to an ‘’identifiable data subject’’. 
 
This linking of ‘’personal data’’ to the consequences that may affect the individual can be 
found in other places throughout the Regulation, including the data subject’s right not to 
600 GDPR, Article 4 
601 Article 29 Working Party (2007), Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, WP136, 
Adopted on 20 June 2007 
602  Judgment of 20 December 2017, Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner, C-434/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 
603 Ibid 
604 Ibid 
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be subjected to automated decision-making in Article 22 of the GDPR which refers to 
any decisions ‘’which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her’’605, a right which does not mention ‘’personal data’’ at all. 
The fact that the GDPR is creating new rights which set aside the concept of ‘’personal 
data’’ is strong evidence of its limitations. 
 
Another important way in which the GDPR’s approach shows this trend is the 
reinforcement of the ‘’principles’’ of the GDPR, and particularly its focus on governance 
and ‘’purpose limitation’’. 
 
The seven principles are the core of the obligations set out in the GDPR for controllers606. 
They ensure that controllers, when processing data, follow some general rules which 
extend to all personal data processed by them. The first five principles are mainly 
articulated around identifying the ‘’purpose’’ of processing, and then establishing why 
and how the data is processed based on that purpose607. The first and second principles 
are based on having an explicit, transparent, lawful legal basis founded on that purpose 
(encompassing all of the data included in that purpose), while the third and fourth 
principles, respectively, are based on only collecting the data necessary to accomplish 
that purpose (‘’data minimisation’’ principle) and keeping and processing all of the data 
necessary to ensure the purpose can be accomplished (‘’data accuracy’’ principle). The 
fifth principle calls for the data to be deleted once the purpose is accomplished 
(‘’retention’’ period). 
 
But the new principle, the ‘’accountability’’ principle analysed previously, which states 
that ‘’The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance‘’608 
with the other principles, is the one which most supports the view that a global, controller-
focused approach is inevitable. This principle is the basis for a GDPR compliance 
framework based on controllers setting up internal policies to ensure the principles are 
being followed throughout the organisation - a framework which looks at the organisation 
first and the actual data second. In particular, the Article 29 Working Party recommends 
a Data Protection Impact Assessment (an assessment of the risks of data subjects)609 
where the data controller is ‘’matching or combining datasets, for example originating 
605 GDPR, Article 22 
606 GDPR, Articles 5 and 6 
607 Colesky, M., Hoepman, J. H., & Hillen, C. (2016, May). A critical analysis of privacy design 
strategies. In Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2016 IEEE (pp. 33-40). IEEE. 
608 GDPR, Article 5(2) 
609 Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) 
and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, WP 248, Adopted on 4 October 2017 
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from two or more data processing operations performed for different purposes and/or by 
different data controllers in a way that would exceed the reasonable expectations of the 
data subject’’. This shows that the same data processed differently may lead to different 
risks, showing that it is the Information, not the data itself, which should be the focus. 
 
Based on these observations, ‘’Information’’ as expressed in this thesis can be defined 
as ‘’any information relating to a natural person’’, bypassing the ‘’identifiability’’ criteria 
altogether. Additionally, the purpose-based approach, based on all of the Information 
held by controllers and for what purposes they can use that Information is the way 
forward for the European right to data protection. Controls should be based on the use 
of the data and regulating those purposes. This is the aim of the ‘’Guarantees’’-based 
framework developed in the following Chapters: to understand and regulate Information 
based on what it can be used for, instead of whether it is ‘’personal’’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let us recap this thesis so far. In the first chapter, we set the background by explaining 
that “privacy”, in the European context, is based on a common core of central forces, 
based on the collection, control, and dissemination of information, with control 
mechanisms being created in order to protect this “Informational Privacy”. These control 
mechanisms can be legal, but can also come from other sources, especially 
technological sources. 
 
The second Chapter analyses the understanding of the European right to data protection, 
with a focus on how the European regulatory system functions, which showed it to be a 
strong, top-down system focusing on having one set of rules across the entire spectrum. 
The rights-based European approach 
, based on a right putting the burden on data controllers and seeing the protection of 
individuals as the primary goal, recognizes that some contexts require a specific 
approach, including the personal data of children or health data, but stay within the same 
overall framework to do so. 
 
As such there exists a certain disconnect between the theorisation of privacy, which is a 
balance of control measures and new ways of gathering data, and the EU Data 
Protection regulatory system which is anchored in a binary approach based on “personal 
data”. 
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 We have then, having set the scene for how informational privacy is being protected by 
both the right to privacy and the right to data protection, explained the factors which have 
upset the traditional understandings of data and which have exposed certain limitations 
in the existing regulatory framework. The developments of Big Data have meant that the 
existing control mechanisms were outmatched, and new situations appeared that they 
were not prepared for, just as in the 1890s, the USA was not ready for instant 
photography, but to a much greater degree. 
 
This Chapter has explained that the exercise of data processing is a mixture of 
technology and human agency, which is affected by a number of biases, limitations, 
inaccuracies, and change. Because of this, the data one has at the beginning of the 
process can become something entirely different at the end of the process. More than 
data, what is actually a risk to informational privacy is the construct we have referred to 
as “Information”, which is the combination of data and human interpretation and bias, 
which changes depending on an infinity of factors, especially the purpose for which the 
data is used. Through studying the transformation of data, we have shown the source of 
why concepts such as group profiling or anonymisation, though they create “Information”, 
do not fall into the definition of “personal data”, even though they might affect 
informational privacy. We have shown not only that an approach which recognises the 
transformation of data across its processing can truly protect informational privacy in the 
age of Big Data, but also that an approach with these features has already seen some 
developments through the increasing risk-based approach taken by the GDPR or the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” recognising the need for a flexible approach to tackle 
issues such as privacy in public.  
 
Through these developments, we have explained what the challenge is, and shown 
where in the European Data Protection regulatory system the limitations are. However, 
because the core limitation, the “personal data” binary, is at the centre of the system, 
moving beyond it to a system in a way that can protect informational privacy in the age 
of Big Data is necessary. As we can see, the European legislators have accepted this 
need to move towards a new approach, but cannot fully do so unless the ‘’personal data’’ 
binary is changed. As shown in this thesis, we propose to move towards a concept of 
‘’personal information’’ which is not a binary but made of degrees: any information 
relating to a data subject is personal information, and if that information is not bound by 
sufficient guarantees informational privacy is not assured. 
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This links back to both the beginning, and the end, of my thesis. We mentioned when 
discussing privacy that it is characterised by a shifting balance between new 
developments and control mechanisms on them; in other words the 
“opacity/transparency” recognised in the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and also part of what makes the difference between “data” and “Information” through the 
fact that “obscurity” can apply not just to data, but also to the interpretation of it. We have 
mapped out a way to understand the underlying causes of what creates a need for new 
control mechanisms, and precisely pinpoint what new effects the changes have on the 
status quo, considering all the factors that “Information” can take into account but that 
“data” cannot. 
 
The next Chapter will study the ‘’Guarantees’’ which limit the way Information is used. 
As we have shown, the EU is already showing signs of moving towards a conception 
which is aligned with this framework. As such, understanding the Guarantees will allow 
us to show where the existing measures to protect informational privacy are effective, 
and where they are not. 
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Chapter 5. The Guarantees 
 
In this Chapter, we take the previous steps that we have developed and use them to 
create what we call the Information/Guarantees Balance. In the first part, we go over the 
scholarly sources that we have used as the foundations for this Balance. We then study 
other ways in which the challenges of informational privacy have been tackled, and what 
lessons can be learned from them. 
 
Based on this foundation, we explain the factors which restrict the use of Information, 
which we call Guarantees. We assert that when Guarantees are balanced, when tools 
limiting the creation, dissemination, and usage of Information which increase the 
“transparency” of individuals effectively create a satisfying status quo, informational 
privacy is protected. We go over these Guarantees and go back to the source of the 
elements that have changed the status quo, putting all of these different factors and 
forces under the same terms, to build an understanding of how to protect informational 
privacy in sometimes unexpected ways.  
 
We will then, in our sixth and last Chapter, go over the Balance itself, first by explaining 
how it is possible to find an existing, satisfactory status quo in the European context that 
we can compare with the current climate in order to find out whether data controllers are 
able to process data in a way that is not limited by sufficient Guarantees. We will then go 
over how to use various tools in order to rectify the balance, and discuss what we call 
the “Privacy Toolbox”, a set of tools which can be used to built up Guarantees. 
 
As such, we are not intending to propose a replacement for the European data protection 
regulatory system. Though we are critical of some fundamental aspects of this 
apparatus, the “Privacy Toolbox” can provide solutions to certain parts of the challenges 
to informational privacy brought about by the age of Big Data. 
 
A. Scholarly Sources of the Guarantees  
I. Lawrence Lessig’s Pathetic Dot  
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In his seminal essay, “Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace”610, Lawrence Lessig lays 
out the vision of John Stuart Mill, an important figure of libertarianism who argued for 
freedom from the government’s power and its power of coercion. His analysis is based 
on asking what the threat to liberty is, and what means can be used to resist that threat. 
 
Threats can take many forms, one of which in the context of cyberspace Lessig identifies 
as “Code” itself - the technological environment of cyberspace as a constraint on human 
liberty. However, that is only one of multiple factors. Lessig looks at these threats, these 
forces, through the eyes of one regulated by them, represented by a “pathetic dot”611.  
 
Lessig categorizes four forces, taking the example of smoking. There are legal 
constraints, on where one is allowed to smoke or not, such as on aircrafts, but that is not 
the only norm. Restaurants have no-smoking signs, even where there is no law enforcing 
them. People around the smoker might complain about the smoke, creating pressure on 
them to regulate their behavior. This type of norm, social norms, can be just as 
constraining as legal ones. 
 
Another force identified by Lessig is the market, using the example of the price of 
cigarettes, which can be manipulated by the State through increased taxation to regulate 
choice. Finally, there are the technological constraints of cigarettes, with health effects 
and strong odor reducing incentive to smoke certain types of cigarettes or others. 
 
These forces - legal, social, market-related and architectural - are the four forces which 
bind all actions by individuals according to Lessig. Changing one will change the whole, 
and each force may be opposed to another.  
 
Lessig then takes this to cyberspace, where the same forces are still present - social 
norms can be found in what is or is not acceptable to post on Facebook. Legal norms on 
defamation, intellectual property and hate speech restrict what one can say online. The 
provision of services and their terms and costs change which ones online users 
participate in or not. And of course, the technological infrastructure of cyberspace is a 
major influence on what can be done in it - possibly the most important612. These 
modalities regulating cyberspace have a balance as well, which is influenced by, yet 
separate from a “real world”’s balance613. This disconnect, this balance in a new context 
610 Lessig (n.36) 
611 Ibid 
612 Koops (n.57) 
613 Ibid 
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that has never seen it before, is a new development, and re-creating the balance found 
in the real world is a major challenge, not to mention the question of whether even to 
follow the same rules as those of the real world at all. 
 
Meanwhile, these constraints do not simply appear. They are all, especially in cyber-
space, man-made and can be affected using mechanics with various degrees of 
complexity614. In order to exemplify the modification of these forces, Lessig brings up the 
possibility of theft of radios: to deter thieves, the government may impose a new legal 
norm such as harsher punishment, but can also make sure radios are more protected by 
improving their security - such as locking mechanisms if the radio is moved, or a 
mandatory GPS tracker installed. Depending on what is more practical or a better 
deterrent, different solutions coming from different sides of the four forces will be 
needed615.  
 
Lessig is adamant on one fact, which is the crux of this thesis, that lawmakers do not 
have to accept the different forces as a given and do not have to limit themselves 
completely to them.  Regulation of the market can regulate the market-led forces on 
behavior, such as the aforementioned increased tax on cigarettes or a tax break for 
electric cars. Laws can also change the architecture, for which Lessig uses the example 
of someone in a wheelchair whom the government can accommodate by legally 
mandating that wheelchair ramps be placed for their use. Another relevant example for 
our purposes is the placing of speed bumps on a road to ensure drivers slow down - an 
architectural guarantee which has the effect of a legal speed limit. Finally, an example 
which we will draw on later is the use of street lights or cameras in public spaces to 
reduce crime616 - this does not prevent one particular crime, or target one particular 
individual, but attempts to limit all kinds of criminal behavior in the area. As such specific 
issues can be handled through non-specific solutions. 
 
Meanwhile, laws can also change social norms - through educating citizens, awareness 
programs, etc. This was an important factor of the anti-smoking campaigns in many 
western countries: in conjunction with changing the market forces (by increasing the tax 
on cigarettes) and the legal forces (by making smoking illegal in various public spaces), 
these campaigns used awareness programs, especially ones targeted at minors, to great 
effect617. 
614 Ibid 
615 Ibid 
616 Ibid 
617 Gilpin, E, A., et al. (1994), Smoking initiation rates in adults and minors: United States, 
1944–1988. American Journal of Epidemiology 140.6: 535-543. 
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 There are unseen effects to these types of actions, of course. Because human behavior 
is not easily regulated, unexpected knock-on effects can occur, and all actions to rectify 
a situation are not beneficial to all. It adds to the calculations the regulator has to make: 
should they act directly or indirectly? What are the benefits and costs of the measure? 
What force to use, and why? What are the potential effects of action? 
 
As one can see, acting on the forces is far from simple. But importantly, while a regulator 
can add to forces to enforce behavior, the opposite is also true. By removing protection 
on certain industries, they can be dis-incentivised, while reducing penalties for certain 
crimes can encourage these behaviors. All of these factors will become highly relevant 
once applied to the context of informational privacy. 
 
 
II. Helen Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity  
 
We have already studied Helen Nissenbaum’s ‘’privacy as contextual integrity’’ 
framework early on in this thesis, as part of a historical study on privacy and its 
developments over time. We will now develop it under a new light, this time in the context 
of the Information/Guarantees Balance.  There are two reasons to do so. First is to 
understand the theories that have led us to develop the conception of informational 
privacy as a balance between Information, and Guarantees limiting the creation and 
dissemination of that Information. Second, is the fact that the points that contextual 
integrity shares with our framework, of taking into account factors beyond just the law or 
just the data, means that some instances of contextual integrity affecting legislation in 
the US prove the need for such an approach. We will first go over what contextual 
integrity is and what it brings to this thesis, then go over contextual integrity’s significant 
impact in US law and how it evidences the success of a contextual approach. 
 
In order to understand the idea of identifying a balance, it is useful to go over the theories 
that have inspired it. Earlier in this thesis, we have argued that the protection of 
informational privacy is moving away from the binary of public and private spaces, as 
well as the binary of personal and non-personal data. If these concepts are to be set 
aside, an updated standard of assessing what Information various parties can obtain and 
what they can do with it needs to be established.  
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The theory of contextual integrity was created by Helen Nissenbaum, and is based on 
the idea of creating not a system of law, but instead a way to try and establish a 
“foundation for policy and law expressed in terms of moral, political, and social values”618. 
Because of the huge range of interests that privacy encompasses, Nissenbaum’s theory 
attempts not to provide an answer to all questions of privacy, but instead to find a set of 
principles allowing for the study of privacy without being bound by discussion on what 
the limits of the right to privacy actually are. Another vital feature of contextual integrity - 
and the primary reason why it is included in this thesis - is the aforementioned separation 
from the binary of public and private spaces. 
 
A second principle is the type of information involved and the restriction of its access and 
transmission. Instead of focusing on who is intruding, the principle is based on the fact 
that someone is. Around that principle lies the idea that people are entitled to have 
secrets, and that one of the major values of privacy is the ability to decide on the degree 
of disclosure one is willing to give about those secrets. This leads to the difficult 
categorization of what data is “personal”, “sensitive”, or other names for data that is held 
as entirely controlled by the individual. The United States, like the EU, holds “sensitive” 
data in a special category, and as such the idea of having certain data being particularly 
important or sensitive is not a cultural conception but a more wide-ranging one. In 
particular, any data related to health or children is held to need special protection. As we 
will see later, this creates interesting dynamics where some “sensitive” data not covered 
by existing legislation can still be protected by the social stigma associated with collecting 
it619. 
 
The final principle identified by Nissenbaum pertains to what is held as the “Personal” or 
“Private” sphere. In our discussion on the distinction between public and private spaces, 
we have shown that the distinction between these is in fact made up of shades of opacity. 
The idea of “opacity” is more difficult to establish in the US conception because of its 
insistence on the “home” as the central space belonging to the individual, but is 
nevertheless gaining traction as acknowledged by Nissenbaum who points out the 
existence of these “gray spaces”. Taking these principles as the “skeleton” around which 
privacy needs to be articulated, Nissenbaum uses them to create the framework of 
contextual integrity620. 
 
618 Nissenbaum (n.102) 
619 Ibid 
620 Ibid 
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These principles are vital to understand, because contextual integrity is not aimed at an 
answer to all challenges to informational privacy but to work at the foundations of these 
principles. The idea of contextual integrity is that all areas of life are governed by “norms 
of information flow”, each inscribed within a certain context. Instead of a “public” or a 
“private” context, each individual situation is its own context with its own rules, depending 
on a number of factors. 
 
Nissenbaum uses “appropriateness” as the measure of whether the flow of information 
is adequate, which allows for great variety and adaptability, with such wide-ranging 
possibilities as the appropriateness of a doctor-patient relationship or the one between 
a married couple. Different contexts with different people mean that the norms of 
appropriateness being violated are enough to characterize a breach, which allows a way 
to bypass the “personal data binary” while still protecting privacy. In addition to 
appropriateness, “distribution” is another set of norms on the transfer of information 
obtained within a context. For example, if one’s friend confides very personal information, 
distributing that information to strangers is a breach of contextual integrity621. 
 
On top of these norms come “roles”, such as the role of patient or doctor, and they dictate 
the types of acceptable information transmission, and principles of transmission which 
are the rules governing the transmission of information - not just what information is 
shared, but why and how622. 
 
 
 
III. The Limitations of a Harms-based Approach to 
Protecting Informational Privacy  
 
We have shown that what needs to be regulated in order to protect informational privacy 
is the creation of Information, not just the flows of data. Stronger privacy and data 
protection laws become necessary when Information becomes created in new and 
expected ways. We will not attempt to delimit exactly why informational privacy is 
important, or what “harms” or “risk” to it mean. Each of these questions could be (and 
has been) the subject of a library’s worth of scholarly works. In this part, we will go over 
621 Ibid 
622 Adam, B. (2006), et al. Privacy and contextual integrity: Framework and applications. 
Security and Privacy, 2006 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE. 
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the reasons why we have approached privacy in this way, and the pitfalls that a “balance” 
approach would avoid. 
 
In this part we will go over the “privacy harm” approach to privacy and why we have 
chosen not to use it for this thesis. Nevertheless, lessons from it have inspired the way 
in which the Informational Guarantees framework has developed, and so this approach 
needs to be mentioned. 
 
We have mentioned before Daniel Solove’s framework of privacy harms623. However, 
Solove himself was aware of the limitations of such an approach. Finding ‘’privacy’’ 
interests and where they are breached is difficult: “Too many courts and policymakers 
struggle with even identifying the presence of a privacy problem. Protecting privacy 
requires careful balancing, as neither privacy nor its countervailing interests are absolute 
values. Unfortunately, due to conceptual confusion, courts and legislatures often fail to 
recognize privacy problems, and thus no balancing ever takes place624. This does not 
mean that privacy should always win in the balance, but it should not be dismissed just 
because it is ignored or misconstrued.”625 This goes straight to the core of what the 
Information/Guarantees framework attempts to do: avoid the very question of finding 
“privacy problems”, and instead find a way to re-establish the same balance as it existed 
before it was upset. 
 
There is undeniable value to taxonomies of privacy. They allow us to have a complete 
and nuanced view of the interconnected interests of privacy, by classifying the complex 
interest that it is. Solove already solves many of the problems of classifying privacy by 
focusing on a pragmatic approach of ‘’privacy problems’’ instead of the elusive search 
for the meaning of privacy626, which shows the American origins of the approach, 
following the “privacy torts” theorised by Warren and Brandeis.  
 
The limitation of introducing “harm” into informational privacy is that it introduces the idea 
of finding who has been “wronged” by the activity in question627. Finding such injuries in 
623 Solove (n.87)  
624 Ibid 
625 Ibid 
626 Calo (n.20) 
627 Austin, L. M. (2014), Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, Not Consent (or 
Harm). Forthcoming in Austin Sarat, ed., A World Without Privacy?: What Can/Should Law Do.. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2524512 
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the context of informational privacy is difficult. Beyond the simple fact that proving moral 
harm is difficult due to its subjectivity628, finding the right boundary is also difficult.  
 
We have seen how challenging defining the limits of privacy is, which is why we have 
limited this approach to “informational privacy”. A recent paper by Bert-Jaap Koops and 
others, “A Typology of Privacy”629, attempts to map out the various interests which apply 
to privacy, which includes two scales - from freedom to be left alone to freedom for self-
development, and from the “personal zone” of solitude to the “public zone” of 
inconspicuousness. In this conception, there are a great number of dimensions to 
privacy: behavioral privacy, proprietary privacy, spatial privacy and more630. 
Informational privacy permeates every one of these dimensions. Is there harm in a data 
controller selling pictures of an individual they uploaded on their server? It is 
informational privacy, but is it also bodily privacy, proprietary privacy, something else? 
Even if harm can be characterized, finding which type of privacy is harmed is a whole 
other question all to itself. 
 
Secondly, there are types of harm not even fully recognized as harm at all. Some argue 
that privacy goes beyond the individuals, and that there is a “societal” dimension to 
privacy, where the violation of an individual’s privacy not only harms the individual, but 
also society as a whole631. Protection of autonomy and of private spaces are held as vital 
to democracy and society632, but this extends as well to places such as lectures theaters, 
intended to be a place for the free exchange of ideas and designed for academic freedom 
(as seen in Antović and Mirković v Montenegro in which surveillance of lecture halls was 
seen as an invasion of privacy)633. Finding the “harm” there is difficult, or even 
impossible: how can one measure the erosion of democracy? How can a value be put 
on that, especially when the erosion is taking place through millions of individual transfers 
and gatherings of data? 
 
628 Koppelman, A. (2005) Does obscenity cause moral harm?. Columbia Law Review (2005): 
1635-1679. 
629 Koops et al (n.24) 
630 Ibid 
631 See “Schwartz, P. M. (1999). Privacy and democracy in cyberspace. Vand. L. Rev., 52, 
1607.”, “Reidenberg, J. R. (1994). Setting standards for fair information practice in the US 
private sector. Iowa L. Rev., 80, 497”.; “Schwartz, P. M. (1994). Privacy and participation: 
Personal information and public sector regulation in the United States. Iowa L. Rev., 80, 553.” 
and “Simitis, S. (1987). Reviewing privacy in an information society. University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 135(3), 707-746.” 
632 Reidenberg, J. R. (2002), Privacy wrongs in search of remedies, Hastings LJ 54: 877. 
633 Antović and Mirković v Montenegro [2017] ECHR 1068 
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Finally come the challenges coming from what we have called ‘’data sculpting’’. As we 
have developed, “personal data” becomes something completely different over the 
course of its life. That something different becomes utterly disconnected from the original 
data, and tracing back harm to the original individual can be exceedingly difficult. Except 
for societal harm, all harm eventually has to be traced back to “who” has been harmed. 
In the Sculptor’s Work, finding that “who” might very well be impossible. 
 
The GDPR has acknowledged this, by using a conception of ‘’risk’’ which does not define 
‘’harm’’634. As we analysed earlier, guidance by the Article 29 Working Party deliberately 
stays away from defining in what ‘’risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects’’ 
consists, but instead defines types of processing which are inherently ‘’high risk’’. This 
shows a shift away from “harm” and towards a contextual, balance-based approach: if 
the flows of Information are limited by insufficient Guarantees, then the processing is 
high risk. 
 
In conclusion, the harms-based approach to privacy holds some valuable advantages. 
Most importantly, it allows a way to escape the “personal data” binary, as the “harm” is 
not reliant on the data itself but is linked back to the individual through the notion of being 
“harmed”. Nevertheless, the notion of “harm” in the field of privacy is as elusive as privacy 
itself, and even when narrowing the scope down to “informational privacy” the “harm” is 
not clear. As we have seen, this was acknowledged by the Article 29 Working Party, 
which focuses their approach of “risk” not on the possible harm, but on the practice and 
its Information implications. In this way, if any Information controller is bound by 
insufficient Guarantees, informational privacy is not protected, regardless of the ‘’harm’’ 
that might materialize. This has allowed the GDPR to move beyond the difficulties of 
defining the broad range of interests that may be protected by informational privacy, and 
focus instead only on informational privacy itself. 
 
B. The Guarantees: A Multidisciplinary Approach  
 
We have gone over the core theorists who have inspired this thesis, why their works are 
so important, and why we use some of these ideas to build an approach based on 
balancing Information and the Guarantees on that Information. From Lessig, we take the 
framework of the four forces and their interactions, to represent the Guarantees which 
634 Macenaite, M. (2017). The “Riskification” of European Data Protection Law through a two-
fold Shift. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(3), 506-540. 
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make it so that a data controller’s ability to create Information is limited. From Helen 
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity, we take the idea of creating a balance instead of 
using a standard which tries to pin down the inscrutable nature of privacy, and looking at 
each context on its own merits rather than using the “personal data” binary. However, 
instead of using flows of information, we focus on establishing a set balance and looking 
at its state in different contexts based not on the flow of information, but on the 
Information controllers themselves, what Information they hold, and the Guarantees that 
bind them. The flows that led to them controlling that Information are only relevant in that 
they bring with them Social, Legal, or other Guarantees on the controller.  
 
In this section, we will explain how these forces can aid us in mapping out informational 
privacy interests, while showing that the use we aim to make of it, different from the one 
laid out in Lessig’s work, will place the Information creator in the position of “pathetic 
dot”. 
 
In this part, we go over the concept of “Guarantees”, the elements which bind every 
individual, corporation and government and restrict their access to Information and their 
ability to transform, transfer, or use that Information. As we will show, these Guarantees 
take a wide variety of forms, from the fact that it is impossible to read minds to different 
anonymisation techniques. To explain this vital concept and why it constitutes a balance, 
we will first explain the substitution of Lessig’s “modalities” for the word “Guarantees”. 
We will then go over each type of Guarantee and its place in the overall framework. We 
will pay special attention to the non-Legal Guarantees, as their coercive power can be 
very important, in particular Market and Technological Guarantees which have seen the 
greatest upsets over time. As such, we will first discuss Technological Guarantees, 
before moving on to Market Guarantees, Social Guarantees, and only then will we 
discuss Legal Guarantees. 
I. Understanding the term ‘’Guarantees’’  
 
The first matter to address is the use of the term “Guarantees” to describe the elements 
which constitute the framework of protection surrounding Information. Lessig’s 
framework talk of “forces”, pressures exerted from various sources on the “pathetic dot”. 
These forces pressure each other as well as the dot, who is swayed one way or the 
other. Guarantees, however, do not sit on both sides or conflict with each other. Instead, 
every element that makes it so that Information cannot be freely obtained, transmitted 
and used for whatever purpose its collector wishes is a Guarantee, while any change 
that makes it easier to create that Information is not an opposite force, but simply the 
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weakening of an existing Guarantee. The ability to record someone with a microphone 
is nothing but the removal of the Guarantee that one’s speech cannot be recorded, which 
had always existed but never been in question, until the appearance of that innovation. 
Understanding the distinction is vital to understanding the framework of Informational 
Guarantees, which is why we will go over what this means for each of the various types 
of Guarantees so that the reader can fully grasp the implication of using “Guarantees”. 
 
The choice to use these Guarantees is motivated by the directing line of this thesis: 
finding a way to treat every technology and change under the same rules. For that, a 
universal core has to be devised which is always true. In this case, the core is the 
complete inexistence of Guarantees - which is only theoretical, as it would require 
omniscience. As such, compared to that state of affairs, the informational privacy 
landscape a hundred years ago and the one today are actually not that different - there 
are still powerful Guarantees in place, but some have been weakened or disappeared. 
In short, the question is not which “attacking” or “defending” forces surround Information, 
but only which Guarantees, how strong they are, and whether the balance is even. 
 
An obvious criticism of comparing Lessig’s four forces as though they have the same 
authority is the fact that one stands out as seeming to have a higher coercive power - 
the Law. If one ignores social norms, they cannot forcibly be put in prison for it. If one 
ignored market forces, they will only find themselves poorer, but still free. This is where 
the word “Guarantees” continues to bring value. As we will show when discussing the 
specific types of Guarantees, the power of a Guarantee does not lie in direct coercive 
power. The word “Guarantee” is to highlight that just because something is a guarantee 
does not mean it is certain. A “force” tends to evoke the image of sustained, constant 
pressure. A “guarantee”, on the other hand, is just as real but can also happen to fail. 
Trusting in a friend that they will not reveal your secret is a Guarantee; you trust they will 
keep your confidence, but cannot know that they will for sure or be able to have a hard 
remedy such as legal action if they do not. This follows the recurring theme of moving 
from a binary approach to one which follows the same kind of idea as the one hinted at 
with the “identifiability” requirement: the “means likely to be used”. No Guarantee is 
perfect and no Guarantee can provide protection with 100% certainty. Instead, a 
Guarantee only has to make it “reasonably likely” that it will be successful in doing what 
it promises to do. And that distinction allows for a much greater umbrella of practices and 
tools, which is why using the term “Guarantees” instead of “forces” is valuable. 
 
With the meaning of “Guarantees” in mind, we will now go over each type of Guarantee 
and their implications. 
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 II. Technological Guarantees  
 
In order to understand what we mean by Technological Guarantees, it is vital to imagine 
a hypothetical world where there would be no such Guarantees whatsoever. If there were 
no Legal Guarantees, then individuals would see no protection for their data coming from 
the State. If there were no Social Guarantees, there would be nothing to stop those who 
know one’s secrets from sharing them at their will. Without Market Guarantees, those 
interested in gathering one’s data would be able to deploy all the available resources to 
do so. All of these are impossible scenarios and each of them would prove to be almost 
impossible to deal with. However they are still one level under what would happen without 
Technological Guarantees. 
 
Technological Guarantees are all the ways in which Information is difficult or otherwise 
impossible to create, whether it is by limiting what data can be collected, whether it can 
be processed, stored, mined, accessed and transferred. As an example, most browsers 
have an “incognito mode” which limits what data is stored on one’s computer or given to 
websites one visits, and this constitutes a Technological Guarantees] - less data is 
gathered which means less Information is produced.  
 
However, another Technological Guarantee is the fact that it is impossible to read minds. 
That might seem obvious, but 100 years ago it was impossible to track someone through 
a gadget in their pocket; the technology simply did not exist635. As long as the technology 
to do so does not exist, then one’s thoughts remain entirely private information. All 
throughout history ways of finding out what people are thinking have been attempted due 
to the value of that information - from lie detection636 to behavioural prediction637, the field 
of “thought identification”, as it is called, is a strange field often on the fringe of pseudo-
science. Nevertheless, there is no reliable way to read minds, but if there were it would 
create immensely valuable Information. There is a deceptively high amount of 
Information which similarly cannot be created because the technology is not there. 
Dreams, emotions, conversations away from microphones, actions away from cameras, 
635 Koops (n.57) 
636 Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2008). A new theoretical perspective on deception detection: 
On the psychology of instrumental mind-reading. Psychology, Crime & Law, 14(3), 189-200. 
637 Baumann, C., Burton, S., Elliott, G., & Kehr, H. M. (2007). Prediction of attitude and 
behavioural intentions in retail banking. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 25(2), 102-116. 
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and so on. Despite technology seemingly being ubiquitous, there are still many limits to 
what can be achieved using it. 
 
The inability to even to obtain the data is an important Technological Guarantee, and 
taking this “barriers to omniscience” approach allows us to understand the 
Information/Guarantees Balance better. When a new technology appears that allows for 
collection of data previously uncollectable, it is nothing but a change in the balance of 
Guarantees: a Technological Guarantee that existed previously (the inability to collect 
the data) has disappeared, which has made the balance uneven and needs to be 
corrected, as Warren and Brandeis did in reaction to gossip columns and instant 
photography.  
 
The example of Warren and Brandeis leads us to the next point in terms of Technological 
Guarantees, which regards the steps following data collection. In the same way that data 
which cannot be collected has no value, data which cannot be stored, transferred or 
processed is similarly useless. For example, human memory is a “data storage device” 
– albeit a biological one. But because the “storage” is imperfect and limited, there are 
many types of data that we can “collect” (through sight, smell, or other senses) but cannot 
store in a meaningful fashion. The most obvious example is crimes with no witnesses 
but the victim - the data is there and exists in the minds of both the criminal and the 
victim, but cannot be stored, transferred, processed, or accessed by any realistic means. 
 
Thus, the fact that we cannot (or rather, could not) store and process various kinds of 
data means that little or no Information can be extracted from it, which constitutes a 
Technological Guarantee in and of itself. When looking at the history of the Balance 
throughout time, this perspective allows for a well-aligned view of the Guarantees 
involved. The development of new data-gathering technologies is not an outside force 
requiring Guarantees to control it. Instead, it is the disappearance of existing Guarantees 
and the subsequent need for new Guarantees to appear or existing ones to be reinforced. 
That is what happened with Warren and Brandeis, and what happened with the events 
which led to the development of the first data protection legislation efforts. In the same 
way, any barriers created to limit once again the capabilities of data gathering638 (such 
638 de Koning Gans, G., Hoepman, J. H., & Garcia, F. D. (2008, September). A practical attack 
on the MIFARE Classic. In International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced 
Applications (pp. 267-282). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
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as tools to help users protect or manage their privacy) are also new, man made 
Technological Guarantees639. 
 
III. Market Guarantees  
 
So far we have shown that the absence of a technology is a Technological Guarantee in 
itself. But many technologies now exist to record various types of data, from our 
heartbeats to our sleep patterns. So if that is the case, why is it that this data is not 
available and gathered by every individual, corporation and state? Setting aside for a 
moment the intervention of the Law and Social norms which limit various ways in which 
data can be gathered and Information created, a major intervening factor are the Market 
Guarantees and how they interact with Technological Guarantees. 
 
The crux of this argument comes from the requirements for identification in the GDPR, 
which takes into account “the means likely the be used” for identification by the data 
controller or processor640. We have shown when discussing anonymisation that with 
enough time and effort, any anonymisation can be broken. Does that mean that 
anonymisation is pointless? No, in fact it is a very powerful tool and is widely used and 
relied upon in a variety of fields and does so well. This is where the “means likely to be 
used” test comes in. Even though the technological means exist to penetrate 
anonymisation, not everyone has the resources to do so. Moreover, not everyone with 
these resources to do either because the benefit of doing so might not be worth the 
expense. Finally, deploying data gathering tools is an expense as well, which means it 
also might not be worth it. To explain what we mean we will go through a few examples. 
 
● A corner shop gathers data on its customers’ purchases. That data could be used 
to create Information pertaining to the customers’ personal lives, such as their 
religion (if they buy halal products for example) or their family life (such as buying 
child diapers) but attempting to ascertain for sure if those assumptions are correct 
is not particularly useful for that local shop. As long as the tastes and preferences 
of the individual are established, looking deeper into their personal life is an 
unnecessary expense. As such, no reasonable business would go to those 
639 Notario, N., Crespo, A., Martín, Y. S., Del Alamo, J. M., Le Métayer, D., Antignac, T., ... & 
Wright, D. (2015, May). PRIPARE: integrating privacy best practices into a privacy engineering 
methodology. In Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2015 IEEE (pp. 151-158). IEEE. 
640 GDPR, Recital 26 
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lengths, and so the “means likely to be used” by that supermarket are limited by 
that fact. 
● A social media platform records all messages between individuals. It could 
attempt to find out how many individuals lie to each other by comparing their 
messages and other data that might be gathered. Nevertheless, that would have 
almost no value to the social media platform itself, so it is not likely to use any 
means to obtain that data. 
● A jealous co-worker wants to find dirt on their high-achieving colleague to mar 
their chances at a promotion. However, they cannot afford a private investigator 
to spy for them. The “means likely to be used” for their investigation is limited by 
their financial means, and so the Market Guarantee of that data being too 
expensive to gather remains. 
● A voice-activated home assistant device collects data to check whether its 
activation phrase is spoken and what the commands of the individual are. While 
it could be always-on, collecting data from conversations and spying on private 
moments, that would mean consuming a tremendous amount of bandwidth, 
which could have prohibitive costs. In this case, the cost of bandwidth constitutes 
a Market Guarantee. 
 
Through these examples, one can see the effect that Market Guarantees have. On the 
one hand, they might seem weaker or less binding than Legal Guarantees. On the other, 
them and their interactions with the limitations of Technological Guarantees are what has 
shaped much of our current environment, and every Legal Guarantee developed to 
protect informational privacy has done so in response to what is essentially a change in 
the “means reasonably likely to be used” by various entities.  
 
These Guarantees actually constitute most of the informational privacy environment. 
There is no law for the theft of large buildings, because there exist no means to steal 
such a building. In the same way, before the 1960s, there was no law for the collection 
of huge amounts of personal data, because there existed no means to do so. The change 
we are seeing now is that the law was designed for an environment where these 
Guarantees seemed set in stone, and did not account for their erosion, or at least not 
enough to keep up with unexpected developments. The main reason behind working on 
this framework of Informational Guarantees is to provide a way to find the core forces 
creating this balance, allowing us to find where the change in Guarantees is and what 
Guarantees are needed to rectify it. 
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We have now gone over the two major types of Guarantees which dictate the 
environment in which these rules operate. Understanding the importance of Market and 
Technological Guarantees is vital to understanding why any change in these Guarantees 
is so impactful. This goes back to our previous discussion on the “opacity/transparency” 
conception of privacy, and reinforces the idea that socio-legal rules on privacy only 
appear in response to new types of transparency. With that in mind, we will now go over 
Social Guarantees, and their highly-contextual place. 
 
 
IV. Social Guarantees  
1. Social Guarantees in Society 
 
Social Guarantees are often the most fleeting of Guarantees, as a Social Guarantee 
exists where a party is both able and legally allowed to reveal, discover, or transfer 
Information, but chooses not to do so. One might equate it to “trust”, which covers the 
most common uses of the Social Guarantees, but they go beyond that.  
 
A simple example is trust between friends. There is no law for friends not to reveal 
embarrassing or private facts about each other to strangers, and there is no true way of 
making sure that your secrets are not being shared. Social contexts are complicated and 
follow many different norms - as highlighted in Helen Nissenbaum’s work on contextual 
integrity which looks at the anatomy of these various flows of information641. Social 
Guarantees can come from duty (such as a priest towards confessors), love (such as a 
couple), trust (between friends), or simple respect (between coworkers). They might 
seem to have little binding force, but in our day-to-day lives we expect these Guarantees, 
not the Law, to ensure our privacy. 
 
The reason why these Guarantees and their overall implications have taken a backseat 
in this thesis (unlike the Legal, Market and Technological Guarantees which have been 
examined in the first half of this thesis) is because the upsets that have shaken the world 
of privacy have not affected every context equally. While individual/business, 
individual/government and government/business relationships have changed 
dramatically, individual/individual relationships remain largely the same.  
 
641 Nissenbaum (n.102) 
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Social Guarantees are more complicated when it comes to companies and governments. 
Companies are primarily driven by profit and have little social obligations towards 
individuals. This is only becoming more of an issue when taking into account the 
“Sculptor’s Work” we discussed earlier as well as the fact that data can be transferred to 
a long chain of controllers over the course of its life. As these factors get more prevalent, 
social ties become increasingly weaker, to the point that any Social Guarantee 
disappears. Nevertheless, as we will show, even though traditional individual/business 
relationships have few Social Guarantees, such Guarantees can appear from other 
sources. 
 
2. Social Guarantees on the Internet  
 
Despite the fact that businesses would seem to be immune to most Social Guarantees - 
as they have very little social obligations towards their customers - there is still some 
influence in the form of public outrage. Indeed, a data controller could potentially create 
Information on individuals in all legality, but which might be considered immoral or 
abusive, leading to backlash. Examples abound for social media, from Facebook 
performing research into targeting emotionally vulnerable teenagers642 or manipulating 
news feeds in order to influence the emotions of its users643, or Twitter selling the public 
tweets of millions of users for marketers and researchers to mine data644. These 
examples can be compounded with the Snowden revelations645, in which it was shown 
that under the PRISM program, the United States government had been secretly 
gathering data from large Internet companies646. 
 
Does public outrage matter? Well, coming to mind is the idea that bad publicity would 
make the business lose customers, or motivate customers to increase their own privacy 
settings. The exposition of these practices being akin to the removal of a Social 
642 Whigham, N., Leaked document reveals Facebook conducted research to target emotionally 
vulnerable and insecure youth. News.com.au, 1/5/2017, available at 
http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/leaked-document-reveals-facebook-
conducted-research-to-target-emotionally-vulnerable-and-insecure-youth/news-
story/d256f850be6b1c8a21aec6e32dae16fd 
643 Booth, R., Facebook reveals news feed experiment to control emotions, 30/6/2014, The 
Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/29/facebook-users-
emotions-news-feeds 
644 Mejova, Y., Macy, M. W., Weber, I. (2015), Twitter: A Digital Socioscope, Cambridge 
University Press 
645 Beckett, L. (2017), Big Data Brokers: They Know Everything About You and Sell it to the 
Highest Bidder, Gizmodo, 18 March 2013, available at: http://gizmodo.com/5991070/big-data-
brokers-they-know-everything-about-you-and-sell-it-to-the-highest-bidder 
646 Preibusch, Sören. Privacy behaviors after Snowden. Communications of the ACM 58.5 
(2015): 48-55. 
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Guarantee (there is a loss of the Guarantee that these practices are too immoral for 
businesses to consider), another Guarantee has to fill in the gap, either a Market one 
(the loss of customers) or a Technological one (increased measures taken by 
individuals), and the Balance would remain even. But is that actually the case? 
 
Research by Sören Preibusch looked into privacy-preserving behaviours after the 
Snowden revelations. It showed that mistrust by German Internet users of government 
and corporate data processing increased by 9% between 2011 and 2013647, but with 
only a minority showing they actually changed how they managed their personal data648. 
Meanwhile, Google Trends showed that searches that might arouse the suspicions of 
the US Government declined in various countries649. Nevertheless, the researcher 
agreed that measuring this data is difficult. Through studying multiple patterns - privacy 
settings in browsers, new web pages created around the topic of government 
surveillance, and measuring visits to privacy-related pages, they showed that though 
privacy-aware behavior increased in the 30 weeks after PRISM was revealed, it had then 
faded. Overall, the Snowden revelations did not seem to have the corresponding 
increase of Guarantees hoped for by privacy campaigners.  
 
In the grander scheme of things there is still a move from Facebook towards other, more 
privacy-preserving services. This is due to a variety of factors, including individuals not 
wanting to be connected on social media with their parents650 or being annoyed by 
Facebook’s features, with half of current Facebook users saying they’d considered 
leaving the website651. Nevertheless, across the major factors behind leaving Facebook, 
a Pew Research Center survey identified privacy concerns as the main issue for 4% of 
users considering quitting Facebook652. 
 
Still, despite these relatively small numbers, the last few years have seen some strong 
initiatives from various social media platforms to improve their privacy settings and user 
control. Facebook has made wide-ranging attempts to create and promote user-friendly 
647 BITKOM (Federal Association for Information Technology). (2013),  Internetnutzer werden 
misstrauisch, 
648 Dierig, C., Fuest, B., Kaiser, T., and Wisdorff, F. (2014), Die Welt ; 
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article126882276/Deutsche-unterschaetzen-den-Wert-
persoenlicher-Daten.html 
649 Marthews, A. and Tucker, C. (2014), Government Surveillance and Internet Search 
Behavior. SSRN Working Paper, Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc., Rochester, NY.  
650 Lang, N. (2015), Why teens are leaving Facebook: It’s ‘meaningless’, Washington Post 
651 Stieger, S., Burger, C., Bohn, M., & Voracek, M. (2013). Who commits virtual identity 
suicide? Differences in privacy concerns, internet addiction, and personality between Facebook 
users and quitters. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 16(9), 629-634. 
652 Rainie, L., Smith, A., & Duggan, M. (2013). Coming and going on Facebook. Pew Research 
Center’s Internet and American Life Project. 
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privacy controls for users653, even as recently as 2017654. Meanwhile, WhatsApp is 
offering full end-to-end encryption for its messages, documents and calls for its hundreds 
of millions of users to promote their privacy655, while Facebook and Instagram, following 
news that police gained access to their platforms to track protesters, updated their rules 
so that developers could no longer “use data obtained from us to provide tools that are 
used for surveillance”656. 
 
But an even more powerful example is the fact that certain brands are actually trying not 
simply to reassure users through giving them new Technological Guarantees, but 
actually working towards creating an entirely new type of rapport, a “social contract”, with 
their users to build this “trust” element which would otherwise seem to be absent in the 
relationships between consumers and the amoral nature of businesses657. This very 
much shows the way in which the disappearance of a Guarantee finds its own need for 
replacements eventually. 
 
These examples seem to be responding not just to data protection legislation, but to 
social outrage and pressure by users. In the last example, especially, the increased 
Technological Guarantees are a direct response to the public outrage over government 
surveillance. There is difficulty in tracking exactly to what extend the attitudes to privacy 
and demand for privacy by users are pushing forward the development of other 
Guarantees, but there is no doubt they have had an impact. 
 
The impact of Social Guarantees despite the absence of traditional social obligations 
thanks to social indignation is a useful tool on the side of the data subjects. Nevertheless, 
such indignation will only be a relevant force as long as these types of Information 
creation do not become the norm.  
 
653 Stern, J., Facebook's New Privacy Controls Roll Out to All U.S. Users, ABC News, 
20/12/2012 
654 Newcomb, A. Facebook’s New Tools are Designed to Put Privacy in Your Pocket, NBC 
News, 26/1/2017, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-s-new-tools-
are-designed-put-privacy-your-pocket-n712246 
655 Groome, I. What is WhatsApp encryption?, Metro News UK, 27/3/2017, available at 
http://metro.co.uk/2017/03/27/what-is-whatsapp-encryption-6535899/  
656 Levin, S.  Facebook and Instagram ban developers from using data for surveillance, The 
Guardian, 13/3/2017 
657 Hosea, M. Why brands are creating ‘social contracts’ to build trust around data use, 
Marketing Week, 4 October 2016, available on 
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/10/04/why-brands-are-creating-social-contracts-to-build-
trust-around-data-use/#content, accessed on 16/05/2017 
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3. Social Guarantees and Subjectivity  
 
The value of informational privacy as a social good is an important Social Guarantee, 
and its disappearance would create a strong imbalance. It is important to remember 
when it comes to the shifting of Social norms that this thesis takes a certain point in time 
as the even balance, and works under the hypothesis that having an even balance is 
objectively a good thing. If society cared not at all for privacy and threw out all 
Guarantees completely, there would be nothing wrong in subjective terms, but the 
Information/Guarantees Balance would be uneven. 
 
As we have seen, as long as wide-ranging surveillance is not “normal”, there will be the 
Social Guarantee of outrage and pressure on services to adopt policies which match the 
privacy preferences of the general public. However, this “normality” of privacy is itself in 
flux. Like every value, privacy is subjective and affected by a number of currents and 
transformations. As the new generations are formed with social media in their day-to-day 
lives, there are concerns that the way they define their generational identity is different 
from previous ones658. Perception of the value of social media is changing, becoming so 
central that losing privacy to continue using it becomes a logical tradeoff659. Meanwhile, 
social media presents its own version of privacy, being able to connect and talk and 
relate to others in a bespoke context, chosen, and separate from one’s home life and the 
gaze of parents and teachers. This makes online activity not merely more “public” than 
offline activity, but also the creator of different Information, under different Guarantees. 
Many on the Internet would not care if a stranger had Information on them, but would 
care if those they know had. As such, the ability to have a separate online life has value 
and is not necessarily a problem in terms of the Information/Guarantees Balance. 
 
An important consideration is the question of whether dissociating the online and offline 
contexts is valuable in the first place. On the anonymity side of the discussion are figures 
and groups stemming primarily from the tech community, from hackers to privacy 
advocates. On the other side stand those who believe there should be no divide between 
the online and offline contexts and that one person has one identity, with Facebook as 
one of its major proponents660. Many States follow the idea of separating online and 
658 Martos, C. M. (2008). The Transformation of Intimacy and Privacy through Social Networking 
Sites. Institute Of Communications Studies, University Of Leeds, Regulation & Governance, 2, 
425-444. 
659 Tene, O., & Polonetsky, J. (2013). A theory of creepy: technology, privacy and shifting social 
norms. Yale JL & Tech., 16, 59. 
660 Zhao, S., Grasmuck, S., & Martin, J. (2008). Identity construction on Facebook: Digital 
empowerment in anchored relationships. Computers in human behavior, 24(5), 1816-1836. 
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offline activity, as can be seen with the expansion of surveillance powers by various state 
such as the US with its Patriot Act661 or the UK with its Investigatory Powers Bill662.  
 
A change in the social guarantee that informational privacy, regardless of whose privacy, 
has value and should be controlled by the individual, would have rippling effects on the 
rest of the Guarantees, especially Legal Guarantees, as the Law reflects the social 
norms of society. There is great debate as to the value of privacy and informational 
privacy and as to whether individuals actually care about their privacy or not. This debate 
is outside of the scope of this thesis, which instead continues to work under the 
assumption that informational privacy does have an important value, highlighted by the 
myriad efforts to create new Guarantees or reinforce existing ones whenever one 
disappears. Ethical behaviors are rewarded by consumer loyalty, which in itself is a 
Market Guarantee (if there is more profit to be made through establishing trust with 
consumers, then this ethical approach will be more common)663. In this way, though 
businesses remain amoral, they adopt Social Guarantees because they influence the 
Market Guarantees that truly motivate them. 
 
 
As we can see, despite the fact that Social Guarantees are very subjective, influenced 
by hard-to-predict trends and outrages, dependent on a public with various amounts of 
technological literacy and a fickle attention span, they still have an important place and 
need to be taken into account. In particular, their power in relationships between 
individuals and their governments and between each other still have a huge importance, 
though it tends to be left by the wayside as it is not where the major upheavals in 
Guarantees are found: secrets between friends remain secrets no matter what year it is, 
and the Balance is (mostly) maintained. 
 
V. Legal Guarantees  
 
We have approached each type of Guarantee in turn. In this way, we have shown how 
despite what it might seem, the Guarantees are primarily made up of the existing social, 
661 Osher, S. Privacy, Computers and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn't Dead, But 
No One Will Insure It. Fla. L. Rev. 54 (2002): 521. 
662 Akdeniz, Y., Taylor, N., & Walker, C. (2001). Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(1): Bigbrother. gov. uk: State surveillance in the age of information and rights,[2001]. Criminal 
Law Review, 73-90. 
663 McMurrian, R., & Washburn, J. H. (2008). Branding: a social contract between a business 
and its customer. In Contemporary Thoughts on Corporate Branding and Corporate Identity 
Management (pp. 5-22). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
188 
 
                                               
economic, and technological environment, with Law only filling the gaps where 
Guarantees are imbalanced. However, as we have seen, Guarantees are becoming 
increasingly weaker, which increases the role of Legal Guarantees to restore the 
balance. The way in which Law is a control mechanism seems pretty clear, however the 
unique way in which Law is a multi-dimensional tool will be explored to show how it has 
the best ability to deal with specific and targeted issues. 
 
We have gone over how restricting access to Information is a vital tool in ensuring 
informational privacy. For this, the Balance is effective at pointing out which data 
controllers obtain Information they did not have before, and which Guarantees were 
changed to lead to that situation. However, another factor in ensuring informational 
privacy is whether that Information is used. An example comes from a government’s 
obtaining of massive amounts of data under the justification of national safety. With that 
data, powerful Information could be created, used for example to track protestors or 
discriminate against groups which hold certain characteristics or ideas. What limits 
informational privacy is that the legitimate justification for the government holding such 
data is strong: the government does need to protect its citizens, and does have a 
responsibility to deploy tools to further that goal. As such, Guarantees are naturally 
weakening as governments’ ability to gather data improves, while any strengthening of 
Guarantees hits the obstacle of national security. This is a limitation of Legal Guarantees: 
Legal Guarantees have to balance different interests. 
 
Protecting informational privacy means limiting either Information from being obtained, 
or the use of that Information to make decisions664. We will go over a few examples to 
show how Legal Guarantees can create various types of other Guarantees, or simply act 
as Guarantees in their own right: 
 
● Technological Guarantee: A legally-mandated transparency tool allows users to 
know what profiles are constructed by the data controller and what products are 
recommended to them based on these profiles. Though the Information to create 
and use the profile is already held by the data controller, the Social Guarantee of 
being perceived as protecting and caring towards users makes it less likely that 
these uses will violate the informational privacy. 
● Market Guarantee: Detailed profiles are created that snoop into very personal 
topics. They cost a lot of create due to legislation on data minimization and 
664 Danezis, G., Domingo-Ferrer, J., Hansen, M., Hoepman, J. H., Metayer, D. L., Tirtea, R., & 
Schiffner, S. (2015). Privacy and Data Protection by Design-from policy to engineering. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1501.03726. 
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consent, but are worth little as buyers are interested in targeting advertising and 
would rather get more data that is more relevant, even if less revealing. This lack 
of demand means that the profiles remain unused. 
● Social Guarantee: The government uses data it obtained through intelligence 
services to create profiles on journalists to analyze those who are likely to be 
critical of the government. Thank to the (legally-enforced) freedom of the press, 
citizens are outraged and the program is cancelled. This is comparable to 
France’s “SAFARI” system which tracked individuals using data without informing 
them, which led to a wide public backlash once it was revealed665. 
● Legal Guarantee - Privacy Law: A government employee is able to use data-
gathering tools implemented by intelligence services to spy on their spouse (a 
practice so problematic it was given a name due to its use in the NSA - 
“LOVEINT”666). As stalking is an offense against the right to privacy, the 
employee is prosecuted, leading others to be more wary of their usage of the 
data. 
● Legal Guarantee - Criminal Law: An employee at a discreet dating service finds 
out a client is using it to cheat on their spouse and considers blackmailing the 
client using that Information. As blackmail is illegal, the employee is too afraid to 
go through with this plan. 
 
These are a few examples as to how to restrict usage and collection of Information using 
Legal Guarantees. They are noticeably more certain than previous Guarantees which 
restrict access to Information, as they can act as powerful deterrents. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Using the Guarantees as a measure for protecting informational privacy allows for a 
multidisciplinary approach, taking into account any factors which become relevant. Using 
Lawrence Lessig’s taxonomy shows how those who control Information only act in ways 
which are dictated by the Guarantees, which emphasises how every type of Guarantee 
has an important impact.  
665 Burkert (n.4) 
666 Peterson, A. LOVEINT: When NSA officers use their spying power on love interests, 
Washington Post, August 24, 2013, accessed 23/5/2017 at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/08/24/loveint-when-nsa-officers-use-
their-spying-power-on-love-interests/?utm_term=.6f11788480b8 
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 Companies obtaining and sharing large amounts of personal data in a way that might 
lead to a large data breach or misuse of data would not do so if Market Guarantees made 
it unprofitable, if Social Guarantees made it unacceptable, if Legal Guarantees made it 
illegal, or if Technological Guarantees made it impossible.  
 
In the same way, a company which does minimal, careful data processing might consider 
starting invasive Big Data processing activities if a lack of Market Guarantees makes it 
profitable, a lack of Social Guarantees makes it acceptable, a lack of Legal Guarantees 
makes it legal, or a lack of Technological Guarantees makes it possible. 
 
In our last Chapter, we will establish how to find where the balance of Guarantees is 
equal and informational privacy is protected. We will also develop the ‘’Informational 
Privacy Toolbox’’: how the different Guarantees have been used, and can be used, to 
protect informational privacy despite the transformations brought about by Big Data. To 
this end, we will also study the various transformations that have taken place in the field 
of informational privacy, what Guarantees have been attempted to fix them, and how 
successful they have been, up to and including the GDPR itself. 
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 Chapter 6. The Information/Guarantees Balance 
 
In the last Chapter, we have gone over the essential elements of the “Guarantees”: 
various elements which work together to create the context in which Information is 
created, transferred, processed, and used. As we have shown, when the Guarantees 
are balanced, privacy is protected. Because of the “Sculptor’s Work” we discussed earlier 
in this thesis, the Guarantees change step by step based on who is holding the 
Information and how the Information was transformed.  
 
The advantage of the Balance comes from the fact that one Guarantee of any type can 
technically replace any other, which allows for a plurality of solutions to the rising 
transformations surrounding informational privacy. But this thesis has a specific aim: to 
use the Balance to provide solutions for the changes in informational privacy. As we have 
shown, the biggest limitation in this apparatus comes from the “identified” requirement 
which does not account for the “Sculptor’s Work” or for the differences between “data” 
and “Information”, as well as the ‘’public/private’’ distinctions in privacy law. Another 
limitation is the focus of data protection on ‘’control’’ over personal information, despite 
having evidenced that meaningful ‘’control’’ can be difficult or impossible to obtain. These 
core issues are unable to deal with the age of Big Data, though there are hints of a more 
flexible approach being considered, as well as existing provisions on the “means likely 
to be used” for identification opening the way for such approaches. In this part, we bring 
together the strands developed over the course of this thesis - the core value of 
Informational Privacy as understood in the European conception, the limitations of the 
existing European regulation, the “Sculptor’s Work” and its implications, and the ever-
present Guarantees underlying the entire informational privacy environment. We study 
how they interplay, and how solving the crisis of informational privacy can be achieved 
by balancing the Guarantees.  
 
The balancing of the Guarantees itself will be approached with a certain goal in mind. 
The aim of this thesis is to lay out a set of tools - something we call the “Privacy Toolbox” 
- with which to influence the various Guarantees to rectify the Balance. These tools can 
be used by various entities - individuals, governments, companies - to influence the 
Guarantees. Detailing the tools for every type of entity would be the work of an entire 
book. Instead, the goal of this thesis is to lay out what actual effect on Information comes 
from various Legal Guarantees, and how to influence the other types of Guarantees 
192 
 
using Legal Guarantees, in the same way that tax legislation on alcohol or tobacco 
products are legal tools which create Market Guarantees. We will also devote some work 
on tools for individuals to protect their own privacy preferences, but will limit it to tools 
that can be provided, promoted, or incentivised by regulatory tools. 
 
We will start our analysis of a practical Balance by attempting to find the default state of 
the Balance - a time and context where the Guarantees were even, allowing a “default” 
state from which the current situation can be assessed. This will be an example of an 
even Balance - it is likely that depending on the type of Information controller, the country, 
the industry, or a number of other factors a different time can be found for an ‘’even 
Balance’’, but this analysis will both show how we propose to establish an even Balance, 
and give a general view of where the Balance was relatively even. 
 
A. Defining an Even Balance: A Historical Analysis  
 
If the right to informational privacy depends on a balance between Information and the 
Guarantees, it is important to find what an even balance looks like. We have mentioned 
how the existing crisis in data protection comes from the fact that the Information-creating 
forces have grown at a speed that has not been met by a fast-enough rise in Legal 
Guarantees, but how imbalanced are these forces? 
 
In order to establish what should constitute the proper equilibrium of forces, there needs 
to be a standard to hold as the “starting point”, a point where the Guarantees and the 
Information are properly balanced. The difficulty of course is that there is no clear single 
point where the Balance was unmoving for a long enough time that might establish a 
clear balance, at least not recently. The Guarantees and Information constantly shift, 
with increasing speed, and identifying a status quo is challenging.  
 
We have established in Chapter 1 that a rise in Information that starts to get out of control 
is generally met with a rise of legal Guarantees, such as instant photography creating 
motivation for Warren and Brandeis to write their essay “the Right to Privacy”. We would 
argue that because of this dynamic, and its consistency, absence of imbalance can be 
found by the absence of the dynamic. In other words, if there was a time when there was 
no effort to put forward new Guarantees, that means the balance was even. In addition, 
as we are looking into the context of European law, only such a balance in the European 
context would be relevant. Lessons from the US or other legal systems are useful, but 
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the balance of forces is very different in the US than it is in the EU - we have gone over 
the differences in privacy conceptions and data protection regulation, but additionally the 
social context, market, and even the architecture are very different. As such, the basic 
balance has to be contextual by nature. 
 
As such, in order to find the closest thing to an even balance to base the assessment of 
the current situation on, the goal is to identify the most recent time the legal Guarantees 
remained unchanged for a significant period of time, in the European context. 
 
Going back to our Chapter 2 study of the history of EU Data Protection regulation, the 
first data protection studies were started in the later 1960s, with the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data667 being signed in 1981. This Convention was a relatively weak 
instrument, explicitly mentioning the right to privacy; its Article 1 stating that “The purpose 
of this Convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever 
his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in 
particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data 
relating to him”668. It had already started to use the “identifiability” criteria (showing that 
the criteria is almost 40 years old, a possible factor for its increasing obsoleteness). After 
the Convention came a number of increasingly-stronger provisions, always responding 
to a rising problem. However, as we have shown with criticism of the Data Protection 
Directive and General Data Protection Regulation, these developments failed to re-
establish the balance. 
 
Meanwhile, looking at the evolution in that period, not of data protection but of privacy 
law, an interesting observation can be made. Instead of any speedy development to deal 
with new ways of infringing on privacy, privacy law itself actually moved very little669. In 
fact, most privacy cases brought to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 
which produced significant jurisprudence, dealt with issues related to data protection670, 
with some issues related to the reasonable expectation of privacy and government 
intrusion. The fact that outside of data protection there has been comparatively limited 
development of privacy legislation, under our hypothesis, is a sign that the balance has 
667 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. TS. No. 108 
668 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Article 1 
669 Kokott, J., and Sobotta, C.. The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR. International Data Privacy Law 3.4 (2013): 222-228. 
670 Ibid 
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shifted little in these areas, and only in the area of informational privacy - which overlaps 
with data protection - has there been a massively significant shift. 
 
This is interesting because if the modern privacy issues brought about by technology can 
be categorised almost entirely inside the purview of informational privacy, then this 
means that this area is where the imbalance in the “Information/Guarantees Balance” 
has appeared. It would mean that tracing the most recent point of an even balance would 
be when informational privacy concerns started to appear. 
 
We have mentioned in our section on the patterns of privacy throughout history in 
Chapter 1 that using data to make decisions has always existed. Information has always 
been created through data. The question is not when that process started, but when it 
started to expand and create an imbalance against the other Guarantees that caused a 
Legal Guarantee response. 
 
An additional challenge in Europe is that the context is different from country to country. 
Nevertheless, the ECHR and other EU conventions have allowed for a (relative) 
alignment of the conceptions of privacy in the various European legal systems, and if 
anything the number of countries only gives us more evidence as to where various 
initiatives have gained traction. Of course, with these conceptions, the most recent even 
balance will change from Member State to Member State (as the Guarantees will change 
between them and as such so will the point at which data protection becomes 
necessary). Nevertheless, we will be looking at the general European context, which will 
lead to a less precise answer, but still give an understanding of the point at which new 
provisions in the protection of informational privacy (which took the form of data 
protection) became necessary in the EU. 
 
The very first true data protection law in Europe was passed by Germany in 1970. The 
Hesse Data Protection Act671 was a law attempting to standardise local uses of these 
new computing technologies, but not a true national law672. The fear of local communities 
was the centralization of power through the means of these new technologies. Concerns 
over the power of the state and the confidentiality of personal information became 
prominent enough to set the law into motion. The Legal Guarantees it put into place by 
that law were quite weak - basic access and correction rights and possible actions for 
671 Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz (The Hesse Data Protection Act), Gesetz und 
Verordungsblatt I(1970), 625. 
672 Burkert (n.4) 
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unlawful processing - but were still a breakthrough at the time673. This is also an 
interesting perspective when thinking of who the law was targeting: the central 
government, and not companies or individuals, because it was the government which 
first had the means to carry out this kind of collection. A Technological and Market 
Guarantee - the central government not having the ability to do that processing - 
disappeared, leading to the need for a law dealing specifically with that imbalance without 
targeting companies. 
 
It was Sweden that passed the first true national-level data protection legislation, which 
was because of its unique situation - Sweden had for decades a personal identification 
number system, ahead of other countries. The rise of computerised filing systems, 
combined with that existing system, created too problematic a combination and led to 
Sweden’s early data protection law674.  
 
The French data protection laws were, similarly, motivated by the development of a 
government-led digital filing system, in this case the Interior Ministry’s “SAFARI” system 
(named after an activity in which individual animals in the wild are tracked and hunted, 
which makes, if anything, for an ominous name)675. As in Sweden, this project relied on 
an existing database of citizen data. More ominously, the project was kept secret until it 
was exposed by an article in Le Monde in 1974, whose writer later became the first 
president of the French Data Protection Authority, the CNIL (Commission nationale de 
l'informatique et des libertés). Meanwhile, the French administration had started a similar 
program to track the personal information of children from their birth throughout their 
schooling to keep track of their medical data. The discovery of these projects caused the 
rapid development of the French data protection bill, which went into effect in 1980, giving 
the CNIL great powers676. 
 
Finally, other countries such as the UK only introduced such legislation when trading of 
data with countries that already had them became problematic - which led eventually to 
harmonisation efforts including the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, the Data Protection Directive, and 
most recently the General Data Protection Regulation.  
 
673 Ibid 
674 Ibid 
675 Ibid 
676 Ibid 
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This shows an interesting pattern - the countries that were first to create data protection 
regulation did so not just because a new type of technology - large-scale computing 
databases - became available, but because that technology combined with an existing 
architecture that could make use of it to create very powerful Information. This shows the 
interplay between factors that might be unexpected (the fact that Sweden and France 
happened to implement the data-gathering programs that rendered their later projects 
possible) which creates an imbalance. 
 
Where does that leave us in deciding the “point of balance”? We would argue that we 
can go back to the flexible “means likely to be used” test. In this case, the goal is finding 
the point at which the means likely to be used by data controllers in order to create 
Information become imbalanced. As such, even if the various Member States that only 
added data protection legislation later did not actually implement data-collecting systems 
such as those found in France and Sweden, the first time they had the means to do so 
would be the moment when the balance became uneven.  
 
In conclusion, we can track the upsetting of the balance in the EU, and as such the 
“default” state of the Balance of informational privacy to a specific time. That time is when 
the development of computing technologies allowed all governments the means to 
gather disproportionate amounts of data on their citizens (followed later on by 
companies, which had less access to data and fewer resources at their disposal 
compared to governments). That time, as seen by the sudden appearance of data 
protection legislation in EU Member States, is the mid-1970s.  
 
This is relevant because it is not just the Technological Guarantees that changed in this 
period. Social, Market, and even Legal Guarantees beyond the scope of EU law, have 
all changed in unexpected way, and re-establishing a balance will need to take into 
account these changes. 
 
Nevertheless, a task that seems insurmountable can be made much easier by the fact 
that many of these factors are relatively straightforward. The existing Legal Guarantees 
of data protection and privacy law, and their limitations, have already been discussed 
above. The Social Guarantees, as we have mentioned, are relatively weak due to the 
nature of businesses as amoral entities. And the Market Guarantees are the easiest to 
quantify, as a simple currency value can be attached to them. It is mostly the interplay 
between the Technological Guarantees and the consideration of new forms of 
Guarantees to make up for the increased level of Information which will need to be taken 
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into account to re-establish the balance. In other words, how can the Law incentivise 
Information-creation through affecting primarily Market Guarantees? 
 
The Balance is now in place. Its goals, based on the interests of informational privacy, 
are set. Its target, Information, is identified. Its tools, the Guarantees, are laid out. And 
the point at which the Balance is even has been found. Now that the main framework is 
laid out, we will analyse a variety of tools that have been developed to deal with certain 
challenges related to this balance, and explain how we should look to fix the core 
imbalances. 
 
 
 
 
B. The Privacy Toolbox: Guarantees from Different 
Disciplines  
 
There are many tools available, which can be used by companies, governments or 
individuals in order to change the balance - either imbalancing or balancing it. Something 
that is important to note is that in some instances an imbalance - or a breach in the right 
to data protection - will be justified because of other societal interests being considered 
more important. A basic example is public surveillance measures being justified by public 
and national security. The GDPR provides for a variety of such situations in its Article 23, 
including national security, defence, public security, public health and social security677, 
allowed based on the ‘’necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society’’ 
test used in EU law to justify breaches by the State of human rights678. On these 
occasions the balance cannot be even, but using tools to get close is still an objective 
worth pursuing. Nevertheless, this analysis will focus on instances where the right to data 
protection is not limited by another right. This analysis will comprise a combination of 
tools, most of which already exist, including some measures already in the GDPR: as we 
have stated throughout this thesis, despite its faults the GDPR is the best data protection 
instrument developed so far.  
 
677 GDPR, Article 23 
678 Büschel, I., Mehdi, R., Cammilleri, A., Marzouki, Y., & Elger, B. (2014). Protecting human 
health and security in digital Europe: how to deal with the “Privacy Paradox”?. Science and 
engineering ethics, 20(3), 639-658. 
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In short, there are two levels of action which can be undertaken to protect the balance. 
One, is to ensure that controllers do not obtain the Information which gives them the 
power to upset the balance. Two, is to ensure that controllers who have obtained that 
Information, do not use it for any purposes which may unduly impact individuals. In the 
world of Big Data, the first aspect is difficult to maintain. This is why I argue that the 
second is the most important, which is where the various Guarantees come into full 
effect. 
 
Before going over these actions and how existing efforts regarding the various types of 
Guarantees either exist or can be put into place, a mention needs to be made of security, 
and its place in this framework. 
 
Security is recognised as being of paramount importance in the GDPR, being the sixth 
principle of the Regulation679, and is a centerpiece of the ‘’risk-based’’ approach to data 
protection. Security in the GDPR is directly tied to risk, as defined under Article 32: 
“Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, 
scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and 
severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor 
shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of 
security appropriate to the risk.”680. As we studied earlier on in this thesis, ‘’risk’’ is very 
hard to estimate. In the context of the Information/Guarantees balance, however, the 
reason why data has to be kept secure is because once it is lost, and either released to 
the public or obtained by an unknown third party, the Balance is impossible to re-
establish. Social Guarantees no longer apply, because those who obtained the data have 
no social obligation towards individuals. Legal Guarantees no longer apply, because 
finding and binding those individuals with legislative instruments is extremely difficult. 
Cyber-crime convictions rates are very low681. As such, legal instruments are unlikely to 
be a Guarantee against cyber-criminals using that data for whatever purpose they 
choose. Meanwhile, Market Guarantees become unknown, because blackmail and sell-
offs of data become options, while Technological Guarantees also are an unknown, since 
the technological means of those holding the data are similarly unknown. In short, 
security is important because it ensures that only those who are subjected to quantifiable 
Guarantees hold Information. 
 
679 GDPR, Article 5 
680 GDPR, Article 32 
681 Smith, R., Grabosky, P., & Urbas, G. (2004). Cyber criminals on trial. Criminal Justice 
Matters, 58(1), 22-23. 
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In order to limit the creation of Information, there are two core options. One is ensuring 
that there is not enough data to create it. The other is to create fake or inaccurate or 
incomplete data, in order to devalue the Information created from it. This can be done in 
various ways, some examples of which we will outline here based on the four types of 
Guarantees. 
 
I. Technological Guarantees 
 
Technologies aimed at allowing individuals to get control over their data are growing 
exponentially682, as academics, engineers and businesses all innovate and develop new 
tools to allow control over information683.  
 
A Guarantee we have developed earlier in this thesis is removing parts of the data, in 
order to allow the data controller to obtain the Information they seek while minimising 
how much of that Information relates to individuals. Meanwhile, unlinkability (the ability 
to use various services without it being possible to link that usage to one natural 
person)684 and unobservability (the ability to use a resource without others being able to 
tell it is being used)685 are all techniques which can be used to limit the creation of 
Information.  
 
Meanwhile, embedding tools which follow the principles of the GDPR - especially the 
third principle of data minimisation686 and the fifth principle of data retention687 - both can 
help with this development. Various tools, both internal to software and hardware (the 
‘’privacy by design and by default’’ mandated by Article 25 of the Regulation688) can limit 
the creation of Information. Meanwhile, limiting Information to make sure that it cannot 
be shared even within the same organisation, using access controls, can have the same 
682 D'Acquisto, G., Domingo-Ferrer, J., Kikiras, P., Torra, V., de Montjoye, Y. A., & Bourka, A. 
(2015). Privacy by design in big data: an overview of privacy enhancing technologies in the era 
of big data analytics. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.06000. 
683 Wright, D., Gutwirth, S., Friedewald, M., Vildjiounaite, E., & Punie, Y. (Eds.). (2008). 
Safeguards in a world of ambient intelligence (Vol. 1). Springer Science & Business Media. 
684 Pfitzmann, A., & Hansen, M. (2010). A terminology for talking about privacy by data 
minimization: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and 
identity management. 
685 Ibid 
686 GDPR, Article 5 
687 GDPR, Article 5 
688 GDPR, Article 25 
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effect. There are many ways to do so - from physical locks to passwords and 
biometrics689. 
 
Some more complex tools can try to limit the use of data by using artificial intelligence 
tools. Detecting certain types of information and filtering them out, detecting possible 
links with existing data, adapting to local privacy standards690, or using language 
translations to check whether some cross-language Information could be created. 
Ironically, sometimes it is necessary to create Information in order to know how not to 
hold it. 
 
II. Social Guarantees 
 
Social Guarantees see their core power in how social pressure can affect companies. 
Earlier on in this thesis, we explored the new principle introduced in the GDPR, the 
principle of ‘’accountability’’. This idea of holding companies accountable to certain social 
norms is growing to a greater degree, through ideas like ‘’Corporate Social 
Responsibility’’691. This increasing pressure, from employees, partners, and consumers 
all692, ensures that efforts are made to fulfill those expectations. 
 
A move towards this is what has been described as the ‘’creepiness factor’’693 - beyond 
the legal obligations required for data protection, there are consequences to being seen 
as a corporation which does not pursue that goal. A simple example is becoming a target 
for data subject complaints for being seen as a problematic company. The GDPR’s 
Article 87 allows for an action for compensation for a breach of one’s rights, and class-
action lawsuits for breaches of privacy and data protection are developing in the 
European context694. 
 
Avoiding the collection and processing of data for unexpected or problematic purposes 
is not just a benefit to avoid getting fined or sued. Obtaining the trust of partners allows 
for business advantages. This can be done through standards such as the various ISO 
689 Sagiroglu (n.294) 
690 Wright et al. (n.683) 
691 Jones et al (n.205) 
692 McGlone (n.208) 
693 Leonard, P. (2013). Customer data analytics: privacy settings for ‘Big Data’business. 
International Data Privacy Law, 4(1), 53-68. 
694 Sapronov, W., & Srouji, J. (2017). Class Consciousness: Class Action Arbitration under US 
and EU Privacy Laws. YB on Int'l Arb., 5, 83. 
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standards based around data security (ISO 27001, ISO 22301, ISO 27005 and more)695 
in order to show accountability and demonstrate that the trust of partners is well-placed. 
 
Meanwhile, trust marks and seals are safeguards of increasing importance. They are 
guarantees provided for by independent entities to gain the trust of consumers696. Some 
of these efforts are driven by the industry, but some are pushed by consumer-protection 
agencies, with various initiatives by academics or associations developing these tools697. 
 
In greater scope, educating data subjects on what data processing can involve has an 
impact on what they find acceptable or not. From initiatives for technological literacy to 
poignant science-fiction making individuals aware of possible futures, there are many 
ways of increasing awareness, leading to data controllers having to be transparent and 
accountable. That is one of the reasons why part of the first principle of data processing 
in the GDPR is ‘’transparency’’698 - a legal tool aimed at reinforcing Social Guarantees. 
 
III. Market Guarantees 
 
While Social Guarantees have a strong impact on incentivising controllers, acting on their 
ability to obtain financial gains based on Information is also important. Data has been 
called ‘’the oil of the information age’’699. As such, any efforts to limit the value that 
Information has will have the effect of limiting incentives to obtain it. Consumer-led efforts 
to devalue data come about through various means, one of the most common ones being 
either removing themselves from data processing (such as using privacy-protective tools 
and software) or creating new, fake data which makes the Information resulting from it 
worthless. This ‘’noise’’ creation can be done in a number of ways, from fake Google 
searches to entirely fake profiles designed to fool databases700. 
 
Another way proposed by some theorists has been to change the paradigm altogether, 
by having individuals sell their data (and control that sale) directly. Many names have 
695 Tankard, C. (2016). What the GDPR means for businesses. Network Security, 2016(6), 5-8. 
696 Wright et al. (n.683) 
697 Hall, T. S. (2014). The Quantified Self Movement: Legal Challenges and Benefits of Personal 
Biometric Data Tracking. Akron Intell. Prop. J., 7, 27. 
698 GDPR, Article 5(1) 
699 Tene, O., & Polonetsky (n.8) 
700 Howe, D. C., & Nissenbaum, H. (2009). TrackMeNot: Resisting surveillance in web search. 
Lessons from the Identity trail: Anonymity, privacy, and identity in a networked society, 23, 417-
436. 
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been given to this idea, such as data vaults701 or data marketplaces702. The idea remains 
the same - when services have been provided at the customer’s expense so far, this 
would instead have individuals in charge of their own information, and able to sell it on 
to whoever they choose. Introducing this kind of tool may allow the value of data to be 
shared with data subjects as much as it is with data controllers.  
 
Market Guarantees are powerful because they are relatively simple to influence through 
legislation. An example is the GDPR’s heavy fines, up to 4% of the entity’s annual global 
turnover or 20 million euro, whichever is higher703. That is a huge cost for an organisation, 
and it is more economically viable to protect data subjects - as being profit-driven is the 
core of any business, Guarantees which speak directly to that core are most effective. In 
fact, most Social Guarantees are only effective because they affect Market Guarantees, 
such as standards that companies are worried about being seen observing, or pro-
consumer initiatives to avoid bad press or appease upset data subjects. 
 
IV. Legal Guarantees 
 
We have evoked the subject of Legal Guarantees in a few places, and the GDPR is 
nothing except the most extensive Legal Guarantee for informational privacy yet. The 
advantages of legal Guarantees can be seen all over this thesis, from companies 
changing their ways to avoid fines to enshrined standards verified by Data Protection 
Authorities and under their supervision704.  
 
A wide variety of such tools can be put into place to implement various Guarantees, from 
forcing data controllers to implement accountability measures (a core theme of the 
GDPR), which is a way to create Social Guarantees artificially. The GDPR mentions 
changing the entity’s ‘’culture’’ many times, and so works to change that culture by legal 
mandate. 
 
701 Shilton, K. (2009). Four billion little brothers?: Privacy, mobile phones, and ubiquitous data 
collection. Communications of the ACM, 52(11), 48-53. 
702 Moiso, C., & Minerva, R. (2012, October). Towards a user-centric personal data ecosystem 
the role of the bank of individuals' data. In Intelligence in Next Generation Networks (ICIN), 
2012 16th International Conference on (pp. 202-209). IEEE. 
703 GDPR, Article 83 
704 Grierson, J., PlayStation data hack: Sony fined £250,000 for 'preventable' breach, 24 
January 2013, accessed on 28/9/2017at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/playstation-data-hack-sony-fined-250000-
for-preventable-breach-8464651.html 
203 
 
                                               
Similarly, through fines and legal actions, through authorising transfers and codes of 
conduct, through setting norms and limitations, Market Guarantees are affected by the 
GDPR. Meanwhile, by creating the concepts of ‘’data protection by default’’ and ‘’data 
protection by design’’ enshrined in Article 27 of the GDPR705, the GDPR is clearing the 
way for a host of Technological Guarantees to be embedded in organisations. 
 
In fact, seeing how the GDPR is built, the use of every type of Guarantee is very 
apparent. But in fact, creating every tool possible to achieve the needed outcome is not 
a new concept - but rarely is it pushed to such an extent. The GDPR is built around 
Guarantees, using a vast array of them to accomplish its goals, and as we noted earlier 
in this thesis these Guarantees are mostly innovations of the GDPR not found in the Data 
Protection Directive. 
 
In short, European data protection law is in a transition period, between the past - a 
prescriptive, rights-based, personal-data-based approach -  and the 
Information/Guarantees Balance-based approach. This thesis outlines this change, and 
the road ahead to accomplish this change completely. This new approach, the 
‘’Informational/Guarantees Balance’’, is both a useful way forwards and one already 
being adopted by EU regulatory authorities, and recognising it would allow for a better 
way forwards to protect informational privacy. 
 
We argue that the transformation towards this approach will and should continue, which 
involves primarily continuing to move away from consent as well as the notion of 
“identifiability”, and continuing to move towards a conception of “risk” based on the types 
of processing and the capabilities of the data controller and not one based on “harm”. 
Taking into account all applicable Guarantees as well as the Information-creating 
capabilities of the particular controller allows for a conception which creates a burden 
proportional to the abilities of the controller instead of one where every controller has the 
same burden no matter what the actual risk involved. 
 
 
C. The Information/Guarantees Balance in Practice: 
Scenarios 
 
705 GDPR, Article 27 
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In order to complete the development of this approach which is developing in EU data 
protection law, we will go through three scenarios which will allow us better to highlight 
the advantages of such an approach. These cases will specifically be based on situations 
where the current tools to protect informational privacy have difficulty in doing so. 
However, the study will remain relatively high-level: matters such as cost-benefits 
analyses and the complexities of psychology or sociology will not receive extensive 
development. This is due to the fact that these case studies are primarily aimed at 
showing examples of the mindset involved in this approach. These case studies are: 
 
Scenario One: The Neighborhood Watch 
 
In this scenario, the data controller is a neighborhood watch in England. A new family 
has moved in for the first time in a decade, and members of the watch become convinced 
that learning as much as possible about these new members is vital to the 
neighborhood’s peace of mind. Using a wide array of tools available to them, the watch 
will attempt to learn as much as they can about their neighbor. This will highlight the 
issue of privacy in public and the role of Social Guarantees 
 
Scenario Two: The At-Home Carer Company  
 
Here the controller is a British company which delivers at-home care services to elderly 
and often disabled individuals. In the course of their activity, carers obtain a huge amount 
of sensitive information, easily used for a variety of profitable purposes. Nevertheless, a 
number of effective Guarantees ensure that the client's’ privacy is safeguarded. This will 
show how a company able to obtain a huge amount of very sensitive data may still be 
limited by powerful Guarantees. 
 
 
Scenario Three: The Multi-Billion Group Profiling Company 
 
This scenario involves a massive multi-billion dollar company, with access, through an 
aggregation of services and partner companies, to essentially all data gathered online 
as well as the financial means to create huge amounts of Information, in particular 
profiles in order to sell Information to a variety of corporations looking to target their 
products better. This will highlight the fact that even organisations with great Information-
creating powers can still be under very significant Guarantees, but also how to justify 
and implement Guarantees linked to group profiling. 
 
205 
 
Scenario Four: The Self-Driving Car Company 
 
Our final scenario will focus on the impact of new technologies on the existing legal 
framework. Self-driving cars are a growing technology which relies on obtaining a very 
large amount of data, collected in public spaces, analysed in a Big Data environment, in 
order to function. As we will see, this technology will prove to be a challenge to a binary-
test view of data protection. 
 
For each of these cases, we will go through the steps of the Information/Guarantees 
Balance. First, we will identify the even Balance, as well as the Guarantees that have 
changed since the last time that Balance was even. We will then identify where the 
imbalance lies, and what Guarantees can be put in place in order to ensure informational 
privacy. As we will see, the GDPR does provide, in the new approach we have shown it 
is heading towards, interesting new Guarantees which have a positive impact on the 
balance. However, we will also see how the challenges identified in this thesis impact 
these scenarios. 
 
Scenario One: The Neighborhood Watch 
 
What can one reasonably expect neighbors to know about oneself? Though that varies 
widely depending on context, in the UK there are signs pointing to the answer being ‘’not 
much’’706. Social norms do not encourage neighbours to know each other particularly 
well. Some bonds can be created by necessity (asking someone to take care of a pet or 
hold a key, for example) which creates a level of trust. This trust is in itself a Social 
Guarantee: that bond gives some assurance that the person can be trusted with one’s 
personal information (as well as belongings or pets). This means that there is a Social 
Guarantee in that trying to pry into one’s neighbor’s lives is not seen as normal or 
acceptable. 
 
Meanwhile, privacy and data protection laws have established Legal Guarantees in that 
context.  Privacy from neighbors has a long history in case law - most recently in the UK 
a case involving a dispute between neighbors showed where one’s right to process data 
for ‘’purely personal or household activities’’ was limited to monitoring non-public 
spaces707, specifically in the case of CCTV monitoring.  
706 A study by social network Nextdoor showed that 60% of UK residents do not know their 
neighbors well or at all (BBC News (2017), Britons ‘should know their neighbors’, accessed on 
4/10/2018 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40811530) 
707 Woolley & Woolley v Akbar or Akram [2017] SC EDIN 7 
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 As for Market Guarantees, the neighborhood will generally have limited financial means, 
which means only mass-market-available tools, skills and technologies are likely to be 
used, limiting the Information which may be gathered. 
 
It is possible for the watch to observe comings and going in the house, possibly even 
following around the residents. However, this would require a significant time and cost 
investment, one unlikely to be available to a neighborhood watch. As such, without the 
addition of new technologies and tools, the Balance is relatively even. There is no 
absolute certainty that informational privacy will be respected, but sufficient Guarantees 
to ensure the risk can be tolerated. 
 
There are a few Technological Guarantees which have seen a change in the last two 
decades, but the main one, especially in the UK, is the ease of availability of CCTV. Even 
though, as we have seen, CCTV capturing a neighbor’s property is a breach of data 
protection law, it seems like this Legal Guarantee has not been wholly effective as 
disputes related to this type of data collecting are common708. From accusations of 
paedophilia if a camera captures children playing to stalking when zoom lenses are used, 
a variety of privacy invasions are now a common risk due to the ease of obtaining of 
CCTV. This change in Technological Guarantees had a wide impact which Legal 
Guarantees have not seemed to address effectively: making these practices unlawful is 
ineffective unless enforcement of that ban is consistently applied, which does not seem 
to be the case in this context.  
 
As such, we have identified the main source of imbalance: easily-obtained CCTV without 
sufficient Guarantees to stem it. 
 
 
We saw that the core imbalance in the context of a neighborhood watch association was 
the presence of CCTV cameras in public, as well as the fact that existing Legal 
Guarantees on monitoring the premises surrounding one’s home have not stopped this 
phenomenon. As such, limiting the Information which can be obtained using that 
technology is the main way of reestablishing a Balance. 
 
708 Moss, E. (2014), Neighbourhood watch: how domestic CCTV is sweeping the UK, The 
Guardian, accessed on 4/10/2018 at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/neighbourhood-watch-domestic-cctv-
sweeping-uk 
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Legal Guarantees are already in place, but not entirely effective as shown by the fact 
that the problem persists despite their presence709. As such, there are two ways in which 
Legal Guarantees could be used: either the existing ones could be enforced more 
consistently, for example with systematic fines imposed on those who breach the GDPR 
by ‘’monitoring data subjects in the Union’’710 through home-based CCTV, or new laws 
and regulations could be put into place. This could include making home-based CCTV 
altogether unlawful, or requiring its installation to be made by an approved entity or 
professional who would be responsible for the CCTV not capturing anything beyond the 
premises of the individual’s property.  
 
Social Guarantees could be applied, such as by a public awareness campaign on the 
importance of privacy in the home711. Public awareness campaigns have a mixed result 
in a number of fields712 but have nevertheless seen many uses, from environmental 
issues such as recycling to wearing seatbelts.  
 
Market Guarantees could consist of making it less affordable to place such CCTV. This 
can be done through taxing CCTV equipment, for example. 
 
Finally, Technological Guarantees can also be applied. CCTV systems which can be 
easily set up to  block or blur part of the field of vision to make protecting informational 
privacy easier. Meanwhile, individuals can set up basic Technological Guarantees such 
as a higher fence or drawn curtains. 
 
Any of those measures, or a combination of them, could be effective in limiting the 
Information which can be obtained by the neighborhood watch association. 
 
Scenario Two: The At-Home Carer Company 
 
The carer industry is a growing market - as the population throughout the western world 
trends toward an older average age as well as more disabilities due to obesity713, more 
professional carers are needed than ever. The job of a carer involves obtaining data 
709 Ibid  
710 GDPR, Article 3 on the scope of the GDPR 
711 Wilson, D., & Sutton, A. (2004). Watched over or over-watched? Open street CCTV in 
Australia. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 37(2), 211-230. 
712 Fletcher, A., McCulloch, K., Baulk, S. D., & Dawson, D. (2005). Countermeasures to driver 
fatigue: a review of public awareness campaigns and legal approaches. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health, 29(5), 471-476. 
713 Wang, Y. C., McPherson, K., Marsh, T., Gortmaker, S. L., & Brown, M. (2011). Health and 
economic burden of the projected obesity trends in the USA and the UK. The Lancet, 
378(9793), 815-825. 
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about individuals which could not be more sensitive - medication, health, intimate private 
information about the patient’s daily life, but also information that is necessarily gleaned 
by spending a significant amount of time performing task for someone in their home, from 
family and friends to financial information. This puts the carer, as a data controller, in a 
position of possessing data about an individual which even Google could not be able to 
match. Without the right Guarantees, what is to stop that data from being used for 
wrongful purposes and breaching informational privacy? 
 
Social Guarantees tend to be weaker in a business-to-consumer context than in a 
personal one, though trust and reputation are an important part of any healthcare-related 
organisation, whether for-profit or not714. Meanwhile, codes of conduct and industry 
regulations are in place to protect the elderly715. As such, as far as the company itself is 
concerned, there are very strong Social and Market Guarantees (reputational damage 
and loss of trust) against breaching informational privacy. Additionally, the care sector is 
heavily regulated in and of itself, adding Legal Guarantees.  
 
Despite these Guarantees however, new challenges have appeared because of the rise 
of the Information Age. Information is now centralised by these organisations and 
accessible by a broader set of individuals than before, and new powerful tools are used 
to monitor patients. The main issue comes therefore from the confidentiality and 
accessibility of that information: carer companies have extremely sensitive data, and 
though they still have no real motivation for infringing their patient’s informational privacy 
anyone who would get their hands on that Information could. This shows us that in this 
context, restoring the Balance is primarily a question of information security and 
accessibility. 
 
In this case, the data possessed by the organisation is extensive. However, it is unlikely 
that powerful Information would be created in a way which would endanger the 
informational privacy of the data subjects, instead of being created for their continued 
well-being. A carer company is under very strong Legal and Social Guarantees, as well 
as having limited means which constitute Market and Technological Guarantees. Thus, 
the core danger to individuals’ informational privacy is that data is being obtained by 
entities or individuals that are not subject to these Guarantees. This means that both 
ensuring security, and regulating transfers of data to third parties, are the core way of 
protecting informational privacy in such a context. 
714 Shore, D. A. (2005). The trust prescription for healthcare: Building your reputation with 
consumers. Health Administration Press. 
715 Hughes, M. (2004). Privacy in aged care. Australasian Journal on Ageing, 23(3), 110-114. 
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 The GDPR already provides Legal Guarantees in this context, by requiring a level of 
security appropriate to the ‘’risk’’ to data subjects. As we saw earlier in this thesis, the 
notion of ‘’risk’’ is itself based on what Information can be obtained with that data. If the 
GDPR is effectively applied, Legal Guarantees should ensure the carer company will 
protect the data effectively. Other Legal Guarantees could be applied, such as 
prosecuting particularly severely employees who lose or steal patient data, or legally 
requiring certain measures to be taken to avoid data breaches.  
 
Social Guarantees are already present in the carer-patient relationship, but awareness 
campaigns and pressure from patients and their families could have a positive impact. 
 
Market Guarantees are also present - the GDPR prevents data from being used for 
purposes others from the ones for which it has been collected, including selling it for a 
profit716. Additionally, carer companies have generally limited means, and as such are 
unlikely to create very powerful Information. Beyond government-mandated measures, 
self-regulation by the industry can be developed, such as standards and codes of 
conduct aimed at obtaining and maintaining the trust of clients to protect the industry as 
a whole. This ‘’trust’’ element links back to Social Guarantees as well. 
 
Finally, Technological Guarantees can be put in place. The GDPR’s preventive 
approach, which imposes a fine on data controllers for not having the right security 
measures in place even where no data breach has taken place, pushes controllers to 
implement Technological Guarantees. Measures implemented to ensure carers do not 
lose data given to them by clients can include encryption or anonymisation, or simply 
moving from a paper format to data hosted in a digital format. 
 
Overall, this scenario shows that carer companies are already under very strong 
Guarantees, and thus may not need to be subjected to the rigorous standards of GDPR 
compliance that the data it collects may require. However, when it comes to security and 
accessibility of data, Guarantees need to be put into place. 
 
Scenario Three: The Multi-Billion Group Profiling Company 
 
 
716 GDPR, Article 5(1)(b) on the purpose limitation principle 
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The ability for companies such as Google or Microsoft to aggregate data through their 
various services is one of the core phenomena that characterises the ‘’Big Data’’ age. 
However, when data is aggregated and then turned into a group profile, that profile is not 
subjected to the GDPR - this is because the data is not ‘’identifiable’’, and thus is not 
personal data despite having an impact on data subjects (thus “relating to” individuals 
due to the “result” element of the processing). Though data protection as a Legal 
Guarantee is mostly not present, other rights do apply, particularly the right to non-
discrimination717. 
 
It was always possible, through research, to create group profiles. However, the profiles 
created by large data aggregators have much more data feeding into them than ever 
before, and tools allowing better Information, which requires appropriate Guarantees. 
 
Nevertheless, there are very few other Guarantees on these controllers. Social 
Guarantees are limited by the fact that most individuals are not aware of the 
phenomenon, or at least not informed in a significant way718. Meanwhile, the profit which 
can be generated from that type of activity is so high that there are few Market 
Guarantees holding such an organisation back. The only limit would seem to be the 
Technological Guarantees involved with how much data and Information can be 
obtained719. 
 
This lack of sufficient Guarantees despite the Information which can be created and its 
resulting impact on data subjects is one of the limitations of the “personal data”-focused 
approach we have identified earlier in this thesis. This has led to a variety of 
organisations such as Google relying on group profiling for a number of purposes, freely 
obtaining Information which may impact individuals but is not covered by the Legal 
Guarantee that is the GDPR.  
 
 
Large group profiling organisations see an imbalance primarily due to the fact that the 
Information they create is not within scope of the GDPR and can be processed without 
any of the Legal Guarantees regulating other types of processing being applicable. We 
have shown how group profiling still ‘’relates’’ to data subjects in the sense that the 
‘’purpose’’ element is fulfilled (the data is processed with the goal of influencing 
717 Schreurs et al (n.16) 
718 Ibid 
719 Taylor, L., Floridi, L., & Van der Sloot, B. (Eds.). (2016). Group privacy: New challenges of 
data technologies (Vol. 126). Springer. 
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individuals) and the “effect” element is achieved (the processing will impact individuals, 
what they see and how they are influenced). This shows a limitation of the “identifiability” 
focus of data protection law. Under an Information/Guarantees Balance approach, we 
can see that though the company only creates group profiles, these still constitute 
personal Information since they “relate” to data subjects. Group profiling is not inherently 
new (any shop owner will have identified patterns in their customer base) but its extent 
and sophistication of them have never been seen before. As such, what Guarantees can 
be put in place to restore the Balance? 
 
A Legal Guarantee would be to include Information which relates to data subjects within 
the scope of the GDPR, even if done through a group profile. Beyond that, however, 
regulation over the use of those group profiles, especially in areas connected to special 
categories of data, would limit the use of that Information. The GDPR already includes a 
right for individuals not to be subjected to “automated individual decision-making, 
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her.”720 which specifically forbids automated decisions based 
on special categories of personal data721. If that right can be applied to group profiling, 
then that would constitute a possible Legal Guarantee. 
 
Meanwhile, Social Guarantees such as pressure on an organisation to avoid unwanted 
impacts of data subjects have been seen, for instance, the public outcry following 
American company Target identifying a teen girl’s pregnancy before her parents did722.  
 
Market Guarantees are limited, since there are huge profits to be made from that kind of 
analytics. Efforts to add noise to the data, in order to weaken the value of the group 
profile, have been attempted by the development of a number of tools such as Helen 
Nissenbaum’s TrackMeNot tool723. This would potentially limit the incentives for the use 
of those profiles. 
 
Technological Guarantees against group profiling can take multiple forms. Ensuring that 
the decisions of these algorithms can be understood and explained would allow more 
control over them by individuals724, but the rise of machine learning is making it difficult 
for even the creators of those tools to understand their decisions: whether this 
720 GDPR, Article 22(1) 
721 GDPR, Article 22(4) 
722 Hill, K. (2012). How Target figured out a teen girl was pregnant before her father did. Forbes, 
Inc. 
723 Howe (n.700) 
724 Goodman (n.28) 
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explanation is even possible long-term is up for debate725. Beyond artificially making the 
profiles less effective through adding noise, stopping the creation of these group profiles 
is unlikely: the economic value involved, as well as the fact that the data is out there, 
available and easily-processed, means that the Guarantees against these profiles being 
created in the first place are very limited. 
 
In conclusion, this shows that the likely most effective area to focus on for the 
establishment of Guarantees is not the creation of those profiles, but the purpose of their 
use. 
 
 
Scenario Four: The Self-Driving Car Company 
 
The core of the challenge in this scenario is that in order for self-driving cars to be an 
effective technology, it requires a huge amount of data to be processed into useful 
Information. A large amount of the data collected by these cars relates to individuals, 
especially the cameras surrounding the car which are constantly monitoring the area 
surrounding the vehicle, including passersby or other cars726. 
 
The issue here comes from the limitations of the GDPR when it comes to that kind of 
data processing. Capturing someone on video may not always be “personal data” (since 
it is not always possible to “identify” the individual) but as the technology becomes better, 
video will inevitably become personal data as tools to identify individuals using that data 
improve. For example, according to Techrunch, Chinese authorities now have the ability 
to identify individuals using “smart specs” which could “identify individuals based on their 
body shape and the way they walk.”727  
 
Eventually, the Technological Guarantees against video data leading to personal 
Information will disappear and all self-driving cars will be, by default, collecting not only 
personal data but “biometric” data, defined in Article 4 of the GDPR as “personal data 
resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or 
725 Doshi-Velez, F., & Kim, B. (2017). Towards a rigorous science of interpretable machine 
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08608. 
726 Surden, H., & Williams, M. A. (2016). Technological opacity, predictability, and self-driving 
cars. Cardozo L. Rev., 38, 121. 
727 Russell, J. (2018), China can apparently now identify citizens based on the way they walk, 
Techcrunch, accessed at https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/07/china-can-apparently-now-identify-
citizens-based-on-the-way-they-walk/ on 09/11/2018 
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behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique 
identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data;”728.  
 
Even though the self-driving car  company may not have a particular interest in creating 
biometric data (being able to uniquely identify passerbys through facial or gait recognition 
is unlikely to be useful for the purposes of the self-driving car’s operation), anyone 
holding that data would have the ability to apply tools to do so. 
 
Nevertheless, collecting personal data without a privacy notice is in breach of the first 
principle of the GDPR.  Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR provides that personal data shall be 
“processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject 
('lawfulness, fairness and transparency');”. The “fairness” aspect of that principle consists 
of a privacy notice provided to the data subject, which cannot be done in the case of a 
self-driving car. The third principle, “data minimisation”, is also unlikely to be respected: 
the way these self-driving cars improve as a technology is by obtaining a huge amount 
of data, and then sifting through it to find useful Information. This is the exact opposite of 
the principle of ‘’data protection by default’’ prescribed under Article 25 of the GDPR729. 
 
As such, the GDPR makes it so that self-driving cars would not be compatible with the 
GDPR, putting a very strong Legal Guarantee against them, to offset the disappearing 
Technological Guarantees. 
 
On the other hand, there are very strong, existing Guarantees for self-driving cars - in 
particular, Market Guarantees. Self-driving car companies do not need much non-
anonymised data to develop their utility, and the means ‘’likely’’ to be used to identify 
individuals in a way which may breach informational privacy are quite limited. As such, 
despite the potential to create powerful Information, in practice that is unlikely to be the 
case. 
 
This leads to a situation where data protection may impact innovation and the 
development of new technologies. As we will see, though this does make for an even 
Balance, there may be ways of doing so which do not have the same negative outcomes. 
This is another goal of the Information/Guarantees Balance: protecting Informational 
privacy while attempting to limit the negative impact of implementing Guarantees on 
other societal goals. 
 
728 GDPR, Article 4 
729 GDPR, Article 25 
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The core challenge in the context of self-driving cars is attempting to reach an even 
Balance without downright outlawing the technology involved. In other words, attempting 
to put sufficient Guarantees in place, despite the fact that the technology involves a large-
scale gathering of public monitoring, while still allowing the technology to be used. 
 
The GDPR already punishes data being used for purposes beyond the ones for which it 
was collected (purpose limitation principle)730. If that is applied effectively, the data 
should not be used for any purposes beyond the safety and efficiency of the self-driving 
car. However, the “legitimate interests” legal basis and its wide application may involve 
the data being used for other purposes which may impact informational privacy. 
 
Social Guarantees could have a powerful impact, as we could see with Google Glass, a 
technology which also involved gathering data in public with cameras which could be on 
at all times. A powerful backlash resulted, in part because of the privacy implications of 
being monitored at all times (restaurants and other establishments banned Google Glass 
users from their establishments) leading to the product eventually being abandoned731. 
A similar backlash against the monitoring capabilities of self-driving car could have a 
similarly chilling effect. In this situation, a Social Guarantee would directly impact a 
Market Guarantee - the backlash making the technology less profitable. 
 
A Technological Guarantee would be applicable if the self-driving car company found a 
way to improve their product which did not require the processing of personal data. For 
example, LIDAR, another data-gathering tool used by self-driving cars, can track objects 
but is as of yet unable to identify individuals.732  
 
We have nevertheless seen throughout this thesis that attempting to stop the collection 
of data is unlikely to be successful in the long term. Instead, focusing on the later stages 
of processing may be more effective. As such, Legal Guarantees focusing on the later 
stages of processing are more likely to be effective, while both allowing the technology 
to be put into place and protecting informational privacy. This can be done by ensuring 
that the data is not used for any purpose beyond that for which it was collected, through 
strict access controls and personnel trained in confidentiality. Strict contractual 
obligations can be placed on any third parties that have access to any Information - even 
730 GDPR, Article 5(1)(b) 
731 Woodside, J. M. (2015, March). Wearable technology acceptance model: Google Glass. In 
Society for Information Technology & Teacher Education International Conference (pp. 1800-
1802). Association for the Advancement of Computing in Education (AACE). 
732 Bloom, C., Tan, J., Ramjohn, J., & Bauer, L. (2017, July). Self-driving cars and data 
collection: Privacy perceptions of networked autonomous vehicles. In Symposium on Usable 
Privacy and Security (SOUPS). 
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if it is made up of anonymised personal data. Organisations processing such data can 
be obligated to have stronger security (already established in the GDPR which bases the 
“security” principle on “risk”733) or to show additional evidence that the principles of the 
GDPR are being followed. 
 
In the same way, boycotts of the self-driving car company itself, but also of companies 
buying and using that kind of data beyond the purposes of safety can lead to that data 
not being worth selling - boycotts as a Market Guarantee have been successful in a 
number of areas734. Finally, Technological Guarantees which constitute stronger security 
and access control measures can also have an impact on the availability of that 
Information.  
 
Overall, once again we can see that focusing on the collection stage and attempting to 
filter what data is obtained by large organisations risk being both ineffective and 
hampering innovation (leading to inevitable non-compliances by opportunistic 
companies). What tends to be more effective is limiting the purposes for which that data 
is used, and the access to the Information produced by that organisation. 
 
 
In this Chapter, we have identified a way to assess where imbalances appear (mainly 
through finding where a new technological innovation has appeared and what 
Information it has allowed to be created). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
733 GDPR, Article 5(1)(f) 
734 Pruitt, S. W., & Friedman, M. (1986). Determining the effectiveness of consumer boycotts: A 
stock price analysis of their impact on corporate targets. Journal of Consumer policy, 9(4), 375-
387. 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis, two core, interlinked propositions have been made as to how to 
conceptualise the interests of informational privacy. The first, is that ‘’personal data’’, 
based around data and whether it is ‘’identifiable’’, and the ‘’public/private distinction’’, 
based around a typology of physical and virtual places, should move towards 
‘’Information’’ and whether it simply ‘’relates’’ to the individual. The second proposition is 
that, instead of focusing on rules-heavy regulation based on a binary approach, a 
Guarantees-based, contextual approach should be the goal, taking into account all of the 
factors permitting and restricting the ability to create Information. 
 
In order to summarize what was achieved in this thesis, I will go over the research 
questions laid out in the Introduction, and show how they were answered. 
 
The first question we asked was: ‘’what are ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’ and what 
interests are these rights trying to protect?’’ Throughout this thesis, the muddled 
definitions of ‘’privacy’’ and ‘’personal data’’ were outlined. Privacy is hard to pin down, 
and many attempts to define it have either failed or ended up with such a long list of 
interests that it started to overlap with a plethora of other rights. As such we made the 
argument that focusing on where it overlaps with data protection, and identifying that 
overlap as the scope of this thesis, was necessary, otherwise this approach would also 
fall to the same limitations of getting lost in those various interests. In particular, data 
protection is expanding into various areas, from discrimination to consumer welfare, and 
as such we defined that particular interest which needs to be protected as ‘’informational 
privacy’’ - where both rights overlap into one area. Importantly, this overlap is not 
accidental; we made the argument that most of the new threats to privacy, brought on by 
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the Information Age, are covered by data protection, leading to a natural overlap between 
the two: ‘’informational privacy’’. Privacy as a whole is not under particular new threats 
from the Big Data age, except where ‘’informational privacy’’ is. There may be other 
interests that are protected by ‘’informational privacy’’, but trying to ascertain them is 
going back into the impossibilities of defining privacy.  
 
As such, instead, we focus this thesis on a particular interest of data protection, which 
overlaps with a particular interest of privacy, without attempting to define why those 
interests are important. This is one of the innovations of creating data protection as a 
separate right - it allows a protection that is not dependant on defining exactly which 
interests need to be protected. The approach developed in this thesis supports that view, 
and bases ‘’informational privacy’’ on it. We also identified that the protection of 
informational privacy is far from new; in fact a pattern emerged: each time a new social 
or technological paradigm shift changed the way information was created and 
propagated, other forces stepped in the fill the gap. The fact that this is the natural pattern 
so far demonstrates that seeing this right as a balance of forces is the logical next step.  
 
The question continues - how are these rights attempting to protect ‘’informational 
privacy’’? To answer that, we explored the uniquely European right of data protection as 
a separate right, as well as the doctrine of ‘’reasonable expectations of privacy’’ in 
European law. These innovations came from the need to deal with new problems without 
trying to tie them to old solutions. By way of contrast, the American approach was shown, 
which created four torts over a century ago, and has not been able fully to move past 
them since. Meanwhile, the EU created the right to data protection, which has seen some 
amount of success. Our analysis identified a pattern - almost all of the innovations that 
the General Data Protection Regulation brought to the data protection apparatus act on 
forces beyond purely legal ones. This lays the groundwork for the findings we make later 
on in the thesis, and shows that as Big Data transforms our world, traditional conceptions 
of how to protect informational privacy have to be left behind, and a system addressing 
the fundamental forces behind the creation and dissemination of Information is 
necessary.  
 
Together, this allowed for the setting up of the core of this thesis: there is both a need 
for a system which acknowledges all the different forces that may impact Information, 
and an actual implementation of some elements of that system in the GDPR. Data 
protection is already headed towards that approach, without having identified it (but 
certainly being influenced by the approaches which have influenced this thesis, such as 
Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity). 
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 The next question was related to Big Data. How does it challenge the existing framework 
protecting informational privacy? Why is ‘’Big Data” such an important transformation? 
To study this, we studied the particular implications of Big Data, and the way it has 
transformed how we understand data and information. Though this is the latest in a series 
of transformations that have changed the balance of information creation and control, it 
is a very powerful transformation, which is changing some fundamental ways in which 
Information is created and disseminated. We argue that this transformation is one that 
requires such a massive overhaul of regulation that it has highlighted how much 
informational privacy is based around the balance of forces. However, we also argue 
that this is just one more change in the paradigm, like the advent of instant photography 
or tabloids. The biggest change in history, but the same phenomenon nonetheless.  
  
With this in mind, the next step was understanding what is separating EU data protection 
from achieving this new approach. The core of this is ‘’identifiability’’: the fact that data is 
only ‘’personal’’ if it can identify a particular individual. This is increasingly ineffective, 
and we showed how two core pillars of the GDPR - consent and anonymisation - are 
undermined by this concept. Meanwhile, privacy law (and, by extension, informational 
privacy) depends on the idea of ‘’private’’ and ‘’public’’ places, which we showed should 
be replaced with a ‘’transparency/opacity’’ distinction, which takes into account new ways 
for Information to be created and disseminated. This links back, once again, to the 
Guarantees-based system developed in this thesis, and how it encompasses the whole 
of informational privacy - solving problems in how both data protection and privacy law 
have dealt with the issue. 
 
This having been set up, we develop the alternative to ‘’personal data’’: ‘’Information’’. 
Can it answer the limitations of ‘’personal data’’? How can it be linked back to 
informational privacy in the way data personal data does? How can Information be 
regulated without the binary approach taken by the GDPR? 
 
We showed the limitations of binary approaches, whether it is personal/non-personal, or 
private/public. This alternative focuses, not on the data and the context in which it was 
obtained, but on the knowledge and insights that are created using that data:  
‘’Information’’. The focus on ‘’Information’’, as we have shown, allows us to avoid the 
difficulties of ‘’personal data’’, chief amongst them the fact that, depending on a number 
of factors, the same data can lead to incredibly different Information. This is because the 
addition of human intelligence, biases, and perspectives to the raw data creates 
something altogether new and with new implications, and recognizing this is vital. The 
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GDPR attempts to address this through the ‘’purpose limitation’’ principle, attempting 
forcefully to stop data controllers from using the unexpected insights they may obtain. 
However, without acknowledging that those insights are something wholly new, there is 
a disconnect between the original data, and the final Information. 
 
As we have shown, the idea of focusing not on the data itself but on the Information is 
not entirely new, and more and more evidence suggests, in the GDPR and elsewhere, 
that moving towards a model which takes it into account is the way forward. Despite the 
fact that ‘’Information’’ as a separate concept does not exist in current data protection or 
privacy law, it is implicitly recognized in the GDPR.  
 
We then showed how this Information can be linked back to the interests of individuals, 
through the ‘’relating to’’ test already present when defining what is ‘’personal data’’. We 
argue that though the ‘’identifiability’’ element of that definition should be left behind, the 
‘’related to’’ aspect, which is slowly increasing in scope (including any decision which 
either is intended to affect an individual, or results in them being affected) is enough to 
link the Information to the individuals who need to be protected - resulting in ‘’personal 
Information’’. 
 
Answering this leads to the final part that remains to be answered: how to regulate that 
Information. 
 
A core assertion of this thesis is that a balance of Guarantees both is replacing, and 
should replace, the current all-or-nothing approach. Before asserting this, however, we 
studied some core approaches that were used as alternatives. The two main ones 
considered - both of which heavily influencing this thesis - are Helen Nissenbaum’s 
‘’contextual integrity’’ and the ‘’harms-based approach’’. The first one revolutionized 
conceptions of privacy by focusing on flows of information; however this thesis attempts 
to place the focus on the Information itself instead of flows. This is primarily due to the 
‘’Sculptor’s Work’’ identified when studying Information: data can be aggregated, 
processed, transformed, minimized, pseudonymized so much throughout its life that it 
may be something entirely different at the end of the flow compared to the beginning, 
and identifying what may be ‘’appropriate’’ can be difficult. Moving away from contextual 
flows presents a challenge - because the Balance must have an objective grounding 
(unlike Nissenbaum’s flows which can change over time); there must be a way to assess 
the ‘’default’’ stage of the Balance. We have made the argument as to how to establish 
that, based on historical developments of privacy, but also based on the hypothesis 
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argued above that the Information Age is only another in a list of paradigm shifts, and 
that the human need for a private space has not changed. 
 
These Guarantees, be they Legal, Technological, Market or Social, all have an important, 
oft-underestimated part to play in the creation and dissemination of Information, and 
ignoring it leads to the blind spots we have identified throughout this thesis. As such, we 
showed that the balance of Guarantees is the way to ensure the future of informational 
privacy. 
 
Besides all the arguments made in my thesis as to the value and pertinence of this 
argument, the most important one is thus: all of the most significant innovations of the 
GDPR appear to be headed towards this approach. From the ‘’accountability’’ principle 
implementing Social Guarantees as an integral part of the Regulation to the ‘’relating to’’ 
aspect of personal data including ‘’purpose’’ and ‘’result’’ elements as part of what can 
make that data personal, EU privacy and data protection law is now stuck between the 
old and the new, and its pillars - especially the prescriptive, non-contextual approach, 
the ‘’identifiability’’ criteria, and the ‘’public/private’’ distinction - are preventing that 
approach from going further. As Big Data continues its transformation of society, 
acknowledging that approach and implementing it will be vital for the protection of 
individuals. 
 
Through the journey of making its argument, this thesis has also done more than propose 
a new way of thinking about informational privacy. It has also reviewed the landscape of 
approaches that have been proposed, and shown their benefits but also their flaws. 
There have been many different conceptions, some harms-based, some rights-based, 
some interests-based735. As we have shown, every approach has its limits, namely that 
harms-based conceptions tend to have difficulty narrowing down what a ‘’harm’’ is, while 
rights-based and interests-based conceptions tend to become quickly outdated and 
unable to deal with new technological developments. The Information/Guarantees 
Balance avoids these limitations - by limiting itself in scope to ‘’informational privacy’’ and 
by looking at imbalances instead of harms - but comes with its own challenges, such as 
setting a default scale for the Balance and its limited scope. The argument has been 
made in this thesis that these challenges are solvable. Because European data 
735 Gellert, R. (2016). We Have Always Managed Risks in Data Protection Law: Understanding 
the Similarities and Differences Between the Rights-Based and the Risk-Based Approaches to 
Data Protection. Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev., 2, 481 
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protection regulation is heading towards this approach on its own, that time is fast 
approaching. 
 
This leads to the conclusion of the primary research question: ‘’Is the EU protection of 
personal information shifting from an ‘’identifiability’’-focused framework to one based on 
a balance of Guarantees on those holding the means to create personal Information, and 
is that framework able to address the limitations of other conceptions as well as the 
challenges brought on by the age of Big Data?’’ 
 
The Information/Guarantees Balance builds on the work done both in the creation of the 
GDPR, as well as an array of theorists and policy-makers, to create a framework that is 
technology-neutral, applicable to the European conceptions on privacy and data 
protection, that protects the informational privacy of individuals without the limitations of 
European conceptions of privacy and data protection. It sets aside increasingly-
meaningless distinctions like ‘’personal’’/’’non-personal data’’ and ‘’public’’/’private’’, 
instead going towards a wider understanding of Information and how to control how that 
Information is created, shared, and used. 
 
This thesis only establishes this conception in a limited scope. ‘’Informational privacy’’ is 
but the small overlap of privacy and data protection, and there is a wide host of interests 
in both these rights that we have not had the opportunity to explore. Consumer welfare, 
for example, is an increasing question in data protection, for example with the creation 
of the right to data portability736 which is ostensibly aimed at that interest and not 
privacy737. Other rights are being proposed to fulfil various interests, from the right to 
explanation738 (to understand increasingly-machine-driven decisions), to the right to be 
de-referenced from search engines739 (introduced with the Google Spain case740 in 
2014), to the right to informational self-determination741 (a fundamental German right that 
offers a very unique approach to privacy as a social good for the promotion of 
democracy). As privacy and data protection discover new dimensions, the 
Information/Guarantees Balance may have value in protecting those as well. 
 
736 GDPR, Article 20 
737 Swire, P., & Lagos, Y. (2012). Why the right to data portability likely reduces consumer 
welfare: antitrust and privacy critique. Md. L. Rev., 72, 335. 
738 Goodman (n.28) 
739 Voss, W. (2016). After google Spain and Charlie Hebdo: the continuing evolution of 
European Union Data Privacy Law in a time of change. 
740 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), 
2014 E.C.R. 317 
741 Hornung (n.146) 
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